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Statement of International Journal of Business Anthropology

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Social Welfare for Marginal Ethnic Groups: Chinese NGOs in Southwest China

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This paper discusses the origin and operations of a dozen indigenous Chinese NGOs working to promote social welfare of the marginalized ethnic groups in southwest China’s hilly regions bordering Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan provinces. Even though they have different specific goals—including poverty reduction, post-disaster reconstruction, community development, environmental conservation, cultural preservation, and so on—these NGOs exhibit several shared characteristics. They were all initiated by community elites with broad based information networks and connections. Most of them also received initial inputs in the forms of funding, operation space, technical training, and advisory supervision from international NGOs. Findings in this study confirm the argument that in spite of the unique governance systems in China, Chinese NGOs in the Mainland are more akin to global NGOs owing to their shared charitable and altruistic concerns. Data from this report is based on the author’s fieldwork in that region over the past decade (circa 2008-2017).

PROLOGUE

Will the retrenchment of the Party-State control in China give rise to a genuine civil society? How will grassroots democracy gain its foothold in this post-socialist society? As the state-society balance tips toward the latter, will we see the revival or formation of non-government organizations (NGOs) to fill in the void for humanitarian assistance to meet long- or short-term needs? Are these newly formed NGOs duplications of their pre-modern predecessors or imitations of modern Western counterparts? What roles have NGOs played in facilitating China’s post-socialist democratic transition? How will China’s transformation conform to (or diverge from) civil society building process based on Euro-American experiences? This paper addresses these issues and sorts out some of the controversies raised by researchers in recent years.

Recent research in China indicates the mushrooming of NGOs in China, and the increasingly significant social roles they play in dealing with practical problems since 1980s. External researchers, in the meantime, have raised questions about the compatibility between what they observed and theories related to civil society building. Some questioned whether these newly developed NGOs in China might be called as such due to their official involvements. Others argued that Habermas’ civil society theory is too narrowly confined to European experiences, and must be expanded in order to accommodate to non-European societies such as China. These conceptual problems need to be resolved before we gain any insight about China’s current development.
This paper argues that the current incremental reform in China has entailed a gradualist political liberalization process. Party-State rhetoric aside, the expanding civil liberty has given rise to a new sense of citizenship. With the burgeoning middle class in the mainland, and their incorporation into the Communist Party, we can anticipate further growth of civil society building in China. Furthermore, with China’s continuous expansion in global affairs, it will have to abide by the accepted international rules regarding basic human rights and civil society practices. In a nutshell, the communist government will have to accept, even though reluctantly, the rise of NGOs as a supplement of the governing arms of modern civil society.

NGOs, Social Welfare and the Building of Civil Society in Post-Socialist China

China in the post-1978 reform decades has gone through a steady and broad-based societal transformation, appropriately called “the Second Revolution” by Harry Harding, as opposed to the 1949 revolution, which primarily liberated the allegedly oppressed rural peasantry and urban industrial proletarians (Harding, 1987). Under the current reform agenda, the abolishment of the three-tiered rural communal organizations in 1980s and the disengagement of the Party-State bureaucracy from urban industrial and commercial enterprises in 1990s, have gradually nudged the society towards the establishment (or re-establishment) of a more “rational bureaucracy” (in the Weberian sense of the term) and an open and competitive market economy (Huang, 1994, 1998). The retrenchment of the Party-State control over people’s day-to-day lives, and the ensuing increases in personal liberty, have galvanized Chinese citizens’ vitality and creativity to produce sustained economic growth in recent decades (Bian, 2000; Howell, 1998).

As this neoclassical, laissez-faire socio-economic policy has gradually taken hold in China, the Party-State, with its curtailed power and resources, has encountered increasing difficulties to meet short- and long-term humanitarian needs at the grassroots level, especially after natural calamities or human made disasters. The comprehensive social safety net established during the Maoist collective era, appropriately called “Communist Neo-Traditionalism” (Walder, 1986), that was built with the ‘iron-bowl’ job security under a command economy, had been discarded, along with its protective garment (Chow, 2000; Whiting, 1991; See also Wong and Flynn, 2001). Under these conditions, Chinese authorities are increasingly paying attention to the formation and operation of civilian self-help organizations, popularly called as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the West, as a measure to assist the government in shouldering these new demands (Bian, 2000; Estes, 1998; Howell, 1994, 1995, 1998; Whiting, 1991).

Will the retrenchment of the Party-State control provide the power vacuum that enables the citizens’ grassroots mobilization and hence the building of a genuine civil society? How will grassroots democracy gain its foothold in this post-socialist society? When conditions compel citizens to take direct actions to defend their personal rights, will they appeal to traditional (pre-modern) type of NGOs, or will they imitate their counterparts in the West? Will the formation of these self-helped NGOs facilitate attaining democratization in post-socialist China? To what extent has China’s civil society building process conform to (or diverge from) that of other societies? These questions have attracted tremendous scholarly attention not only because they point to China’s possible future development directions, but, they also raise issues regarding the theories related to civil society building and post-socialist social transformation (Estes, 1998; Whiting, 1991; Weller, 1998).

To some extent the problem seems to lay with the traditional Chinese social fabric that emphasizes interpersonal networks that often circumvent the supposedly impersonal and impartial rule of laws or market mechanisms, euphemistically called “social capital” by some (Chow, 2000; Keane, 2001; Redding, 1998; Smart, 1998). We may wonder whether it will require the development of a new citizenship concept along with its new ethical commitments before ordinary Chinese consider taking part in such impersonal NGOs for common public goals.

The other half of the problem, however, seems to have been derived from questions of Habermas’s conceptualization of civil society building—a process largely based on European experiences where the church had played active social roles independent of the state-society dichotomy. Such tripartite social division was not significant in Chinese history and society (Whiting, 1991). Furthermore, the state-society
relationships in Chinese cultural context may not be seen as oppositions, but rather as one embedded in
the other: the state is an indispensable part of the society and is expected to provide protection, guidance
and order to it (Chow, 2000; Hann and Dunn, 1996; Keane, 2001; Win, 1998).

To understand the complexity of these issues, I begin with a discussion of the changing history and
social significance of NGOs in the West. This will be followed by an analysis of the history of indigenous
NGOs in pre-modern China, and their current development under the reform and open policy. The next
section points out some practical and conceptual controversies revolving around contemporary China’s
NGO growth. Some of these problems derived from pragmatic difficulties of promoting grassroots
democracy in a nominally socialist society; others came from conceptual difficulties when transposing a
European-based theory to China. The next section analyses a dozen NGOs I interviewed in Southwest
China’s hilly regions of Yunnan, Sichuan, and Guizhou from 2009 to 2015. Even though having different
specific goals—including poverty reduction, post-disaster management, community development,
environmental conservation, cultural preservation, and so on—these NGOs exhibit several shared
characteristics. They were all initiated by community elites with broad based information networks and
connections. Most of them also received initial inputs in the forms of funding, operation space, technical
training, and advisory supervision from international NGOs. Findings of this study confirm the argument
that in spite of the unique governance systems in China, Chinese NGOs in the Mainland are more akin to
global NGOs owing to their shared charitable and altruistic concerns. It is precisely because of this type
of international connections that the government has taken a jaundiced view about the growth and
development of these grassroots organizations as foreign agents.

The Development of NGOs in the West

In Western social history, the development of NGOs is virtually synonymous with the development
of civil society and democracy: the establishment of social groups or organizations by individual citizens
based on shared needs and concerns outside the official nation-state domains. These voluntary, non-profit
organizations serve a broad array of societal needs. In the United States, for instance, “Some 5% of
the...Gross National Product is derived from this non-profit sector!” (Fox, 1987). More specifically,
“Most organizations existing before World War II were rooted in the Christian tradition and structure, and
were largely an outgrowth of missionary activities,” such as the Salvation Army, Catholic Relief Services,
and World Church Council (Fox, 1987). It is only after World War II that we find increasingly large
number of secular (non-church related) NGOs formed that provide relief assistance in developing
countries, although religious NGOs still play a dominant role in such efforts.

In 1960s and 1970s, many western NGOs also began to devise development assistance in developing
countries in order to eradicate the root causes of poverty and the shameful vestige of colonialism. By
virtue of their grassroots nature, such groupings or organizations often provided timely assistance to
needy citizens with more ‘efficiency and efficacy’ (Frantz 1987) than the state apparatus, thus
strengthening people’s sense of autonomy and independence, and the building of civil society (Drabek,
1987). Such successes have increasingly attracted financial sponsorship and contributions from the
private sectors as well as governments in recent decades.

The rapid global expansion of NGOs in terms of the number and size can be seen in a recent tally that
“The NGO universe includes well over 15,000 recognizable NGOs that operate in three or more countries
and draw their finances from sources in more than one country” (Gordenker & Weiss, 1996). Another
comprehensive survey of the non-profit sector in 22 countries in North American, South American,
Europe, Asia, and the Middle East indicates that it represents a $1.1 trillion industry and employs close to
19 million full-time equivalent paid workers (Salamon, et al, 1999).

In Western history, the rise of such voluntary, citizens groups is considered as an indispensable part
of the rise of democracy and civil society - the weakening of the autocratic, monarchical state.
Furthermore, Jurgen Habermas’s (1989) insightful discussion of the rise of the ‘public sphere’ in
European history as an indicator of the rise of civil society has generated increased interest in the study of
grassroots organizations beyond the official state machinery (e.g., Rankin, 1993; Wakeman, 1993). It can
be regarded as a democratic forum in which citizens not only congregate to pursue common goals but also voice opinions to influence official policy-making.

NGOs’ rising power and structural network across nation-state boundaries in the post-Cold War era have prompted many scholars to ponder over the new roles they may play under the current abysmal conditions of the “crisis of state” (Salamon, et al, 1999). The strengthening of grassroots civil society organizations directly challenges state bureaucracies, and certainly implies the weakening of traditional nation-states in international politics (Ong, 1999; Sassen, 1996). The critical relief assistance by NGOs in areas devastated by ethnic conflicts or civil wars prompted many international developers to urge the NGOs serving the new roles as mediators or intermediaries in ‘conflict management’ (Aall, 1996; Fox, 1987). Furthermore, the weakening of the traditional nation-state by transnational NGOs implies the emergence and formation of a ‘global civil society’ (Hirst & Thompson, 1999), which is ushering into a new ‘global governance’ (Weiss & Gordenker, 1996) or “global associational revolution” era (Salamon, et al, 1999).

NGOs in Chinese Cultural Context

Researchers of Chinese history generally agree that with a weak and small imperial bureaucracy, pre-modern Chinese society enjoyed high levels of local autonomy (Hsiao, 1960). To meet societal needs, local elite engaged in “sponsorship or establishment of institutions for welfare, education, religious purposes, social betterment, or defense (tang, yuan, temples, schools, militia, etc)” (Rankin, 1993). For instance, poor peasants in Southeast China’s coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian provinces turned to kinship organizations, called ‘patrilineal lineages’ with corporate trust funds, for financial assistance in funerals, famine relief, and even education advancement for the gifted and talented (Friedman, 1958, 1966; see also Lam and Perry, 2000). Merchants and craftsmen formed guilds and regional associations to assist each other as they traveled to distant cities—the predecessor of the Chambers of Commerce in modern time (Chen, 2001; Golas, 1977; Ho, 1966; Rowe, 1993). Even though some scholars questioned whether such locally oriented activities really fit Western concepts of ‘civil society’ (Wakeman, 1993), they are nevertheless genuine indigenous non-governmental organizations.

The three decades following the establishment of the People Republic of China in 1949 had seen rapid expansion of the Party-State power and controlling apparatus through collectivization. Since almost all social welfare needs were fulfilled by the hierarchically structured collectives or work units, virtually all traditional NGOs disappeared from official existence and actual operation, except for few satellite organizations controlled by the Party-State as an extension of its arms to mobilize the masses, such as All China Federation of Women, Chinese Association of Science and Technology, Chinese Writers’ Association, and All China Federation of Trade Unions (Whiting, 1991). It was not until the early 1980s when collectivization was formally abandoned that we find the return of selected NGOs, such as the China Children and Teenagers’ Fund, established in 1981, that provides social support, educational assistance and health services to poor children and their families (Estes, 1998; Howell, 1995a; Whiting, 1991).

With the liberalization policy deepened throughout the decade of 1980s, there was witnessed the explosive proliferation of NGOs in the form of professional associations (Howell, 1995a; Chow, 2000), philanthropic organizations and foundations (Estes, 1998; Whiting, 1991), as well as special interest organizations (Howell, 1995b). It is estimated that “by October 1993 there were reportedly over 181,000 such organizations registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (Howell, 1995a). Following the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008, the number of civilian organizations exploded to 431,000, including 238,700 mass organizations (shehui tuanti 社会团体), 190,400 civilian organizations (minban feiqiye danwei 半官半民团体), and 1,843 foundations (Outlook Weekly, September 12, 2010).

Researchers generally follow the nomenclature systems used by the Chinese government to breakdown these newly formed NGOs into three broad categories: mass organizations (shehui tuanti 社会团体), semi-official organizations (banguan bamin tuanti 半官半民团体) and popular organizations
A brief discussion of these different categories is needed to understand the complexity of the issues.

Mass organizations include all satellite organizations established early by the Party-State as outreach arms to mobilize the masses, such as the Women’s Federation, the Chinese Writers’ Associations, All-China Federation of Trade Unions, as well as foundations and professional associations established in 1980s. These organizations were primarily funded by the Party-State, and their officials were transferred from state bureaucracies. Most of these organizations have government assigned office space and some even have regular publications to promote their works. While Party-State insisted that these organizations are not part of the state bureaucracy, and some of these organizations have been trying hard in recent years to project the images that underscore their autonomy, external researchers have been debating whether they should be considered as real NGOs (Howell, 1995a; Whiting, 1991).

Semi-official organizations include professional associations established in various regions or cities with formal encouragement, or direct involvement, or initial funding from the Party-State. These voluntary associations do have other revenue sources, such as membership dues, and some elected officials along with Party-State appointed representatives. They include organizations such as Association of Individual Laborers, Association for Factory Directors and Company Managers, and so on. The practical necessity of forming these professional organizations certainly reflects the rapid pace of privatizing productive enterprises in China in the reform decades. As remarked by Chow in the following statement, “By 1997, there were 54,418,500 individual laborers, running 28,508,600 family-owned small business units (most of them were food stands, repair shops, and small restaurants)” (Chow, 2000). Similarly, the proliferation of private commercial enterprises such as chemical fertilizer retailers or landscape plants retailers, also entail the establishment of new traders’ organizations. To encourage their establishment, the Party-State may provide startup funds as well as office facilities. Retired cadres may be assigned to assist their initial organization drives. Once established, however, these organizations may gradually shed their official connections through raising their own membership fees and relocating to their own office space (Chow, 2000).

The last type of NGOs includes those popular organizations established through private initiatives without Party-State involvements. These include various hobby-oriented organizations, such as those involved folk dances, calligraphy, meditation (e.g., qigong) and so on (Howell, 1995a). To gain official approval, these organizations must get registered with local authorities. These organizations would probably be considered as genuine NGOs by Western standard because of their financial and political independence. However, because of their narrowly defined goals and amorphous structures, they tend to be short-lived with limited influences.

Among the above three types of NGOs, the first one has the best formal organization, nationwide network, official connections, and source of funding, but the least autonomy. Researchers will be reluctant to accept them as true NGOs. My preliminary research in southwest China indicates it was these state sponsored organizations that had been actively taken the lead in championing citizens’ causes and rights. For instance, it was the Women’s League that had been promoting women’s awareness against domestic violence, or the Association for Professional Biologists who had been advocating environmental conservation and anti-pollution issues through newspaper editorials and grassroots rallies.

The second type, the semi-official organizations, tends to be closer to the “true” NGOs as we see them in the West, with higher degrees of political and financial autonomy. These organizations, however, due to its localized nature, have less social impact than the first type. The last type, while resembling authentic NGOs in the West, is probably the least significant in grassroots mobilization and civil society building. The issues will be further explored in the next section.

Practical and Conceptual Problems of NGOs in China

To envisage genuinely successful development of NGOs in China, several problems must be addressed. There are two sources of such problems. The first set of problems is more pragmatic and seems to be revolving around the nature of the Chinese Party-State, and its fundamental animosity towards any efforts aimed at promoting grassroots democracy. The second set of problems revolves
around conceptual issues or theories related to civil society building. As the whole notion of civil society was originated from Europe’s historical trajectory, its applicability in China might be questioned. I will discuss these two sets of problems separately.

The first set of the pragmatic problems revolves around the intrinsic and seemingly inevitable contradictions between the authoritarian Party-State and the promotion of the civil society. Based on heuristic foresight, we can almost predict the following three controversial issues in China as the NGO movements gain momentum at the expenses of the Party-State. The first is the NGOs’ religious affiliations. How can the Party-State reconcile the fact that relief assistance provided by religious organizations have played increasingly important roles in China when the official Marxist doctrine is against religion? This issue could have involved both domestic and external NGOs. The second issue hinges on NGO leadership and organization structure. How can the Party-State reconcile the rise of charismas leaders in newly formed NGOs who can successfully mobilize the masses for particular goals outside of the established Party-State structure? The third one, also closely parallel to the previous one, is NGOs’ transnational nature and their entanglement with issues related to state sovereignty. How can the Party-State reconcile the issue of having international organizations providing relief assistance to domestic needy without fearing the curtailing of its monopoly of power?

The most pressing problem for NGOs in China is their religious affiliations. As indicated above, most Western NGOs are rooted in Christian traditions. Even today, church organizations such as World Church Council, CARE and Oxfam are active players in international relief assistance. Similarly, in Taiwan, it is the lay Buddhist organizations, such as Ciji Compassionate Association, who have taken active roles in providing philanthropic assistance in China after major disasters (Chang, 1996; Huang & Weller, 1998; Ting, 1997). Given the Chinese official stance of anti-religiosity, how would the authorities respond when accepting assistance from NGOs with religious affiliations? Will permission be granted when such organizations seek to establish a long-term presence in China in the form of offices, communication networks, and warehouses? The fine line between relief work and proselytism can sometimes be extremely thin with the long-term presence of these religious NGOs. A related issue is: how would the government treat indigenous religious NGOs as opposed to foreign ones? Unless this issue is handled properly, perhaps through modification of existing laws that grant full legal status to religious organizations, there will potentially be causes of conflicts.

The second problem that needs to be addressed is NGO leadership and organization, especially indigenous ones. NGOs are often formed by individuals who share similar concerns and interests, and who are willing to work together in order to achieve common goals. These individual initiatives often provide fertile ground for the rise of charismatic leaders. By virtue of their personal persuasions, appeals, and convictions, these grass-root leaders successfully attract followers, command devotion and commitment, and mobilize volunteers and valuable resources to accomplish common goals. These goal-specific organizations often exhibit high levels of discipline and efficiency among the members and volunteers. Will the existence of such well-structured organizations be interpreted as frontal challenges to state authorities? Will NGOs’ organizational efficiency and successful membership recruitment be considered as surreptitious effort to undermine official Party-State power? What kind of communication should the NGOs and state apparatus establish that would neither undercut state authorities nor jeopardize NGOs’ autonomy and independence?

Thirdly, we should consider the transnational nature of many global NGOs and their roles in China. Various international NGOs have been actively involved in promoting specific goals, such as Carter Center’s and International Republic Institute’s involvements in China’s grassroots democracy through village elections (Shelley, 2000), and Ford Foundation’s poverty alleviation programs in southwest China that advocate greater local control of national forest (Saich, 2000). Given China’s sensitivity towards international interventions in her domestic affairs (Howell, 1995a), it is difficult to know initially where and how to draw the line between providing international assistance in grassroots development or disaster relief on the one hand, and interfering in domestic affairs on the other hand. Some kind of mutually agreeable protocols and guidelines should be worked out between major international NGOs and Chinese authorities in order to avoid potential confusion and conflict. We believe that only through open and frank
discussions can all sides reach a workable forum in which joint efforts can be made to foster the development of democratic institutions in China through the growth of NGOs.

The second set of the problems are conceptual ones in nature and derived from the theoretical implications of civil society building as defined by Habermas. Are these predominantly government sponsored NGOs in mainland China the true instruments of civil liberty? How should we consider them in light of democratic mobilization? And, lastly, whether the civil society building process in the West, along with its democratization process, can be predicted by this model and be duplicated in China? I will elaborate these issues below.

Most researchers who conducted empirical researches in China argued against dismissing these government sponsored NGOs as less than genuine. Howell argued that “The term civil society fails to capture the diversity of organizations that have emerged in China since reform” (Howell, 1995b). In the same vein, Whiting pointed out that “Chinese NGOs may be characterized as existing in a transitional stage between complete dependence on the government and some degree of autonomy from it” (Whiting, 1991; Howell, 1995b). Furthermore, Howell suggested that “Foreign NGOs should not necessarily deplore the prospect of working closely with the Party/State or with some semi-official social organizations” (Howell, 1995a), because of the all permeating power of the Party-State. In light of these ambiguous conditions under which the NGOs developed in China, Estes coined the term GONGOs (i.e., government organized non-government organizations) for China (Estes, 1998).

If the NGOs in China’s reform era are not identical to NGOs in the West, then the next logical question we may ask is: Can these organizations be regarded as facilitating agencies to accomplish civil society building predicted by Habermas’ theory? In other words, Can we expect the successful duplication of the civil society building process in China even with less than ideal NGOs? Again, researchers who have conducted empirical researches in China tended to be critical of Habermas’ theory. Howell succinctly identified what he called “The Poverty of Civil Society” problems:

In applying the concept of civil society to China, we should also be aware of its particular history in Western political thought, its normative content and its multiplicity of meanings and usages….Civil society has been seen as a crucial ingredient for democratic life. This historical and ideological baggage again creates its own set of specific problems for the analyst studying China (Howell, 1995b).

Similar reservation was also expressed by Chow, who argued, “One unique characteristic that needs to be specifically addressed is that the dichotomy of ‘civil society’ and ‘the state,’ which is often used to analyze modern capitalist societies, cannot be simply transplanted to the study of China. In other words, there was no a priori state/society divide in China before the reform began” (Chow, 2000).

It seems their viewpoints can be summarized into the following three arguments: 1. The state-society division in European history is different from that of pre-modern China, as seen in the absence of the church outside of the state-society dichotomy; 2. ‘Citizens’ expectation of their personal rights as well as the roles of the state played in protecting such rights is quite different between China and the West; 3. Habermas’ general theory of civil society building, while useful in European cultural-historical contexts, may not be applicable to understand China’s current societal transformation. All these three arguments will undoubtedly be debated among researchers in the years to come. But, with increasingly more empirical research opportunities being possible, we might be able to put them to test in future.

NGOs in China’s Neighbors: Hong Kong and Taiwan

While researchers have disagreements regarding the civil society building roles played by China’s NGOs, we may look at similar development in China’s neighbors, especially Hong Kong and Taiwan. After all, all three societies share similar cultural heritage and have gone through rapid societal transformation in recent decades. Needless to say, the most salient features we can say about Hong Kong and Taiwan are their rapid economic growth: Hong Kong in 1960s and Taiwan in 1970s. Improved living standards have seen the rise of the middle class in the both societies having formed the driving force behind their democratic movements and the building of civil societies (Hsiao and So, 1999; Lam and Perry, 2000; Win, 1998).
Lam and Perry lamented that due to Hong Kong’s great success in market economy and laissez faire government, even under the British colonial era before 1997, people seldom noticed the vibrant “third sector,” i.e., the citizens’ self-motivating, goal oriented movements in the form of social services, political pressure groups and philanthropic activities that supplement government programs. For instance, one of Hong Kong philanthropic organizations, called Community Chest, has coordinated activities of 125 member organizations, and, “In 1996, donations to the Community Chest were more than HK$177 million” (or US$22.7 million) (Lam and Perry, 2000). Another interesting point about Hong Kong is the large number of NGOs organized on the basis of pre-modern Chinese indigenous organizations, such as lineages (called ‘clans’ by Lam and Perry) or regional organizations accounting for 15 percent of all registered non-profit organizations. Even more impressive is Oxfam International-Hong Kong. It established its first assistance office in Kunming, Yunnan, in 1992, and has committed over RMB$450,000,000 to various humanitarian assistance projects in China by 2007 (Oxfam International Hong Kong 2007). As will be seen in the next section, Oxfam International-Hong Kong has played a centrally critical role for China’s current NGO development.

Similarly, in Taiwan in 1980s, the rise of the middle class and large business conglomerates began to exert pressure on the authoritarian Nationalist government to launch political reforms that minimized some of its abusive state power. The retrenchment of the state control witnessed the rapid growth of grassroots citizens’ organizations based on various persuasions: consumers’ rights movements, environmental protection movements, anti-nuclear movements, and women’s rights movements. All these movements have been confrontational towards the authoritarian Nationalist government, further accelerating the demands for reform and democratization. Based on this, Hsiao and So coined the term “contentious civil society” to describe this process (Hsiao and So, 1999). Regardless of what labels do we use, Taiwan has been considered a successful transitional case to the development of a full-fledged civil society with democratic governance.

NGOs in Southwest China

From 2010 to 2012, I carried out fieldwork in southwest China’s hilly Yun-Gui Plateau, which includes the entire province of Yunnan, Guizhou, and southern Sichuan (See Map 1 below). To understand the organization and operation of the NGOs in this region, I used the following research steps. The first one is to collect information about local NGOs through government registration and local news reports. This is followed by online visits of their official webpages to compile initial information about the nature and practices of each specific organization. Before I personally visited the organization, my assistant managed an appointment to verify the availability of the organization’s responsible person for my interviews. In total, I visited 66 NGOs in two years with a wide stretches of organization formats and practices. In the following, I used information from 12 such NGOs for my analyses about the nature and specific characteristics of these NGOs.
Spatially, these 12 NGOs have the following geographic distributions: four each from Yunnan and Guizhou, three from Sichuan, and the last one crosses Yunnan and Guizhou. In terms of time established, we have the following distribution:

### TABLE 1

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearly the rise of NGOs in China is a post-2001 phenomenon when China’s economic development reached a certain threshold level and the rise of the urban middle class as a non-refutable social fact. Urban elites played a crucial role in China’s post-socialist transformation. In terms of the age of the 12 NGO founders, it also clearly showed its concentration among the younger and better educated generations:

### TABLE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of NGO founder</th>
<th>Below 29</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>40-49</th>
<th>Above 50</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The elitist’s nature of China’s newly risen NGOs can be seen in their founders’ education levels. All 12 founders of the studied NGOs had attained college education degrees. Two even had post-graduate training and served as college professors. The other professionals included two livestock specialists, two government office workers, two middle school teachers, an architect, a news reporter, a retired government official, and a fresh college graduate.
When examining the origin of these 12 NGOs, we can divide them based on the organizer’s initial inspiration: self-motivated individually (9), government initiated (2), and a branched-off from international organizations (1). It is interesting to note that the two government initiated NGOs, or GONGOs, are the least active among the 12 and with the most complaints, even though they have stable and generous funding supports from various levels of the government (i.e., provincial and prefectural government both).

When looking at the financial resources of these 12 organizations, there is a clear cleavage between two broad categories. Both the GONGO (2) and the spinoff international organization (1) indicated no budgetary concerns. All three have sufficient structural backing from established institutions: the government and the church. The opposite is true for the other 9 self-motivated organizations. Raising sufficient funds for operation seemed to be a major concern for all. It was under this context that Oxfam International-Hong Kong (OI-HK, henceforth) played a crucial role in facilitating their birth and growth. All 9 organizations had received assistance from OI-HK in one form or another during various stages of their development. The assistance may take the form of rented office space for an NGO during its incubation period. Or it may take the form of a grant to launch its maiden trial project. Or it may take the form of a workshop for its workers so that they may learn how to recruit volunteers, raise funds, do bookkeeping, apply for external funds, and write annual reports.

Since all of the 12 NGOs are multitasked, we can tabulate their involvements based on the specific tasks they are engaged in.

**TABLE 3**

**TASKS AND DISTRIBUTION OF 12 NGOS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work Category</th>
<th>Content of Activities</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Reduction</td>
<td>Community development projects; Small-scale loans; Improved animal breeding; Promotion of indigenous handicrafts for tourists; Road building to facilitate trades.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Exchange</td>
<td>Internet information platforms for NGO projects and funding application; Availability of volunteers; Post-disaster material needs.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Short-term workshops for school teachers from poverty regions, future volunteers, and NGO workers.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster Management</td>
<td>Post-disaster reconstruction; Mudslide prevention; Distribution of aid goods; Warehousing goods.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Preservation</td>
<td>Recording oral history, songs and dances, and handicraft production; Survey of temples.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Protection</td>
<td>Preserving biodiversity; Reforestation; Preventing soil erosion; Maintaining local indigenous species.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Improvement</td>
<td>Promoting civilized ‘urban’ lifestyle; Proper social decorum for poor children; Enhancing people’s devotion to socialism and social conscientiousness.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fund Raising</td>
<td>Set up fundraising booths in shopping centers; Email fundraising; Recruitment of fixed monthly donors.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Funding AIDs orphans’ education; Build libraries in poverty regions; On the job training for school teachers; Distribute sports packages for students in poor areas.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health &amp; Hygiene</td>
<td>Build latrines and drinking water tanks; Awareness of AIDs and other contagious diseases; Funding for cold-chain operations.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is apparent from the above list that these NGOs have filled in major social welfare chasms that the government has been unable to handle. It falls on the shoulders of the newly risen urban middle class who, after having gained the material comfort of life, begin to search for the meaning of life through concerns over pan human sufferings and humanitarian needs. The best example in our sample is an NGO called “A Ray of Sunshine” in this region. It was organized by an architect, Mr. Fan, who made a fortune through urban landscape designs and housing constructions in recent years before he even reached 35th year of his age. Through a happenstance encounter he found out about a poverty-stricken region in the hilly Miao minority area where elementary school students often have no shoes to wear or no money to pay school fees. He decided to do charity work. He organized his colleagues in the architecture firm in 2010 to form this organization. Through work connections and the use of websites, they collected surplus goods from various local manufacturers and warehouses. In the hilly regions, the organization identified school teachers as contact persons to collect information on special requests from students. On weekends, they used their own all-wheel drive vehicles to transport the goods to school teachers for distribution. To minimize expenses, all the volunteers paid for their own meals and fuel costs when delivering goods. Mr. Fan was very proud of his work and said, “When the provincial Red Cross found out about our work the following year, it proposed to incorporate our NGO into the Red Cross system. Even though this move would have given us some legitimacy with the government and provided us with some logistic support, such as an accountant for our bookkeeping and capital liquidation, we decided not to accept it. This is so because we cherish our independence and we dislike the kind of overhead charges Red Cross put on every transaction.” This NGO has been blossomed into a very vibrant social group with over 300 young volunteers participating in its various programs in 2017. Newly established projects such as repairing dilapidated classrooms and establishing scholarships for good students have been added to its recent activities.

Not all NGOs or their founders are successful. At a time of rapid social change, there are young people who are looking in vain for new aspiration and opportunities for self-elevation. In 2010 I met a new college graduate, Mr. He, who just started an NGO. Having witnessed the abysmal chaos after the Wenchuan earthquake, he decided to take a new path in disaster management. He wanted to set up warehouses with large capacity to provide emergency supplies, such as tents, clothing, instant foods, bottle water, electricity generators, first aid kits, etc., for future disaster relief. To collect the necessary funding, he and a co-worker went to shopping malls on weekends to collect donations. To conserve meager funding, they paid themselves only RMBS1,500 per month. They lived in cramped rooms for the low rents, and purchased cheap foods in late evening from the markets for their meals. Life was hard, but Mr. He was full of enthusiasm and energy. He proudly said to me, “With our capacity, the next time when major disaster strikes, we will be better prepared.” In 2011 when I visited this organization again, I was told that it had been folded and Mr. He had abandoned his goal. He was converted to Christianity, joined a missionary group, and went to Africa for his own spiritual salvation.
CONCLUSION

Based on previous discussion, we can draw a few concluding remarks about growth of NGOs in China and their impact on civil society building. First, the proliferation of NGOs has been astronomical, and the trend will continue along with the current economic growth and the rising middle class. Sustained economic growth in China during the past three decades has contributed to the improved living standard, especially among urban dwellers along the coast. Enhanced education levels over the same period have also contributed to a new sense of citizens’ awareness. The rise of the middle class, albeit small in number and percentage for the entire population, signals for a fundamental structural change in Chinese society. Demands for legal rights and protections, such as consumers’ rights, environmental conservation, and industrial workers’ protection from work-related injuries, will generate more grassroots movements that accelerate the civil society building processes. The announcement of incorporating entrepreneurs into the Communist Party by the then President Jiang Zemin in 2000 clearly signals for the awareness of the top echelon of the Party-State that change is inevitable, and democratization will become China’s mainstream development in the years to come.

Second, in considering the relationships between NGOs and civil society building in China, we should include the organizations initiated by the Party-State as genuine NGOs. Both the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese society are going through rapid changes. Owing to the all-encompassing and permeating nature of the Communist Party before the reform era, it would be next to impossible to expect the automatic formation of citizens’ voluntary associations after 40 years of oppressive rules. Under this condition it would not be unusual to find the best organized and best operated social groups outside of the Party-State bureaucracies established by the Party-State as fronts to appease certain segments of the society. The increased liberty given to citizens from the top has underscored a new dialogical relationship between the Party-State and society. It is under this condition that we will find members of the Party-State initiated NGOs deciding to disassociate themselves from the Party-State apparatus, and transform their organizations into genuine NGOs to serve societal goals.

It is along the same vein that we can conclude that while Habermas’ general theory of civil society building seems to be appropriate in explicating the civil society building processes in China; there are also discrepancies that must have been taken into considerations about the unique history and cultural heritage in China. Among the major differences are: first, the lack of a religious institution that sets outside the state-society dichotomy. Without an institutional alternative or mediator between them, the state-society division may become more sharpened and contentious as seen in political riots in Taiwan in 1970s and China in 1980s. The shortened feedback loops between state and society, however, also make their changing balances more direct and observable. In other words, the retrenchment of the state power will entail the dramatic increase of grassroots organizations, even when such organizational formats are newly imported from the outside and not a part of the cultural tradition.

Furthermore, while we know something about the sudden plethora of newly established modern NGOs, either those formally established by the Party-State or those linked to special interest groups in the form of voluntary associations, we know virtually nothing about traditional NGOs and their revival in contemporary China’s social landscape. Ethnographic reports have indicated the reestablishment of lineage halls or regional associations (Huang, 1998; Jing, 1996), but these reports are sporadic and incidental. Other traditional self-helped organizations, such as religious cults and credit associations, are probably quietly making a comeback in order to fill in the void created under the current reform. Owing to their sensitive nature, however, there has been little information about them. Obviously, these organizations would not have been registered with Party-State authorities due to their uncertain legal status, thus making their existence virtually under researchers’ radars. This will remain so, unfortunately, until democratization is fully established in China and that all citizens’ organizations will be protected equally under the rule of laws that we will possibly have a clear count of all NGOs, both modern and indigenous, that operate in building the civil society in China.

The love-hate relationship between the Party-State and the proliferating NGOs is quite evident. The tangible material benefit provided by NGOs has fulfilled needs that the entrenched Party-State
bureaucracy has been unable to meet. Furthermore, many NGOs have introduced efficient management systems that provide useful alternative governing models for local bureaucrats. But the negative implications of these, from the government’s perspective, are equally obvious. Any NGO’s success in alleviating social suffering is a public indictment of the failed Party-State and its local bureaucracy. Even more troublesome are new ideas that NGOs introduce from the West to the general public. Concepts such as “participatory management,” “transparent governance,” “grassroots democracy,” “open society,” “gender equality,” “sustainable development,” and certain others often appear in NGOs’ brochures and instructional programs and have become common parlance among NGO workers.

It is this ambivalence that stymies government efforts to lay out a clear set of policies for the mushrooming NGOs. One way to control them is by the registration practice mentioned above. This immediately puts many international and some local NGOs in legal limbo. Most international NGOs are not formally registered because of the unlikelihood that they would be taken under the wing of any government office, and hence they are forced to operate in a legally gray area.

Will a financially secure Chinese state simply kick out the international NGOs and replace them with government-operated ones? I do not believe this scenario will take place. Under the current development trajectory, the Chinese state is eager to participate in international sociopolitical arenas in more sophisticated and responsible ways. The presence of international NGOs is a clear signal that China is a full-fledged member of the international community and abides by its common rules. In conclusion, the development of NGOs in China mirrors the country’s reality and possibilities. It indicates both the international community’s expectation of China’s participation in global game plans and China’s potential roles in a global future given its distinct social development experience. These concerns are both Chinese and global in nature.
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Indigenous People, Change, and Development: 
A Romantic Nationalism Model 

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In the 19th century, Romantic Nationalism provided an alternative to rational visions and universal strategies for mankind. Doing so involved affirming that people are emotionally and uniquely connected to their cultures and heritage. Many indigenous, ethnic, and traditional peoples continue to respond in a manner reminiscent of Romantic nationalism. Understanding and appreciating these parallels can be a valuable tool for those related to economic development projects that involve such peoples. This paper provides business anthropologists with a useful overview of Romantic Nationalism and its relevance in today’s world.

INTRODUCTION

Many mainstream decision makers experience difficulties because they fail to adequately understand their clients, partners, and/or collaborators. To cater for such a situation, many consultants offer training, advice, and insights regarding the habits and priorities of people from China, Japan, Germany, and many other major trading partners. By providing a sophisticated cultural grounding, these specialists seek to enhance the cultural skills of those they serve.

In addition to understanding large, powerful countries, appreciating the distinctiveness of indigenous, ethnic, and traditional cultures is also important. One of the missions of applied anthropology (of which business anthropology is a part) is to help mainstream decision makers and negotiators gain the tools and insights they need to effectively operate in a culturally sensitive manner.

This paper goes beyond discussing the unique details of particular cultures or countries by providing a broad framework for understanding a variety of parallel responses that are often made by peoples who, in other ways, are very different. Romantic Nationalism (a 19th century European political movement) provides valuable clues and insights in this regard. By adapting our thinking regarding Romantic Nationalism to reflect the contemporary situation, a method for better understanding of responses to change (including cultural resurgence) emerges.

The Enlightenment Yesterday and Today

The Enlightenment (Gay, 1996) was an intellectual movement of epic importance that swept Western Civilization, reaching a high point of dominance in the late 18th century. The Enlightenment was greatly influenced by the methods of British “Rationalism” or “Empiricism” (Priest, 2007) that was championed by scientists such as George Berkley and David Hume.
As time went on, French intellectuals embraced these techniques and perspectives, using the emerging scientific method as a foundation for an intellectual movement that emphasized rational and universal solutions to the problems faced by cultures, peoples and society. The resulting Age of Enlightenment (and its empirical, rational, and universal orientation) was eventually elevated to a philosophy of life, not merely a set of ad hoc research tools. Unfortunately, the movement tended to chauvinistically dismiss other ways of thinking by depicting them as primitive, irrational, and superstitious.

To this day, many scholars and practitioners in the fields of business and economic development embrace strategies and perspectives that are reflective of the Age of Enlightenment. Thus, business leaders are fond of developing the “best way” to do something and then apply these tactics in a wide variety of contexts. The methods of scientific investigation, furthermore, owe a great debt to the Enlightenment in ways that draw attention away from humanistic and culturally specific considerations. Today, the dominance of such methods is being challenged. Business anthropology, for example, is actively contributing qualitative methods and culturally sensitive orientations that are vital in this regard.

A first step towards a broader view that led to a tempering of the Enlightenment was made by John Locke (a leading empiricist), who introduced the “Tabula Rasa” (blank slate) paradigm (Locke, 1996). Asserting that at birth the human mind is completely “empty” until “written upon” by the events in their lives, Locke argued that people are products of their experiences. As a result, the “Tabula Rasa” model (although empirical in nature) possesses aspects of humanism, progressiveness, and tolerance because it views people as molded by the events in their lives.

In spite of Locke, the universal tone of the empirical method was largely unchallenged until Immanuel Kant (Scruton, 2001), the German philosopher, argued that the human mind possesses innate abilities of analysis (including 12 distinct varieties of thought) that exist independently of empirical observations. In other words, Kant reminds us that various innate characteristics of human thought facilitate the empirical method. This shift in emphasis is known as the “Kantian Turn” in philosophy.

Because Kant’s philosophy led to the weakening of the Enlightenment (and its rational and universal bent), the stage was set for broader views that emphasized the significance of human emotions, the distinctiveness of specific cultures, and a broader view of mankind that expands beyond rational thought. Thus, although much business thinking is clearly reflective of the Age of Enlightenment, more humanistic alternatives eventually emerged. And, as we shall see, they exerted a great impact upon the development of anthropology.

**Culturally Specific Alternatives**

Starting in the mid-18th century, critics of the Enlightenment began to aggressively complain about its limitations. In particular, detractors challenged the Enlightenment’s assertion that rational thought and universal strategies are the foundation of superior societies and cultures.

Johann Gittfried Herder (Barnard, 2004) who studied under Kant, applied the Kantian Turn in philosophy to the study of society. In doing so, he undermined the Enlightenment’s premise that the history of mankind is a long march towards rational life, coupled with universal strategies that should be embraced by all people.

Earlier in his career, Herder developed an interest in folklore and cultural criticism. Doing so involved emphasizing that cultures possess unique and important foundations that are expressed in language, art, the intimate beliefs held by a people, and so forth. Herder, of course, lived in an era when many ethnic groups and regions had been conquered and reconquered in wars beyond their control. When dominant victors took charge, they often used the tactics of cultural hegemony (or dominance) in attempts to stamp out the cultural and ethnic distinctiveness of the local people. Nevertheless, Herder emphasized that “nations” or “peoples” (he was actually talking about cultures or ethnicity) can best be viewed with reference to their emotional and cultural heritage, not arbitrary boundaries on a map.

Herder set the stage for modern folklore scholarship when he insisted that each folk (or “volk”) possesses its own traditions, customs, language, and so forth. This heritage typically resides within the people in a legacy that is not written down, but informally passed from generation to generation by
example and word of mouth. This folklore (easily ignored by those who focus upon “high culture”, “kings and battles history”, coupled with the written word), can be very powerful. Herder referred to the distinctiveness of specific peoples as “volkgeist” or “the spirit of the people”. Herder also referred to its opposite as “zeitgeist” or “the spirit of the times”: a reference to the influence of circumstances and current events.

Herder’s thinking set the stage for the work of Frederick Hegel, the 19th century German philosopher. Before Hegel’s time, the concepts of “culture” and “national character”, which are so common today, were not widely used or well developed. Expanding upon Herder’s thought, however, Hegel viewed a nation as a cultural tradition that existed as a large and chiefly homogeneous collective entity. He observed that these nationalities often continue even when their formal “state” or “country” ceases to exist. Owing to the partitioning of Poland by Prussia and Russia in the 18th century, for example, Poland got ‘extinct’ as a political institution for 123 years. Poland, from a “volkgesit” perspective, however, remained intact and remerged as a formal nation in the 20th century. It is interesting to note that in the Middle East, the Kurds (as we shall see below) make a similar argument today. This is the view of “nation” (actually culture) that Hegel emphasized. Today, of course, the “civil” view of nation is a powerful alternative that is based on laws, rights, obligations not culture or ethnic identity. Nonetheless, the ethnic/culturally-specific view of nation has long existed and under certain circumstances it remains a powerful force.

Hegel’s model is clearly related to (and it significantly influenced) modern views of culture that are utilized by today’s anthropologists who view cultures as holistic entities made up of diverse parts (including language, art, literature, religion, worldviews, and so forth that are united in synergistic ways). In the case of distinctive cultural enclaves, this is often true.

The work of Herder and Hegel are examples of a gradual movement away from the dominance of the Age of the Enlightenment. Their work provided the tools needed to view people in terms of their distinctiveness and the feelings they harbor (not with reference to some rational, universal, and standardized plan for humanity). Doing so transcends focusing upon sovereign states that may be the result of historic accidents. Modern anthropology and sociology owes a great debt to their work.

The Romantic Era

In the late 18th century, British intellectuals (among others) embraced many of Herder’s sentiments leading to the emergence of what has come to be known as the Romantic Era (Blanning, 2001). Attempting to “tease out” or recapture the cultural heritage of Britain, poets such as William Wordsworth (Mason, 2010) viewed rustic peasants as the guardians and transmitters of a unique and precious cultural heritage. Wordsworth, for example, wrote in a style that attempted to replicate the way that humble farmers talked, thought, and acted. As a corollary, Romantic intellectuals suggested that these unassuming people possessed profound grassroots wisdom. By advancing this chain of thought, Wordsworth (and the Romantic Movement in literature he helped to create) celebrated unique and emotional aspects of specific cultures as revealed by the “common folk”. The Enlightenment’s emphasis upon rational, universal, and forward-thinking alternatives was, thereby, challenged and an alternative based upon unique and emotional (not rational and universal) aspects of life was championed. Although a strong alternative to the Enlightenment was being developed, however, Romanticism had not yet become a political movement or a rallying cry for downtrodden peoples.

One example of this trend was the rise and popularity of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood, a group of intellectuals and painters that sought to reform art by eliminating the impact of the Renaissance that was viewed as overly confining, rigid, and limiting. As an alternative, the pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood embraced what they felt was a more human and spontaneous form of artistic expression that was asserted to have existed in the Middle Ages and characterized by greater freedom of expression. Revealingly, this movement was founded in 1848 which (as we shall see below) was a year of great political upheaval inspired by an emotional outpouring stemming from the desires of various peoples to assert their culture, heritage, and traditions. To a large extent, these events sought to temper the universal and rational emphasis of the Enlightenment.
Napoleon’s Experiments

Over time, Romanticism, which had begun as cultural criticism and a literary/artistic movement, was transformed to include a strong political orientation. The emphasis upon political involvement stemmed from the belief that since (1) cultures are unique and (2) people have a strong emotional connection with them, and (3) the rational and universal orientation of the Enlightenment was misguided. From an activist point of view, this chain of thought encouraged people to strengthen and preserve their traditions and not allow them to be diluted by outsiders.

Nonetheless, advocates of the Enlightenment remained as a powerful force during the early 19th century. A classic example of this trend is the Napoleonic Code. After coming to power as the leader of France, Napoleon commissioned a panel of respected jurists to create a legal framework that would be rational, consistent, objective, efficient, and fair to all. When Napoleon conquered a territory, he mandated that this code be installed as the new law of the land. Of all his achievements, Napoleon was most proud of this legal system, observing, “My true glory is not to have won 40 battles…what will live forever is my Civil Code.” (Wanniski, 1998:184.)

In spite of Napoleon’s noble intentions and the many successes and positive influence of the Code, dissatisfaction sometimes arose. Opponents complained that the legal system a people live by expands beyond rational, objective, and universal rules. Legal frameworks also possess a specific cultural content or slant. If alien legal systems are thrust upon people, critics continued, the code they are forced to live by might conflict with their heritage and traditions. Speaking about Catalonia, for example, Enric Prat de la Riba (1998) observes that people “spoke of law as a live entity, which is spontaneously produced by national consciousness…They said that law and language were both manifestations of the same national spirit…” Interestingly, in 2017, Catalonia made a bid for independence from Spain due to sentiments that appear to be very similar to these 19th century responses.

Such priorities and concerns, of course, continue in other contemporary contexts. Many Muslims want to be ruled by a code of law that is based on Islamic traditions while, in the West, efforts are sometimes taken to insure Sahari law does not influence Western Countries, such as the United States.

These views forcefully undercut the notion of an impartial, culture free, and universal law. Opponents depicted Napoleon’s universal code of law as a thwarting and alien artifact, not a liberating tool of universal application. Demands were made to embrace alternatives that took the form of a culturally appropriate legal system. Universal and rational alternatives that had been introduced were rejected. This thinking set the stage for a political movement known as Romantic Nationalism.

Romantic Nationalism and Its Implications

Cases where the Napoleonic Code was rejected demonstrate the growing demand that people be allowed to live according to their cultures and traditions. A basic premise of this position argues that unique cultures possess significance to those who embrace them. Consistent with such views was the belief that universal and rational schemes introduced by outsiders (however noble their intentions might be) can easily emerge as thwarting and oppressive. Powerful forces overriding the will of the people came to be viewed as particularly vile. Throughout Europe, attempts were made to recapture the heritage of the culture or ethnic group and, in the process, eliminate outside influences as well as arbitrary controls (that were viewed as oppressive).

In doing so, the Romantic Movement began to take on political overtones. Throughout Europe, a legacy of cultural (and political) hegemony had long existed in which a dominant empire or nation attempted to use force and schemes of social engineering to transform distinct people into homogeneous members of a larger nation. As people gained a greater sense of their ethnic identity due to the advancement of Romanticism, however, many cultural enclaves rejected the influences of those who sought to manipulate and remake them.

Norway, for example, dominated by Denmark (and later Sweden) for centuries, had long been strongly pressured to abandon its heritage and embrace the culture of its “mother country” (sic). Eventually, Norway reaffirmed its heritage. Composers such as Edvard Greig (Grimley, 2006) wrote “serious music” based on traditional folksongs. The Norwegians even revived a form of their traditional
language (New Norse) due to the efforts of Ivar Aasen who travelled the countryside to discover how traditional people spoke. His findings were used to restore a nearly extinct language to everyday use. This resurrected form of speech was embraced by the people of Norway and is still widely used today. Norway, culturally and politically dominated by outsiders for centuries, reaffirmed its unique identity and eventually won independence. Consistent with the spirit of Romanticism, Norway changed the name of its capital from Christiania to a more Norwegian Oslo (in a manner similar to Turkey renaming Constantinople as Istanbul). More recently, in 2017, the town of Barrow, Alaska (USA), the most northerly city in North America, changed embraced Utqiagvik, its original indigenous name. In all three cases, these actions stem from a desire to celebrate, recognize, and affirm a cultural identity.

The Example of Greece

For an example of Romantic Nationalism in action, consider the Greek War of Independence against the Turks (Greece had been part of the Ottoman Empire since 15th century).

When the Ottomans were in control of Greece, the local people enjoyed few political freedoms. Turkish rule and domination, however, did not cause Greek culture and traditions to fade into oblivion. On the one hand, the Greek Orthodox Church provided cultural stability and the mechanism needed for the Greeks to preserve their ethnic identity. In addition, because Christians paid higher taxes than Muslims, the Empire was motivated to allow Greek culture and Christianity to continue because mass conversion to Islam (and the resulting eclipse of the Greek heritage) would have cost the rulers money due to a lower rate of taxation. Although in some places (such as Albania) significant Islamization took place, this did not occur in Greece.

As a result, in the early 19th century an intact Greek culture continued to exist and many of its members felt oppressed by Turkish domination. The Greek people, furthermore, were aware of the American and French revolutions, the philosophy of Romanticism, and its emphasis upon the power and sacredness of a cultural heritage. In addition, Ottoman power was waning (years later, British politician John Russell referred to the Empire as the “Sick man of Europe”). The time was right for a rebellion.

In 1821, the Greek War of Independence began (Brewer 2001). It immediately gained the sympathy of Europeans who viewed Greece as the mother of European civilization. A strong emotional reaction of great strength caught the imagination of Europe, especially in Britain and France. The struggle came to be viewed almost as a crusade in which the cradle of European culture was struggling against alien and oppressive rulers. These events were taking place in an era when Romantic sentiments, that emphasized emotion and distinctiveness, were strong and vital.

Not only that, one of the towering leaders of the Romantic Movement (Lord Byron) volunteered to serve the revolution and off he went to Greece only to die in pursuit of the cause. The death of this icon of Romanticism did much to increase support for the cause. Owing to his sacrifice, Byron continues to be regarded as a national hero among the Greeks, while the rest of Europe lauds him as a powerful intellectual force and a champion of Romanticism.

The Ottomans probably could have put down the Greek revolt except for outside intervention by Britain and France. Eventually, the Greeks prevailed. As a side effect of this struggle, the Ottoman Empire became suspicious of Greeks. Historically, the Ottoman Empire had been multi-ethnic even though the government and its leaders were Turkish. But now, the loyalty of those who were culturally different began to be questioned. A process had started that in the early 20th century resulted in the Turks seeking to make their country more culturally homogeneous. This, of course, can be viewed as another twist of Romantic Nationalism (perhaps its dark side): instead of distinct people seeking a homeland of their own, attempts were made to remake the country and its peoples into one homogeneous mass. To accomplish this goal, harsh and inhumane measures were often used against minority groups.

The Greek War of Independence, furthermore, encouraged a rash of other groups and regions to begin their own struggles for independence, spurred on by Romantic Nationalistic goals and ideals. Throughout Europe, people were inspired to assert their ethnic traditions and seek a homeland.

A high-water mark of this movement occurred in 1848 (Dieter, 2000) when widespread, but largely uncoordinated, rebellions challenged the established authorities of many European countries and empires.
A major influence fanning the flames of discontent was the demand that large homogeneous ethnic groups be allowed to live, unmolested by powerful outside forces, in countries of their own. Ultimately the rebellions of 1848 were defeated and the pre-existing regimes prevailed. In spite of this conservative victory, the seeds of change had been sown and a chain of thought with far-reaching consequences set in motion.

Significant among these insurrections is the Herzegovina uprising (Ekmecic, 1973) that lasted from 1875 until 1877 in which ethnic Serbs in Herzegovina began a struggle that quickly spread to other Serbian areas. Once the unrest became a major conflict, it rapidly spread to include other ethnic groups within the Balkan region. The “April Uprising” in Bulgaria is notable in this regard. The urge for independence in Bulgaria was spearheaded by the re-establishment of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in 1870 and other nationalistic agendas that were consistent with Romantic Nationalism.

Collectively, historians refer to these actions to the Great Eastern Crisis. The hostilities ended due to the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 which recognized the de-facto independence of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro, along with the complete autonomy of Bulgaria.

These tensions continued into the 20th Century and led to the Balkan Wars. By this time, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia had won independence. Unrest remained, however because many ethnic populations continued to live under Ottoman rule. Owing to this situation, many of those living in the Balkan countries sought to unite with members of their ethnic groups that continued to be controlled by others. In 1912, countries that had broken free of Ottoman domination formed the Balkan League. Once that union was established, two Balkan wars were fought in quick succession. In the first, the Balkan States were victorious over the Turks. In the second, the other members of the Balkan League (along with Ottoman aid) defeated the Bulgarians. Both wars had strong ethnic overtones and can best be viewed as examples of conflicts triggered by Romantic Nationalism.

After World War 1, furthermore, a political reshuffling took place that was inspired by Romantic Nationalistic sentiments.

Thus, in the 19th and early 20th centuries a wave of Romantic Nationalism swept over Europe. It was inspired by the desire of people to live according to their heritage and traditions. It reacted against rational and universal alternatives. Today, parallels to that era still continue.

**Developing a Romantic Nationalist Orientation**

The era of Romantic Nationalism provides an almost laboratory setting to observe the impact of social and economic change upon people whose cultural heritage is being threatened and/or is enjoying a renaissance. Although the Romantic Nationalism movement took place in the past and typically involved people who may have little in common with today’s struggling populations, useful parallels can, and should, be drawn from these historic examples. By generalizing how people have responded and what caused them to do so, useful perspectives can be developed regarding the reactions of ethnic enclaves in a changing world.

A specific orientation is presented below with reference to Romantic Nationalism. By considering these examples, the quest to preserve and strengthen a cultural identity can be better understood. Some impacted groups are large and operate within the “modern world”. Others may be small ethnic enclaves scattered in remote places. Although important differences exist, the following relevant issues are considered:

1. **The hegemony of rational and universal strategies can cause dissention.** During the Age of Enlightenment, powerful nations recommended (and/or forced) people to adopt the rational and universal agendas that they favored. Doing so often involved cultural, political, and/or economic hegemony that forced people to think and act in alien ways. Romantic Nationalism involved a reaction against these Enlightenment priorities that focused upon cultural identity and attempts to throw off outside influences. The same potential for action and reaction exists today.
2. **Many modern decision makers continue to reflect the Enlightenment.** Similar to the strategies of the Enlightenment, many of today’s business leaders, consultants, economic development specialists, and planners continue to search for universal solutions and “best practices”. If these programs are implemented without adequate attention to the resulting cultural impacts, tensions can develop.

3. **Cultural enclaves are often pressured accordingly:** On many occasions indigenous, ethnic, and traditional peoples are subjected to the pressures of cultural hegemony. In the past, these techniques often took the form of overt policies designed to undercut local cultures. On many occasions today, in contrast, outsiders seek to embrace strategies merely because they are believed to be appropriate and/or efficient choices. In either case, people subjected to such pressures are apt to feel that their heritage is being weakened and destabilized.

4. **The continued power of Romantic Nationalism:** Although Romantic Nationalism tends to be associated with the 19th century, many cultures and ethnic enclaves continue to act in a manner that is similar to it. Owing to these parallels, Romantic Nationalism can provide a useful lens for understanding a wide variety of peoples and the choices they make. These actions appear to be an independent invention due to analogous pressures, not a conscious and overt emulation of the historic movement.

5. **Different Peoples, Similar Responses:** When subjected to similar pressures, people who are very different and not culturally related are likely to respond in parallel or identical ways. A model based on Romantic Nationalism can provide analysts and decision makers with valuable predictive and analytic abilities.

6. **A supplement to culturally specific orientations:** Appreciating a culture’s unique characteristics has great value. Gaining this knowledge, however, can be difficult and it is not easily transformed for use in other contexts. A Romantic Nationalist perspective, in contrast, can provide insights regarding how different peoples respond in parallel ways when facing similar pressures. This method of analysis should be part of the toolkit of leaders, decision makers, and business anthropologists who deal with diverse people facing analogous challenges.

The era of Romantic Nationalism demonstrates the power of cultural identity and the struggles that have been waged to preserve and strengthen it. In many parts of the world today, cultural enclaves are reasserting their identity in ways that are akin to this historic movement. Understanding these contemporary reactions and their implications is vital in a changing world. An updating and generalizing of Romantic Nationalism provides a useful way to do so. Business anthropology has a vital role to play in dealing with such potentials.

**Relevant Examples**

To demonstrate the relevance of Romantic Nationalism in today’s world, examples are provided. The first deals with the Kurdish people, a large ethnic group with a distinctive cultural heritage that typically lives a “modern” lifestyle. This discussion demonstrates that cultural renewal can take place among large groups with “mainstream” habits. The second set of examples includes observations involving a variety of indigenous communities, large and small. By dealing with such variation, the discussion is usefully expanded.

1. **The Demand for Kurdish Independence.**

   The Kurdish people of the Middle East are a distinctive cultural group that numbers in many millions. Today, large populations of Kurds live in Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq in regions that are adjacent to each other. They have been described as the world’s largest ethnic group that lacks a national homeland (Landis and Albert, 2012). After the emergence of the Ottoman Empire (1281-1923), the Kurds were usually controlled by the Turks (although various Kurdish regions were contested by rivals, including the Persians). In spite of Ottoman control, however, the Kurds long enjoyed a level of self-rule because the
Empire appointed local leaders and the Kurdish people were able to live according to their cultural traditions and heritage.

The situation began to change in the early 19th century when the Ottoman Empire sought to consolidate and centralize its power. This trend led to unrest. The first Kurdish uprising took place in 1880 (Ozoglu, 2004), led by Sheik Ubeydullah, who sought independence for the Kurds and the establishment of Kurdistan as an independent country free of Turkish or Persian control. Although the rebellion was defeated by Ottoman forces, the uprising demonstrated a growing desire for independence.

In the early years of the 20th century, a reformist group called the Young Turks gained power in the Ottoman Empire. Besides seeking to modernize and secularize the country, the Young Turks initiated a strong push to reduce the degree of cultural pluralism and ethnic variation in an attempt to make the Empire more culturally homogeneous. This priority led to significant campaigns of ethnic cleansing involving ethnic Greeks and the oppression of non-Turks, including the Kurds (Fisk, 2005 322).

After World War 1, the Ottoman Empire was dismantled. During negotiations regarding the lands in the former Empire, Iran noted that historically all of Kurdistan had been part of the Persian Empire and asked that this territory be returned. This request was not granted (Schofield, 1989) because the British wanted the Kurdish sections of Iraq and the French demanded Kurdish territory in Syria. Turkey (a new country stripped of its former empire), furthermore, wanted to keep as much territory on the Anatolian Peninsula as possible, and after winning the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923), it gained the right to control Kurdish lands adjacent to predominantly Turkish regions of the country. The remaining sections of Kurdish territory fell to Iran. For a short time, an attempt was made to establish a Kurdish state, but it failed to survive (Prince, 1993). Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, various revolts and rebellions occurred but were not proved successful.

Over the years, attempts have been made to undercut Kurdish culture. In Turkey, for example, laws were passed that outlawed the use of the Kurdish language in both public and private contexts (Toumani, 2008). Chronic and long-lasting insurrections by the Kurds (such as in Turkey between 1984 and 1999) saw examples of excessive violence on both sides. My purpose here is not to judge these events, but merely to point out that many Kurds were (and are) willing to put their life on the line in the quest to win a national homeland.

Eventually compromises were suggested such as the establishment of semi-autonomous Kurdish regions or zones (as in Iraq). Over time, this semi-autonomous region has begun to act more and more like a country. The Kurdish region of Iraq, for example, has been able to establish its own military force that helped greater Iraq and its other allies during the current wars in the region. In September 2017, the Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum was held and 93% of the voters demanded independence. Currently in Syria, a movement towards greater autonomy is also emerging. Kurdish militia in Syria are active and the government is considering giving the Kurds greater autonomy. These actions (and others like them) indicate a growing trend towards greater self-determinism for the Kurdish people, no matter what the final arrangement might be.

To fully understand these events within a historic context, a consideration of the suggestions of United States President Woodrow Wilson is useful. Woodrow Wilson was a tireless proponent of self-determinism, stating, for example, that “National aspirations must be respected; people may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. ‘Self determination’ is not a mere phrase; it is an imperative principle of action” (Wilson, 1918). These statements, of course, reflect the tenets of Romantic Nationalism as well as the goals of the Kurds and other ethnic groups in the Middle East (such as the Arabs who sided with the British during World War 1 after being promised a homeland after the war). Britain ultimately reneged on these promises, because it wanted to extend its empire within Arab territory. Owing to British and French ambitions, the Kurds were also denied a homeland and their lands were parcelled out to the victors of the war.

Had President Wilson been able to advance his vision of self-determinism, a solution reflective of Romantic Nationalism might have been possible. After World War 1, unfortunately, the United States experienced a period of political and economic isolation. Because of this trend, Wilson was unable to forcefully advance the cause of self-determinism in the Middle East. Without his leadership, various
parts of the former Ottoman Empire were divided up by Britain and France with little concern for the ethnicity of the people who lived there.

In Iraq, for example, ethnic groups and/or religious sects that were hostile to each other found themselves merged into the same country. And, as discussed above, the Kurds were divided among several countries (including Iraq) and forced to endure a minority status everywhere. Such fates are the antithesis of Romantic Nationalism, a movement that spotlights cultural identity.

Goals reflective of Romantic Nationalism that were embraced by ethnic groups, such as the Kurds, did not disappear. Just the opposite; the Kurds have made repeated attempts to gain a national homeland and this agenda continues to this day. Such dogged and continuing campaigns are not without precedent. As discussed above, after being divided up by Prussia and Russia, Poland “ceased to exist” as a country for 123 years. Nonetheless, the Polish people survived as a cultural entity and eventually the country of Poland reemerged and continues to exist today. The Kurds have a similar goal. Their actions are best understood with reference to Romantic Nationalism.

In tabular form, some key issues are addressed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>TABLE 1</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kurdish Quest for Independence</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Political Hegemony</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>After World War 1, Britain and France divided up the former Ottoman Empire in ways that suited their priorities and did not reflect the needs or wishes of the peoples who lived there. As a result, the Kurds, a large ethnic group, found itself divided among 4 countries, suffering a minority status in all of them.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural Hegemony</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As a minority group, the heritage and traditions of the Kurds were not adequately addressed. In some places, following Kurdish ways (speaking the language, for example) was outlawed. The goal of such sanctions was to achieve cultural homogeneity through overt controls and social engineering.</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Romantic National responses</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>As a minority group in various countries, the Kurds have typically been asked to conform to (or at least tolerate) the will, demands, and lifestyle of the majority. These requirements usually ignore a strong emotional connection the Kurds have for their heritage. The Kurds have been unwilling to live devoid of the emotional connection to their culture and traditions. These responses are reflective of Romantic Nationalism.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Current Situation</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>The quest for Kurdish independence still remains. Various initiatives (both violent and peaceful) have gone on for decades. Movements are underway to grant a special status and greater autonomy to the Kurdish regions in some countries that have large Kurdish populations. Other Kurds demand a separate and unified state. These alternatives are strategic examples reflective of Romantic Nationalism.</td>
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</table>

**Discussion**

Romantic Nationalism was a 19th century movement, typically involving Europe, in which ethnic groups sought to live according to their traditions and heritage. In certain parts of the world, large groups remain that are currently unable to enjoy self-determinism and enjoy their heritage. Where such environments exist, responses similar to Romantic Nationalism are likely to occur. The Kurds are one example of this possibility.
In the 19th century, large cultural and ethnic groups in Europe were motivated to unite socially and politically in attempts to preserve (and live according to) their heritage. These situations gave rise to the era of Romantic Nationalism. Where similar conditions exist today, parallel responses can be expected. The situation of the Kurds is one example of this possibility among large contemporary ethnic groups.

2. A Wider Variety of Responses

Although the knowledge of Romantic Nationalism can be valuable when dealing with specific cultures, such as the Kurds, it can also be used to understand the responses of a wide array of ethnic enclaves. Although ethnic groups vary in size and in regard to the circumstances faced, the paradigm provided by Romantic Nationalism is useful in a wide variety of situations, because it deals with identity, the threats to a people’s heritage, and actions that are designed to preserve or strengthen the culture.

Instead of dealing with one notable group, such as the Kurds, this discussion considers a wider range of pressures, responses, and characteristics that involve a variety of groups, large and small. Many of these peoples have little in common except for the similar pressures confronted and, perhaps, their parallel responses. Hopefully, by examining these diverse examples, the fuller implications of behavior, reflective of Romantic Nationalism, can be better understood.

Historically many ethnic or cultural groups have been dominated by outsiders. Typically, the modus operandi of the colonial powers or the controlling nation was to enter a region and set up legal and administrative systems that suited their needs. In some situations, day to day rule was being carried out by local leaders. In other cases, the colonial power exerted stronger and more centralized rule. These policies, furthermore, often gave rise to post-colonial pressures after independence.

From a demographic perspective, in many countries or regions the local people remained in the majority as a relatively small number of outsiders took up residence (although these expatriates typically exerted great power and were a privileged class). Regions with such a history and demographic makeup are often referred to as “Third World”.

This arrangement typifies the situation of colonial sub-Saharan Africa (and its later post-colonial history) with the exception of South Africa. Local groups often experienced a weakening of their power and self-determinism although demographically they remained in the majority. Such situations can easily encourage Romantic Nationalistic sentiments and actions, serving as a catalyst when cultures seek to reassert themselves.

In addition, as colonies became established, different ethnic groups were often merged into the same political entity or administrative unit. When the colonial system was intact, the alien administration typically moderated the tensions that arose between rival groups in order to keep the peace. After independence, however, these contending groups often remained in opposition to each other, although no outside force existed to intercede on behalf of parties that felt they were being treated unfairly.

In North Africa, for example, two distinctive groups are the Arabs and the Berbers. During colonial rule, the colonial administrations apparently made decisions that were fairly impartial and did not tend to favor one group over the other. After independence, however, many Berbers have complained that the dominance of the Arabs and that the use of Arabic in official business works against their interests (Informal personal communication). I do not know if this is true, but the appearance exists and, with it, a potential for Berber resentment.

Tensions and rivalries such as this have often spawned feelings akin to Romantic Nationalism when different ethnic groups in the same country came into conflict. The Biafran War (civil war in Nigeria during the 1960s) is a tragic example of this possibility.

On other occasions, a massive influx of immigrants from the outside made the indigenous people a minority in their own land. This has been the experience in places like North America, Australia, and New Zealand. Such regions are often known as the “Forth World”. In both Third World and Forth World situations, political hegemony prevailed in which indigenous peoples were controlled by outsiders. In other cases, one indigenous group attempted to dominate others in what amounts to a domestic form of cultural hegemony. The actual tactics of this control and manipulation vary.
In North America during the 19th century, relentless waves of immigrants pushed the indigenous peoples ever further West (with tribes usually being relegated to undesirable or unwanted hinterlands). This process continued until the “frontier was closed” and the displaced indigenous peoples could retreat no further. Ultimately, reservation life became commonplace. Nevertheless, in the United States today American Indians enjoy a range of rights because of treaties and/or their indigenous status. The Congress of the United States, however, has asserted the right to restrict or eliminate these privileges (although doing so under current circumstances is not a tenable option).

Despite the current political climate, the rights of the American Indians can be unilaterally restricted; this has occurred in the past. The years from the end of World War 2 until the 1960s, for example, is known as the “Termination Period” of American Indian history because the official policy of the United States government was to eliminate the powers and rights of Indian tribes and completely integrate these people (and their resources) into the social and economic life of the country. The intention of the government was to phase out the special identities and/or privileges enjoyed by American Indians and their tribal governments. Currently, the United States has backed away from that policy, acknowledging the rights, privileges, and special status of American Indians. But an act of Congress could change that at any time.

Today, the American Indians (as a collective, multi-cultural group) are a small minority. Demographically, individual tribes are even more insignificant. As a result, they must adhere to the will of the larger population. This is an example of a Forth World arrangement in which indigenous peoples emerge as marginalized factions of minor demographic significance within their own homeland.

In addition to political implications, cultural hegemony (or dominance) often occurs when outside cultures or ways of life exert profound pressures that transform a people. In the 20th and 21st centuries, for example, American popular culture, movies, fast food, blue jeans, rock and roll music, and so forth have exerted a powerful impact upon the world and many of the cultures within it. This influence has become so great that various nations and cultural leaders fear that their heritage is being overshadowed and weakened by these alien influences. Under these circumstances, a cultural renaissance, if often sought, that closely resembles Romantic Nationalism. Small isolated cultural enclaves are probably even more vulnerable to cultural diffusion of this sort.

The cultural hegemony associated with American life, however, is primarily a reflection of the times, not an orchestrated strategy of social engineering or part of scheme of multifaceted mind control. In many historic circumstances, however, cultural hegemony has been a key component of a unified and systematic strategy designed to weaken local cultures. For many years in the United States and Canada, for example, the younger generation of tribal leaders was forced to attend boarding schools far from their home. The major goal of these institutions was to assimilate the next generation to the “mainstream” culture in ways that were designed to weaken the local power structure and undercut the cultural traditions of the indigenous peoples. Missionaries and governments often closely cooperated in attempts to replace the religious heritage and, thereby, challenged the authority of local leaders. Thus, Sheldon Jackson, who administrated the Alaska Native Boarding Schools in Alaska, was also a Presbyterian Minister who helped divide up Alaska into segments in a scheme that was devised to better and more efficiently coordinated missionary efforts among Native Alaskans.

Thus, in addition to political hegemony, cultural hegemony can exert a strong influence either formally or informally. Sometimes, however, cultural hegemony is rejected by those who are targeted or impacted. Earlier in this paper, we saw how Norway, long subjected to cultural hegemony by Denmark and Sweden, reassessed its cultural heritage and transcended the alien culture that had been forced upon it. Many indigenous people today embrace agendas that are reflective of how Norway embraced Romantic Nationalism. Indigenous people, for example, often favor a revival of the local language, traditional law, focusing upon indigenous folklore and customs.

Coupled with these trends are the pressures of economic and social development. As discussed above, during the era of the Enlightenment, well-meaning outsiders often sought to devise the one best way to do things and introduced these innovations wherever possible. In this spirit, alien cultural institutions (such as a legal system considered to be rational and fair) were introduced. Many people,
however, felt that laws and mores are so intimately intertwined with the culture that alien systems should be avoided. In the United States, for example, Native American tribes operate their own court systems. Developing such institutions was encouraged by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. To facilitate this act, the Bureau of Indian Affairs developed a generic and pre-fabricated “boilerplate” of legal codes that provided detailed practices and procedures that tribes could easily adopt. Although many tribes initially embraced a “Western-style” court system in this way, today there is a trend for many courts to revert back to the traditional legal systems that had long been practiced by the people. A particular court, for example, might authorize a panel of elders to issue verdicts instead of empowering judges and/or juries. This situation is very similar to the fact that various European peoples rejected the Napoleonic Code because it clashed with the heritage and traditions of the people and their cultures. Doing so is clearly akin to Romantic Nationalism.

Business practices and economic development initiatives can also emerge as examples of cultural hegemony. Modern business leaders and economic development specialists often operate in a manner that is reflective of the Enlightenment and its attempts to be rational and universal. This, unfortunately, can lead to lack of appreciation of the heritage of those who failed to echo the current management fad. Conflicts and misunderstandings can develop when members of distinctive cultures prefer options that reflect their heritage and unique needs, not methods that were developed in the West.

Thus, in many ways the reactions of today’s indigenous people parallel the Romantic Nationalism of the 19th century. These similarities do not appear to be a case of conscious cultural diffusion or overt borrowing. Instead, these trends seemingly result from similar pressures and challenges that have triggered analogous or parallel responses. An overview is presented in tabular form in Figure 2.
TABLE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representative Indigenous Situations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political hegemony</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>During the colonial era (and analogous periods in places like the United States that have small cultural entities under their control), political dominance was often a fact of life for distinctive cultures and peoples. Even after the end of the colonial era (and similar developments such as the end of the Termination Period in the United States), the legacy of political and cultural manipulation often continues, exerting a powerful influence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural hegemony</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural hegemony occurs when a powerful outside culture exerts a strong impact upon people and their cultures. On some occasions (such as the popularity of the “American popular culture” worldwide), cultural hegemony is simply a reflection of the temper of the times. On other occasions, dominant forces use cultural hegemony as a conscious tool of social engineering intended to weaken the local leadership and heritage.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Pressures</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The age of the Enlightenment emphasized rational and universal solutions to the world’s problems. Although business leaders, consultants, and planners might not consciously extend the Enlightenment, they often act in a similar manner to it. By doing so, these decision makers and advisors risk overlooking the significance of unique and local traditions and their values.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Romantic National responses</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposed to pressures that mirror the issues faced by Romantic Nationalists in the 19th century, many contemporary peoples are responding in a manner that is reflective of that social movement. It does not appear that such actions are overtly inspired by Romantic Nationalism, but merely that they are reacting in similar ways due to parallel pressures and challenges.</td>
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**Discussion**

By understanding Romantic Nationalism, the situation faced by and the responses of contemporary cultural enclaves can be better understood. It appears that elements of Romantic Nationalism have been independently re-invented in response to circumstances that are similar to those of the 19th century.

Responses reminiscent of Romantic Nationalism continue to exist. By understanding this 19th century movement, we can better comprehend today’s parallels and effective ways to respond to them.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Romantic Nationalism was a movement that took place in the 19th and early 20th centuries (largely in Europe) that involved ethnic groups and cultural enclaves reasserting their identity and, typically, demanding a distinct homeland where their cultures and heritage could thrive and develop on their own terms.

When working towards that end, the leaders of Romantic Nationalist movements typically rejected the demands and strategies provided by powerful outsiders who tended to offer (or demand) that rational and universal strategies be adopted. As an alternative, local solutions that acknowledged the emotions, sentiments, and the feelings of the people were embraced.

An understanding and updating of Romantic Nationalism provides perspectives of value when examining contemporary movements involving cultural resurgence. Reactions of this type take place among large “modern” groups such as the Kurds as well as smaller, more isolated cultures including the indigenous peoples who live in many regions.

Thus, in a very real sense, the ideas of Romantic Nationalism continue to exert a powerful influence. A fruitful strategy to use when evaluating and dealing with those who act and think in this manner is to (1) seek to understand the uniqueness of a culture (2) while looking for parallel responses to commonly occurring pressures. A focus upon Romantic Nationalism provides clues in this regard.

Romantic nationalism becomes a vital force when the cherished cultural underpinnings of a people are challenged or weakened. This is especially true when outsiders forcefully introduce rational and universal agendas that seek to cancel out highly valued traditions, cultures, and heritages. Under such circumstances, an emotional resurgence often takes place.

By keeping Romantic Nationalism in mind, business anthropologists can help develop a better understanding of social change, stability, and economic development among distinctive peoples. Impacted peoples include both large and “modern” groups (such as the Kurds) and a wide range of other cultural entities (including “minor” ethnic enclaves and indigenous peoples). Romantic Nationalism can effectively model how people seek to preserve and reassert their heritage, control their world, and practice self-determinism. The desire to do so is bolstered by movements that are akin to but apparently uninfluenced by Romantic Nationalism.
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Impacts of Changes in the International Geopolitical Landscape on the Tibetan Tea Trade—From the Ming and Qing Dynasties to the Republican China Period

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The sale of Yunnan tea to Tibet began in the late Ming dynasty and the early Qing dynasty, and grew rapidly with many routes of horse caravans entering Tibet. However, for a long period, Tibetan tea produced in Sichuan remained the primary variety sold to Tibet, and it enjoyed irreplaceably important status. In the late Qing dynasty, especially after the Xinhai Revolution in 1911, the relationship between Tibet and the central government weakened under British armed intervention. The sales volume of Tibetan tea produced in Sichuan kept dropping due to unsmooth roads leading to Tibet, excessively high prices and especially the dumping of Indian tea. In the meantime, with the opening of marine corridor of Yunnan tea, the cost of marine transport of Yunnan tea to Tibet was reduced greatly, and its sales volume in Tibet kept on rising. In the early Republican China period, Yunnan tea became the main variety of inland tea in place of Tibetan tea produced in Sichuan. The marine corridor rose when Indian tea was dumped in Tibet after the two Britain-Tibet wars, frustrating Britain’s attempt of monopolizing the Tibetan tea market while supplying daily necessities to the Tibetan people, and playing an important role of maintaining connections between Tibet and inland China.

Historically, tea sold to Tibet was produced in Sichuan, Yunnan and Shaanxi Provinces mainly. As one of the main varieties of Tibetan tea, Yunnan tea originates in Fohai (today’s Menghai County), Cheli (today’s Jinghong City), Jinggu and Mianning (today’s Lincang County), Yunnan. The sale of Yunnan tea to Tibet began in the Ming and Qing dynasties, flourished in the Republican China period, and has continued to date.

The tea corridor connecting Tibet and inland tea producing areas is also known as the “Han-Tibetan tea-horse trading road”. Historically, the Tibetan Tea Road was a vast traffic network composed mainly of three major main roads (Sichuan-Tibet Road, Yunnan-Tibet Road and Qinghai-Tibet Road (Gansu-Qinghai Road)), and numerous branch and auxiliary roads, spanning the provinces (regions) of Sichuan, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai and Tibet, and extending outward to South Asia, Southeast Asia and West Asia.

Frontier trade between the mainland and Tibet in the Tang and Song dynasties occurred in northwestern China mainly, so the Tang-Tibet Ancient Road became a main trading route. This road runs from the Tang capital Chang’an in the east, through Shanzhou (today’s Ledu, Qinghai), Shancheng (today’s Xining, Qinghai) and Chiling (Riyue Mountain), the Gaduo Ferry on the Tongtian River, Lieyi (Yushu), the Chawula Pass of the Tanggula Mountains and Hechuan Post Station (Nagqu) to Lasa (Lhasa) in the west (Chen, 1987), and its branch runs through the Himalayas westward to Nepal and Sindhu.
(ancient India). In the Song dynasty, tea drinking prevailed in Tibet. Since the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau produced no tea, all tea consumed in Tibet was from Han areas. At that time, the Song dynasty was in constant war with the Liao, Jin and West Xia countries in the north and northwest. The Song dynasty exchanged tea for warhorses with Tibet. Today’s Shaanxi was an important tea-horse trading area then. After the Ming and Qing dynasties, tea sold to Tibet was mainly from Sichuan and Yunnan in the southwest other than from the northwest. Accordingly, for most people today, the familiar Tibetan tea roads are the Sichuan-Tibet and Yunnan-Tibet Roads: the Sichuan-Tibet Road runs from Ya’an, Sichuan through Luding, Kangding, Batang and Chamdo to Lhasa, and the Yunnan-Tibet Road runs from origins of Yunnan tea (today’s Xishuangbanna, Pu’er, etc.) through Dali, Lijiang, Zhongdian and Deqin to Chamdo, then through Pomda and Zayu or Lhorong and Gongbo’gyamda and finally to Lhasa, Shigatse, etc.

Along these two main roads, there are numerous branch roads of various sizes, such as the branch road from Ya’an to Songpan to the south Gansu Tibetan area, that running from the north branch of the Sichuan-Tibet Road through Dengke (today’s Dege, Sichuan) to Yushu, Xining and Taozhou (today’s Lintan) in Qinghai Province, and that running northward from Chamdo via Riwoche and Dengqen to northern Tibet. This developed tea trading network connects Sichuan, Yunnan and Tibet closely into the highest, steepest and remotest tea-horse trading road in the world.

The major varieties of Yunnan tea sold to Tibet were brick tea, round tea, square tea and bulk tea, in which brick tea was the main variety of Yunnan tea sold to frontier areas, originating in Fohai, Yunnan. Initially, brick tea took the form of “ball tea”, and generally mildewed due to long-distance transport. During 1912-1917, heart-shaped brick tea with a handle was created, with seven bricks per barrel, wrapped in bamboo shoot leaves, with a gap between every two bricks for continuous evaporation to avoid mildewing. Brick tea was made from spring tip, Ershui and gain flower tea, and formulated in three layers (bottom, middle and surface), steamed and pressed into bricks, and then packed.2

The past changes of the road for selling Yunnan tea to Tibet were closely associated with domestic and international political and economic conditions. It can be said that the rise and changes of this road reflected the political situation and international geopolitical landscape of Tibet relative to the central government, and South Asian and Southeast Asian countries in different periods.

Historical Background of the Rise of Yunnan Tea

Domestic Factors: Improvement of Traffic between Yunnan and Tibet, and Decline of Sichuan Tea Sold to Tibet

From the Ming dynasty, the focus of Tibetan tea sale shifted from the northwest to Sichuan gradually. There were two main tea trading roads running from Ya’an and Guanxian – Tibetan tea producing areas in western Sichuan – to the Kham Tibetan area and Tibet: the South Road (Lidiao Road) and the West Road (Songmao Road), where tea sold from such producing areas as Ya’an, Tianquan, Yingqing and Mingshan via Tachienlu to the Kham Tibetan area and Tibet was known as South Road frontier tea, and that sold from such producing areas as Guanxian, Shifang and Pingwu along the Minjiang River, via Mao County, Songpan and Nuuerh to the south Gansu and Qinghai Tibetan areas as West Road frontier tea.

Owing to long distance and traffic blocking between Yunnan and Tibet, Yunnan tea was sold to Tibet in the early Qing dynasty, later than tea sale through the Sichuan-Shaanxi route. In the late Ming dynasty and the early Qing dynasty, tea production in Sichuan was damaged greatly due to long-term wars, resulting in a significant shortage of Sichuan tea sold to Tibet, when Yunnan tea began to rise. In Year 18 of Qing Emperor Shunzhi’s reign (1661), the Dalai Lama requested tea trade in Beisheng Prefecture (today’s Yongsheng County, Lijiang, Yunnan) (Qi, 2014:317), and then the Qing government set up a tea-horse trade market there, allowing free private trade. A tea market was set up there because this place was located strategically on the border of Yunnan and Tibet (Liu, 2007:416). In Year 4 of Qing Emperor Kangxi’s reign (1665), the Qing government revoked the tea and horse supervisory offices in Shaanxi,
and opened a tea-horse market in Beisheng Prefecture (Zhao, 1977:3655), further improving the status of Beisheng Prefecture in tea-horse trade. Since then, the sale of Yunnan tea to Tibet grew rapidly, with many routes opened, and Yunnan became one of the main sources of Tibetan tea. Its rise was attributed to the following factors:

In the Ming and Qing dynasties, tea planting and processing in Yunnan developed greatly expanding from the six major tea mountains to Mount Ailao, Mengle and the Nushan Plateau in the Lantsang River Basin so forming some tea producing areas in southern Yunnan. The farmers there were expert in tea planting in the mountains in Simao, laying an economic foundation for the sale of Yunnan tea to Tibet. In addition, in the late Ming dynasty and the early Qing dynasty, since southwestern China experienced years of war, the people lived in destitution; the population dropped greatly; and much land was laid idle. From Year 10 of Qing Emperor Shunzi’s reign (1661), the Qing government recruited inland Han farmers to farm on unclaimed wasteland in Yunnan, and promulgated some preferential policies, such as tax exemption for the first three years (Qing, 1985:49). After the change of the tribal chieftainship system to the standard Chinese bureaucratic system during Qing Emperor Yongzheng’s reign, former domains of chieftains became newly opened minority domains (Qing, 1985:907). In Year 1 of Qing Emperor Qianlong’s reign (1736), the Qing government no longer restricted migrants going to southwestern frontier areas for reclamation, and allowed them to reclaim odd pieces of land (Qing, 1985: 811). Then, a large number of Han people from Hunan, Hubei, Sichuan, Guangdong and Guizhou Provinces migrated to tea producing areas in Yunnan, who settled there, either dealing with trade or reclaiming land.” (Jiang, 1987:1233) Incoming inland migrants brought inland tea making techniques, and improved the quality of Yunnan tea.

Furthermore, with the transfer of Yunnan troops to Tibet during the reigns of Qing Emperors Kangxi and Yongzheng, traffic conditions between Yunnan and Tibet were improved, and Yunnan merchants began to enter Tibet for tea trade. In particular, after the opening of the railway from Indian seaport Calcutta to Darjeeling on the south piedmont of the Himalayas in 1888, the time of traveling from Calcutta to Lhasa was shortened greatly to less than one month. It took six or seven months to transport goods from Kangding to Tibet (Sichuan, 1999:247).

The Qing government set up customs passes in Tachienlu (Kangding), prohibiting Han merchants from entering Tibet, who sold their goods to Tibetan merchants for sale to Tibet. Forwarding merchants in Xikang put goods in cartons wrapped in cowhide or directly in cowhide, and transported goods with cattle and horses, because this area featured barren land, rugged roads and harsh weather, and goods were likely to be damaged (Zhang, 2005:399). In contrast, the Qing government had weak control over the Lijiang, Zhongdian, Jianchuan and Atuntze (Deqen) route with less customs passes. Compared to Sichuan tea merchants, Yunnan merchants most entered Tibet for transport and sale.

Owing to the above factors, Yunnan tea was sold to Tibet in large quantities. In the late Qing dynasty and the Republican China period, horse caravans transporting Yunnan tea could enter Tibet directly. In the Republican China period, there were over 20 Yunnan firms doing business in Lhasa, mostly selling bowl tea (Han, 1984:96). Before the peaceful liberation of Tibet in 1951, there was a Yunnan provincial guild in Lhasa, and Yunnan merchants transported Yunnan tea to Tibet via two routes: the land route passed
through Myanmar, and the marine route through India (Xing, 2003:200). Yunnan tea was not only sold to the Deqen Tibetan area and Tibet, but also sold well in the Kham Tibetan area.

**International Environment: Pressure of Indian Tea Dumping and Conclusion of Unequal Treaties**

In the mid of 17th century, tea was introduced into Britain. From the 18th century, the custom of tea drinking became popular in Britain, and the demand for tea grew surprisingly. The British love for tea surpassed any other European country. In addition, the growing demand of the British for tea triggered two major events in the world history – the American Revolution and the China-Britain Opium War.

The outbreak of the Opium War was attributed to the sharp growth of British tea imports. In 1790, the East India Company imported 14.69 million pounds of tea from China. At the end of the 18th century, with the revocation of British tea import tax, tea import volume rose sharply to 20.35 million pounds in 1800 to 30.04 million pounds in 1830 and sharply to 40.67 million pounds in 1839 before the Opium War. In the first half of the 19th century, the per capita tea consumption in Britain grew moderately from 1.5 pounds in 1800 to almost 2 pounds in 1850. However, due to the rapid growth of the British population in this period, actual gross tea consumption actually doubled, and the tea was almost all imported by the East India Company from China (Moxham, 2010:62).

In contrast to the growing tea demand in Britain, China has almost no demand for Britain commodities except silver. This was because with the reform of the Chinese taxes and corvee system during the 16th-18th centuries, silver played a very important role at the state level, i.e., the operation of the state government organs then relied on silver, and almost all silver of China was imported. The British exchanged American silver for Chinese tea and other goods so that silver inflows entered the national fiscal system quickly, and were largely stocked up by the treasury, emperor and magnates. Therefore, some scholars suggest that the large-scale import of silver then avoided potential serious inflation (Chen and Liu, 2010).

Owing to the tremendous trade deficit between China and Britain, the British government began to encourage merchants to export opium planted in India into China to offset the deficit of tea trade. In August 1842 after the China-Britain Opium War in 1840, the defeated Qing government was forced to sign the unequal Nanjing Treaty with Britain. Afterwards, great powers like France and the U.S. also signed a series of unequal treaties with the Qing government. After the Opium War, Britain further expanded opium exports to China, causing severe damages to the Chinese economy. Although this war was called the Opium War, an important cause of its outbreak was Britain’s expanding demand for tea, and the tremendous trade deficit between China and Britain.

From the 18th century, the East India Company began to study the feasibility of planting tea in India in order to break the tea monopoly of the Qing government and reduce its trade deficit with China. When British envoy Macartney passed through a tea producing area in Jiangxi Province during his visit to China in 1793, he took away several tea trees with soil with the consent of local officials, and carried them to Bengal for research and trial planting (Morse, 1926: 229). In 1833, William Bentinck became Indian Viceroy, and began to study planting tea in India. In 1834, a tea committee was founded in Britain to introduce tea and seeds from China.

From the 19th century, the East India Company kept expanding to the Himalayan region. In 1826, the British seized Assam bordered by Bhutan, a river valley with lush trees in the Yarlung Tsangpo River Basin, ideal for plant growth. The British quickly found wild tea trees there, so Indian Viceroy Dr. Bruce set up the first tea plantation there. Owing to the poor taste of the local wild tea, Dr. Bruce tried to smuggle tea seeds and growers from tea producing areas of China. In the search for the best tea species, the East India Company assigned British gardener Robert Fortune to Chinese tea producing areas to collect plant samples and tea seeds in 1843. Fortune bought large quantities of high-grade tea seedlings and seeds in Anhui Province, and transported them to India along with some tea growers and whole sets of tea making tools (Rose, 2010:141). In the mid 19th century, Britain planted tea in Assam successfully. From 1860, Britain started extensive tea garden construction there, and expanded tea planting to Nepal.
and Sri Lanka. Afterwards, the output of Indian tea kept rising, with a gross output value of 60,533 British pounds in 1859 and 262,0140 British pounds in 1877, an increase of 45 times (Dutt, 1969:347). In 1880, the tea planting area of Britain on the south piedmont of the Himalayas reached 843 square kilometers, with three fourths in Assam. In 1888, the quantity of tea imported by Britain from India exceeded that from China for the first time, and tea became excess with the saturation of domestic demand (Moxham, 2010:113).

In order to promote the sale of excess tea, British India began to think of how to dump tea to the tea-loving Tibetans across the Himalayas in Tibet and northwestern China. George Bogle, who was assigned by the East India Company to Tashilhunpo Monastery as an envoy as early as 1780, was impressed by the tea drinking custom of the Tibetans. He described this as follows: “All people drink tea in the style of the Tatars, and those personages drink tea all the day” (Markham, 1879:51). This might be the first time when the British noticed the tea drinking custom of the Tibetans, and enhanced their understanding of this custom.

The entry of Indian tea into Tibet had been prohibited before the Shimla Conference. For example, a Darjeeling merchant smuggled Indian tea into Tibet in large quantities in 1872, but was arrested and imprisoned for three years in Phari on the Tibet-Bhutan border (Macaulay, 1885:89-91). After winning the first Britain-Tibet war, Britain signed the unequal Tibet-India Treaty with the Qing government and the Tibet local government in 1890, and the Renewed Tibet-India Treaty in 1893. According to the two treaties, Britain not only turned Dremojong (Sikkim) formerly affiliated to the Tibetan local government into its protectorate, but also got the privilege of access to port and cargo trade with five-year tax exemption in Yatung, opening the door for selling Indian tea in Tibet. However, the Tibet local government did not observe the relevant provisions of these treaties afterwards, and Han and Tibetan merchants were prohibited from doing business in Yatung. Yatung was located at the southernmost tip of the Chumbi Valley, with no civil residence, no resident, no food supply and no bazaar, and with only a small piece of river flat as an open zone. In 1894, German wool trader J.M. Korb sent a meeting notice to Tibetan merchants and local officials before coming to Yatung for trading, but no one appeared at the meeting. Korb felt helpless about this: “Yatung is unsuitable as a trading port” (Liu, 1997:61). The Tibet local government set up a customs pass in Phari that was truly open to trade, and prevented merchants of India and Sikkim from trading in Tibet, especially Indian tea (Liu, 1997:63), so that British merchants in India kept filing complaints with the British government. On the other hand, the Qing government and the Tibetan local government rejected the unreasonable request of British Indian Viceroy G.N. Curzon that the trading place be transferred from Yatung to Phari, and traders could contact the Tibetan local government directly (Lamb, 1960:241). After the failure of the negotiation between the Chinese and British sides in Ganba in 1903, the British government decided to take a military action using this as an excuse. Curzon assigned Francis Younghusband to attack Tibet in 1903. After the British troops occupied Lhasa, the Qing government and the Tibetan local government were forced to sign the Lhasa Treaty, opening up the road from India to Tibet and gaining trading rights in Tibet. In 1908, the agreement between Britain, China and Tibet Amending the Trade Regulations of 1893 was signed, which allowed the import of Indian tea into Tibet. All customs passes from Yatung and Phari to Gyantse and Shigatse were withdrawn, and Indian goods entered Tibet without any obstacle. In particular, the seizure of the Chumbi Valley changed the former Yatung-Tibet route, and reduced transport costs greatly. Francis Younghusband attacked Tibet for the purpose of seizing the Chumbi Valley and controlling the trade route for the export of Indian tea into Tibet (Younghusband, 1934:243-244). Afterwards, Britain built a road from the Chumbi Valley to Gyantse.

In 1826, the British seized Assam to border Bhutan. In 1835, British India leased Darjeeling from Dremojong as its Tibetan access base and transfer station. In 1861, the British defeated Dremojong, and got the railway right throughout Dremojong, making the central route of India-Tibet traffic smooth, and granting the British direct access to the Tibetan border via Darjeeling. In 1865, British India further defeated Bhutan, which ceded territory for peace, so the road between Bhutan and Tibet was also opened.
After conquering Myanmar and Sikkim, Britain immediately built a road to the southwest frontier of China. In 1879, British India completed the highway from Darjeeling to Mount Rina south of the Chumbi Valley. In 1881, the railway from Siliguri to Darjeeling was opened, and in 1886, the Darjeeling Railway was formally opened, so that trains could run from Calcutta in India to the Tibet frontier directly. In Myanmar, the railway from Yangon to Mandalay was opened in 1889, and the branch railway from Mandalay and Lashio was completed in 1902, so that tea from Yunnan tea producing areas could be transported in Lashio via Mandalay to Yangon by train, to Calcutta by ship, then from Calcutta to Kalimpong by train, and finally via the south piedmont of the Himalayas to Tibet by mule and horse.

Rise of the Land and Marine Corridors for the Sale of Yunnan Tea for Tibet

Yunnan tea was sold to Tibet either by land or sea. There were three land routes – one from Fohai – the main producing area of brick tea – via Simao, Jingdong, Lijiang, Deqen and Chamdo to Lhasa, another from the Lantsang River, Shuangjiang River, Mianning, Yunxian County, Shunning, Menghua, Xiaguan, Lijiang, Deqen and Chamdo to Lhasa; and the other from Kunming, Yuanmou and Huili to Kangding.

In the Qing dynasty and the Republican China period, tea sold from Yunnan to Tibet was transported by horse caravans mainly, from Pu’er and Simao, via Dali, Lijiang, Yongning and Muli to Tachienlu (Kangding), with some sold to Tibetan merchants in Kangding, and some further transported to Lhasa for sale. In addition, Tibetan horse caravans also purchased tea in Yunnan, and would go to Simao and Menghai in an endless stream in every spring and autumn, sometimes with up to 4,000-5,000 horses. They would sell some horses and returned with bought tea. Several famous major bazaars in western Yunnan, such as the March Fair in Dali and the Mule-Horse Fair in Lijiang, were also good opportunities for Tibetan horse caravans for exchanging goods and buying tea. At that time, large-scale Tibetan horse caravans traded in fur, musk, antlers, fritillaries, Cordyceps sinensis and other Tibetan specialties, and carried back tea when returning.

The Yunnan-Tibetan tea-horse land routes were mostly located in high mountains. Since southwestern Yunnan was hot with frequent plagues in the rainy period, when humans, mules and horses were likely to become ill, caravans usually passed from northwestern Yunnan through this region to Tibet before the May rainy period. Passage was difficult in summer when leeches prevailed and winter when mountains were covered by snow.

In the early Republican China period after the Xinhai Revolution, the situation of the Sichuan-Xikang region deteriorated by frequent warfare and active bandits, so that merchants deemed the Tibet-going route via Atuntze to be dangerous, and the land trade of Yunnan tea began to decline. Accordingly, most Yunnan tea was transported from Fohai via Yangon in Myanmar by land, to India by sea, and then to Tibet by land. This route became the marine route for the sale of Yunnan tea to Tibet.

After completion of the railway leading to Darjeeling in 1881, Yunnan merchants tried going to Lhasa from Shanghai, Calcutta, Darjeeling and Yatung as an alternative to the long land route from Chengdu via Tachienlu and Chamdo. In this Yunnan tea route making a detour via Southeast Asia and South Asia from Yunnan to Tibet, tea was transported from tea producing areas such as Simao and Xishuangbanna via Kengtung and Yangon in Myanmar by land, to Calcutta in India by sea, then to Darjeeling or Kalimpong by train, and finally from the south piedmont of the Himalayas to Tibet by mule and horse. This route was one of the main routes for the sale of Yunnan tea to Tibet in the Qing dynasty and the Republican China period. Convenient ship or railway transport was available throughout the route from Yunnan (by sea) to Yatung in Tibet except the last 300 miles (Lamb, 2002:178). After 1925, the number of Yunnan merchants doing tea business via this route increased gradually.

All goods entering Tibet from India had to pass through Kalimpong – the trading center of the Himalayan region, first going northward from Calcutta for 327 miles to Siliguri by train, then to Geillekohla 29 miles north by small train, and finally to Kalimpong by cable car. There were two mountain routes entering Tibet from Kalimpong.
One route passed through the Zalila Mountain Pass: from Kalimpong to Zalila (4 days), from Zalila to Natang (4 days), from Natang to Phari (4 days) and from Phari to Lhasa (13 days). This was the main corridor between India and Tibet, and could be used by both humans and livestock (Li, 2000:91).

The other route passed through the Ladola Mountain Pass and Sikkim, with 12 stops in total: 1) Jenbu; 2) Sikkim; 3) Bendenmeli; 4) Jensigang (all mountain roads afterwards); 5) Jima; 6) Bibidang; 7) Yatung; 8) Glika; 9) Ribigang; 10) Gano; 11) Phari; and 12) Lhasa. The time taken to pass through this route was almost the same as the first one. In 1904 after the second British invasion of Tibet, British troops were stationed in Chumbi, Tibet, Chumbi was turned into a trading port, and a path from the Ladola Mountain Pass to Chumbi was built. In 1923, the trade route from Sikkim to Ladola was further built, further facilitating the entry of goods from Sikkim into Tibet (Liu, 1997:160).

Goods transported from Kalimpong to Tibet had to be carried by mules and horses, with each fleet containing at least 100 mules and horses. Each mule or horse could carry about 70 kilograms, where tea was contained in two packs on both sides of the back, and covered with oil cloth for weatherproofing. From each October to next March, Tibetan caravans would carry Tibetan specialties to Kalimpong, buy Yunnan Kalimpong there after selling goods, and backtrack to Lhasa. This period was chosen to avoid rains mainly.

With the opening of the Yunnan-Myanmar Highway after the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War, Yunnan tea could be transported to Myanmar by truck, then to India by sea and then to Tibet by land, or directly from Menghai via Myanmar to Tibet by railway and water. High transport volumes reduced transport costs greatly.

Since neither the Tibet local government nor British India levied customs (Liu, 1997: 40-41), costs of selling Tibetan tea by sea were lower than those of Sichuan tea. In 1936, 750,000 kilogram of Yunnan tea was sold in Tibet, with per capita consumption of 0.75 kilogram (based on a Tibetan population of 1 million) (Tan, 1944). According to the 1954 archives of the Commerce Department of the Tibet Autonomous Region, from 1942 to 1954, 2,000-4,000 mules and horses entered Tibet from Yunnan, carrying in 600-1,700 loads of tea with a total weight of 550,000 kilograms. According to a survey by Tibet Trade Corporation in Kalimpong, India, 6,000 loads of brick tea with a total weight of 330,000 kilograms were imported from Kalimpong via Yatung in 1951 (Li, 2000: 18). The volume of Yunnan tea transported by sea was much more than that transported by land.

### TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1938</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>6000</td>
<td>10000</td>
<td>12000</td>
<td>15000</td>
<td>18000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total amount</td>
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<td>95000</td>
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<td>262800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


After 1911, tea sold from inland China to Tibet was almost all Yunnan tea, while Sichuan frontier tea was sold to Xikang mainly, with only a small amount of high-grade fine tea transported to Tibet for consumption by nobles and senior monks (Ren, 1990:260). In 1941, investigator Wang Kexun assigned by the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission to Xikang said after examining the economic situation of Xikang, “Tea merchants in Xikang are now selling Yunnan tea due to poor past business.” (Tang, 2005: 421)

In the 1940s, most Yunnan tea merchants in Lhasa were from Yunnan (Han, 1984:96). Han monk Xing Suzhi, who lived in Lhasa in the 1940s, recalled the head of the Lhasa Yunnan Guild was Zhang
Xiaozhou, who not only had business in Lhasa, but also set up a branch in Kalimpong, India (Xing, 2003:200). Among Yunnan merchants, Ma Shiyuan was most senior, who came to Tibet to deal with tea, jewelry and wool when he was young. Other Yunnan merchants and firms also included Ma Lianyuan, Zhu’s, Liu Futang, Zhang Xiaozhou, Heng Xiaozhou, Heng Shengong, Hong’s, etc (Li, 2000:36). Except Yunnan merchants, some Sichuan merchants also dealt with tea on a small scale in Lhasa. Section Chief Li Youyi of the Tibetan Office of the Republic of China government pointed out after examining the Lhasa market, “There are at most over 30 Yunnan merchants, dealing with the import of tea, copper, food, etc” (Li, 1951:87).

Yunnan tea sold to Tibet was used to prepare butter tea – a traditional Tibetan tea drink, and was highly popular among the Tibetans due to its mellow taste. However, from the early 20th century, Indian tea imitating Xikang brick tea and Yunnan bowl tea also entered the Tibetan market in large quantities. In the early 1940s, General Manager bskal bzang ye shes of Xikang-Tibet Trading Company found after visiting Kalimpong that there were several Tibetan tea firms run by Indians and Britain in Kalimpong, among which two were larger. One was Indian firm, which exchanged imitated Xikang brick tea and Yunnan bowl tea for Tibetan wool, and produced 7.5 tons of brick tea and 35 tons of bowl tea annually; the other was the firm of British, which produced 2,000 packs of imitated Fohai bowl tea annually (Bskal Bzang, 2005:336).

The sale of Yunnan tea to Tibet did not go smoothly, because the British Indian government often prevented Chinese merchants residing in India from traveling between India and Tibet. On September 2, 1912, Cantonese merchant Lu Xingqi running Tianyi Firm in Calcutta called President Yuan Shikai, alleging “The British envoy interfered with Tibetan affairs…… disallowing Chinese to go to Tibet from India.”(Wu, 1983:34) Since tax exemption for commodities entering Tibet from India covered Tibetan nobles and merchants only, Han merchants had to buy a tax exemption certificate issued by the British from Tibetan nobles or merchants, and such certificate became a considerable income source for Tibetan nobles then (Xing, 2003:203). Tibetan tycoons such as Punda Tsang, Sadu Tsang and Tsha Rong had established firms in Kalimpong and other places to deal with wool and tea, in which Sadu Tsang was the Tibetan dealer of a British great tea merchant, and his commission was one tenth of the after-sales price.

CONCLUSION

Tibetan is one of the ethnic groups that like drinking tea the most in the world, and tea drinking is an essential part of their daily lives. According to available Tibetan and Han historical records, tea drinking in Tibet can be dated back to the Btsan-po period, namely the Tang dynasty in inland China, when tea was not popular in the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, and was a rare drink available to nobles and monks and even a good drug. In the Song dynasty, with the intensification of tea-horse trade between Tibet and the Song dynasty, tea entered Tibet in large quantity, and tea drinking quickly became popular in all classes of Tibetan society as a custom and lifestyle. In the Ming and Qing dynasties, tea became a daily necessity for the Tibetans. As a Tibetan proverb states, “One would rather refrain from food for three days than refraining from tea for one day.” However, although the tea drunk by the Tibetans is called “Tibetan tea”, it is not produced in Tibet, but in tea producing areas in Ya’an and Pingwu in Sichuan Province, southwestern Yunnan Province and southern Shaanxi Province. In view of the importance of tea for the Tibetans, tea was controlled by the governments of the past central dynasties as an important means of controlling non-Han people. However, from another perspective, tea had greater political significance than economic significance in maintaining the relationship between the government of the central dynasty and Tibetan areas.

The sale of Yunnan tea to Tibet began in the late Ming dynasty and the early Qing dynasty, and grew rapidly with many routes of horse caravans entering Tibet. Dali and Lijiang in Yunnan Province rose quickly as transfer and distribution hubs of Yunnan tea entering Tibet. However, for a long period, Tibetan tea produced in Sichuan remained the primary variety sold to Tibet, and enjoyed irreplaceably important
status. In the late Qing dynasty, especially after the Xinhai Revolution in 1911, the relationship between Tibet and the central government weakened under British armed intervention. The sales volume of Tibetan tea produced in Sichuan kept dropping due to unsmooth roads leading to Tibet, excessively high prices and especially the dumping of Indian tea. In the meantime, with the opening of marine corridor of Yunnan tea, and the signing of the Yunnan-Myanmar Commercial Treaty between China and Britain, and the Amended Tibet-India Trade Regulations between China and Britain, which stipulated that no tax was to be levied among Yunnan, Myanmar, Tibet and India, the cost of marine transport of Yunnan tea to Tibet was reduced greatly, and its sales volume in Tibet kept rising. In the early Republican China period, Yunnan tea became the main variety of inland tea in place of Tibetan tea produced in Sichuan. In the Republican China period, Indian and Yunnan teas became the main varieties of Tibetan tea sold in Tibet. This situation did not change until 1959, when Ya’an frontier tea became the main variety of Tibetan tea again.

The marine corridor rose when Indian tea was dumped in Tibet after the two Britain-Tibet wars, frustrating Britain’s attempt of monopolizing the Tibetan tea market while supplying daily necessities to the Tibetan people, and playing an important role of maintaining connections between Tibet and inland China.

ENDNOTES

1. Liu Zhiyang is a professor at School of Sociology and Anthropology, and a research fellow at Centre for Historical Anthropology in Sun Yat-sen University, China. This study was supported by a grant from Guangdong Planning Office of Philosophy and Social Science (GDXK201703).

2. Brick tea is made by picking, processing and packing, in which picking includes collection and sorting, processing includes screening, mixing, weighing, steaming, rubbing, presssing, unpacking and re-drying, and packing includes inner and outer packing.

3. In February 1890, the Qing government assigned Sheng Tai to Calcutta to sign the Tibet-India Treaty with British Indian Viceroy Lansdowne, not only admitting that Sikkim was protected by Britain, but also redefined the border between Tibet and Sikkim as required by the British, so that China lost a lot of land. In 1893, after Sheng Tai’s death in 1892, the Qing government assigned He Changrong to sign the Renewed Tibet-India Treaty with the British in Darjeeling, stating that China would open up Yatung as a trading port, where the British were entitled to extraterritorial jurisdiction here, and also that goods imported via the Tibet-Sikkim border would be tax-exempted for five years.
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Flexible Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from A Chinese Company in Africa

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In the emergent field of corporate social responsibility (CSR) studies, there has been growing interest in understanding and practice in particular sociocultural contexts in developing countries. As a rising force of overseas investment, Chinese enterprises are increasingly encountering local challenges stemming from CSR. This paper is an ethnographic study of a Chinese gold mining company in contemporary Ghana in regard to CSR knowledge and practice. It investigates how multiple actors negotiate understandings of CSR in a Chinese gold mining company as compared with an American gold mining company. The research was conducted near the mining sites located in Odumase of Eastern region and Juaso of Ashanti region of Ghana during 2016. Its CSR practice was compared with that of the Akyem mining site operated by an American mining corporation. Through ethnographic fieldwork, this paper contextualizes the construction of diverse understandings of CSR among multiple actors in this Chinese investment project. It also demonstrates how both formal and informal engagements with affected communities constitute its CSR practice. Based on a case study and comparison with an American mining company, this paper finds that large-scale Chinese mining operation in Africa is receptive of the concept of CSR but its practice is very unique.

INTRODUCTION

The last two decades have witnessed China’s rising profile as a global investor especially in the developing world. From its “Go Global” (走出去) strategy to the most recent Belt and Road Initiative, China has audaciously embraced globalization and mercantilism. Against such background, Chinese enterprises and entrepreneurs encounter the culturally “other” around the globe on an unprecedented scale.

China’s foreign direct investments (FDI) to Africa have been growing at an unprecedented rate with its total FDI stock in Africa reaching US$39.88 billion in 2016 (MOC, 2016), more than twelve times of that in 2004. Although only Africa received about 2.9% of China’s total FDI, the substantial growth in the new millennium reflects that the continent has been one of the most popular FDI destinations for Chinese companies. The three largest sectors of China’s FDI to Africa are construction (28.3%), mining (26.1%) and manufacturing (12.8%). Chinese investments in Africa’s mining sector are particularly active when compared with its global FDI profile with only 11.2% going to mining (MOC, 2016). Although Chinese investment in Africa’s mining sector has grown more vigorously during the past decade than that from the US, China is still a relatively new player. Mining accounts for 66% of US total FDI stock in 2015 (Eom et al., 2017).
A major challenge to Chinese enterprises in overseas investment is adapting to the social, cultural, legal, and political environment. In extractive industries such as mining, challenges are most arresting since operations usually cause concerns about significant social change in affected communities. Chinese companies usually face challenges from multiple stakeholders at the local level who are seeking alternative sources of income, compensation for affected land, relocation of housing, and environment reclamation, all of which should be addressed by corporate social responsibility theories and practices. In addressing these challenges brought by China’s global investments, enterprises are still exploring paths and theories of corporate social responsibility for their own unique problems. In 2012, China for the first time published the Guide on Social Responsibility for Chinese International Contractors (Ministry of Commerce&China International Contractors Association, 2012). While the Chinese government recognizes the crucial importance of CSR for its overseas investments, this guideline is written for construction and civil engineering companies and does not provide standard CSR benchmark for diverse industries. As a result, successful investments usually apply an ad hoc approach in their CSR practices locally and achieve a hybrid form of existence within the local contexts.

Many Western scholars have focused on the implications of Chinese FDI in developing countries from the perspective of Western legal and social frameworks. For example, analyses of Chinese presence in Africa express concerns of poor labor conditions, environment degradation, and corruption. Notwithstanding these existing issues, these analyses have failed to investigate such processes via a bottom-up approach, and therefore miss the idiosyncratic conditions and diverse factors contributing to the Chinese experience regarding the social, cultural, and political implications of FDI. The anthropologists have focused on labor issues (Lee, 2007), manager-employee relationship (Giese 2010), and corruption (Kragelund, 2009). Corporate social responsibility (CSR) of Chinese enterprises is one of the least discussed areas among studies of China-Africa engagement.

Most of the scholarship on CSR is addressed in management studies. Management literature focuses mostly on the level of corporation and formal market. However, economic anthropologists have long argued that economic behavior is not mere rational choices but is embedded in other social institutions as well. CSR practice as corporate behavior is also embedded in wider social, cultural, and institutional contexts that involve both formal and informal actors. When studying CSR in developing countries, conceptual models and methods that are used to study corporations in formal market economies are no longer adequate to capture the complex processes in which CSR is expressed and practiced by multi-level actors in various formal and informal institutions (Jamali and Karam, 2016). Furthermore, CSR is co-constructed via negotiation among actors from both business and non-business contexts. Thus, CSR expressions and practice can benefit from the holistic approach and micro-focus of anthropological approaches that examine at the level of actor practice.

Business and development anthropologists have started to join the table to contribute its methodology and theories. In the field of CSR, anthropologists have offered insights on how CSR is articulated and realized through on-the-ground case studies in many sectors (Dolan and Rajak, 2016). In particular, scholars have investigated specific practices of CSR and responses in local contexts around the world (Sawyer, 2004; Kirsch, 2006; De Neve, 2009; Dolan and Scott, 2009; Li, 2010; Gardner, 2012; Gilberthorpe, 2013). These contributions pave the way for further theorization of CSR in diverse socio-cultural contexts in which both corporations and local communities operate.

While studying CSR in contexts of developing countries, anthropologists have a special duty, which is to construct a CSR theory inductively based on their fieldwork rather than to interpret findings in terms of theories in Western market economy contexts. The conceptual framework of CSR formed in the Western contexts has been imported to China since the 1990s (Moon and Shen, 2010). In the recent wave of outward investments, many Chinese businesses fail to meet local CSR expectations, which results in controversies and losses. With a late exposure to this imported construct, entrepreneurs and CEOs of Chinese corporations become increasingly aware of its importance during their OFDI operations. In response, the Chinese government has put forward regulations regarding CSR activities (Yin and Zhang,
2012). However, CSR awareness among most managers and CEOs is still limited. Many are not cognizant of CSR international standards (Xu, 2010). State-owned enterprises, large-scale enterprises and companies that are traded in the stock market practice CSR more assiduously. Thus, it is crucial to understand how CSR is understood and practiced by Chinese corporations within a particular local context.

This paper aims at adding to the existing anthropological scholarship of CSR by providing a specific case study of CSR practice of a Chinese mining corporation in Ghana. By examining attitudes and practices by various Chinese and African actors, it aims at identifying a CSR construct with Chinese characteristics and its implications against the backdrop of China’s prominent profile in Africa. This paper also contributes to CSR literature on developing countries by joining discussions about fieldwork-based localized CSR theory. This paper hopes also to contribute to business anthropology scholarship on Chinese OFDI by identifying challenges of Chinese enterprises investing overseas.

This paper is based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in the Odumase, Juaso, and Akyem (Figure 1), all of which are towns near the mining sites, as well as Accra, Ghana in 2016. Participant-observation and semi-structured interviews were conducted with the chief geologist, community program manager, Chinese project manager, and CEO of a Chinese gold mining company. Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with local chiefs, opinion leaders, members of social responsibility forum near the mining sites. Interviews were also constructed in Accra, with chief technological officer of the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources and staff members of Ghana Minerals Commission.

![FIGURE 1](map.png)

**FIGURE 1**

**MAP OF FIELD SITES (FROM LEFT TO RIGHT: JUASO, AKYEM, ODUMASE)**

**Ghana’s Gold Mining Industry and Chinese Investments**

Ghana is considered as a strong democracy in West Africa and model example of neoliberal reforms. Following the unsuccessful socialist configuration of its economy envisioned by Kwame Nkrumah in the 1950s and 1960s, Ghana has fully embraced neoliberal principles and has become a major hub economy led by export-oriented growth in the West African region (Aryeetey and Harrigan, 2000).

In the 1980s, Ghana initiated structural adjustment programs prescribed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in an effort to recover from domestic agricultural crisis and an international debt crisis (Rothchild, 1991). Without a full-fledged industrial base, Ghana is deeply locked in its foreign
trade agreements mandated by its lenders and thus heavily relies on exporting its natural resources such as gold, timber, minerals or food stuffs like cocoa and shea nuts (Chalfin, 2004).

In the mining sector, these policies include divesting state gold mines, rehabilitation of existing mines, liberalization of exchange rate, and implementing attractive policies and legal, fiscal, and institutional framework for the minerals sector. Such policy changes have resulted in an increase of gold production from 240,000 ounces in 1984 to 4.4 mn ounces currently. The minerals sector contributes 16% of the domestic revenue. Total investment inflow into the sector since 1983 is 15 billion USD. (Speech by the Minister of Lands and Natural Resources, Nii Osah Mills, 2016)

In the mid-1990s, Ghana furthered its effort to integrate itself into the world economy when the Trade and Investment Gateway initiative was put forth, paving the way for its position as an economic hub for the West African region (Chalfin, 2004). Efforts such as tax-free industrial zones and seeking aid for transport infrastructure aiming at increasing foreign investments and making Ghana an attractive gateway for foreign capital.

Around the same time, China has been experimenting on its own market reform since the 1980s. China’s investment in Africa dramatically intensified since 2000 and its aid programs in Africa also took a new turn to emphasize win-win relationship with recipients. Facilitated by the “Go Global” strategy designed by Chinese government that encourages Chinese companies to internationalize and invest in foreign markets, many Chinese state-owned companies used foreign aid projects as stepping stones to establish themselves and expand to other sectors. Private sector capital and state-owned company join resources to take advantage of neoliberal policies on both sides, contributing to increasing Chinese presence.

The Chinese footprint in Ghana’s gold mining is relatively new as compared to Western countries such as UK, U.S.A and Australia. The earliest Chinese gold mining prospecting in Ghana took place in the late 1980s when a group of geologists from Heilongjiang province visited there. There is no official data available on the number of Chinese-owned gold mining companies in Ghana. According to Chinese Embassy in Ghana, only a few Chinese corporations have proper licenses to operate in Ghana in 2016.

These Chinese companies have only obtained reconnaissance or prospecting licenses. The reconnaissance license can only grant limited reconnaissance operations for an initial period of twelve months. The prospecting licenses grant operations for three years (Ghana, 2006). According to data obtained from the Minerals Commission, only five Chinese companies are among the list of companies granted mineral rights in 2016. Of these five, the Chinese company in this paper is the only one that has obtained mining lease rights (see Table 1).
TABLE 1  
LIST OF CHINESE GOLD MINING COMPANIES REGISTERED  
WITH MINERALS COMMISSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Company</th>
<th>Size (km²)</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Category²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CJIC-China International Investments Ltd</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>Wassa Dunkwa</td>
<td>Western</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guanhua Mining Investment Ghanaian Ltd</td>
<td>25.51</td>
<td>Kutukrom</td>
<td>Western</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubei Yangtze International Mining Co. Ltd</td>
<td>51.02</td>
<td>Yawkrom</td>
<td>Western</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaanxi Mining Gh. Ltd</td>
<td>300.52</td>
<td>Kulungugu</td>
<td>Upper East</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akoko Goldfields Ltd</td>
<td>28.07</td>
<td>Wirenkyiren Amanfroo</td>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>AX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: List of Companies that have been granted mineral rights as on January 12, 2016. Minerals Commission.

In addition to these officially registered large-scale Chinese companies, it is estimated that thousands of Chinese nationals operate in small-scale surface gold mining, which is prohibited for foreign nationals by Ghanaian law. As a result, the Ghanaian law enforcement agencies frequently arrest individual Chinese miners for violating mining regulations and immigration laws. The Ghanaian enforcement has led numerous crackdowns on illegal small-scale mining since 2009. The presence of small-scale Chinese gold mining triggers conflicts with Ghanaian artisanal miners as well as concerns of local community regarding environment.

The Policy Environment of Gold Mining and CSR

Although foreign nationals are prohibited to operate in small-scale gold mining, Ghana does have a regulatory framework for gold mining operations by large-scale corporations. The policy environment in which these enterprises are to operate not only consists of national laws, policies, guidelines, but also includes customary system of governance at the local level such as community stool land management by chiefs.

The laws governing all minerals and mining activities include Ghana’s Minerals and Mining Act (703), Minerals and Mining (Amendment) Act (794), and Minerals and Mining (Amendment) Act (900). As an addition to ensure mining sector’s contribution to sustainable development, Ghana recently launched Minerals and Mining Policy (Ghana 2016). Two highlights of the new policy are: 1. to regulate small-scale mining to be environmentally responsible, and 2. to ensure the integration of the mining industry with the local economy, especially the service sector.

From the perspective of government regulatory body, mining corporations need to meet requirement in the following areas: 1. the licensing of mineral and mining operations; 2. environmental regulations; 3. occupational health and safety; 4. fiscal policy attracting investments; 5. consultation with affected stakeholders and community development.
Ghana’s Minerals Commission provides a more detailed guideline for CSR (Minerals Commission, 2012). The ten themes of the guidelines include: corporate governance and ethics, human rights, workplace and labor standards, health and safety, environmental stewardship, risk assessment and management, material and supply chain stewardship, community and social development, stakeholder engagement, and compliance and reporting.

A Chinese Gold Mining Company’s CSR Practice

In his fifty’s, Mr. L has been an entrepreneur in Ghana for over a decade. Originally from Zhejiang province, Mr. L had worked in many sectors before becoming an agricultural chemicals businessman in Ghana, selling pesticide and farming equipments from his Kumasi-based company. When the gold price had picked up around 2008, he saw opportunities in the gold mining and started a transition towards mining sector. In 2009, he persuaded an agricultural products and trading company from his hometown to acquire his Ghanaian company and became the CEO. The new company became a subsidiary of the Hong Kong listed holding company and Mr.L was able to pool capital to acquire 83% share of a Ghanaian mining company having mining rights on a 28.07 square kilometers concession and reconnaissance permit for 56.13 square kilometers in East Akim District of the Eastern Region. Thus, Mr. L’s new mining company became the only Chinese controlled mining company that has been granted mining lease license.

As a savvy entrepreneur, Mr. L is familiar with the policy environment of gold mining and adept at navigating through complex relations with regulatory agencies, Ghanaian business partners, and local chiefs. He is well aware of the social impacts of gold mining and risks of small-scale artisanal mining. Thus, he chooses to invest in large-scale gold mining by cooperating with large Chinese mining corporations that have extensive experience.

In 2014, Mr. L’s GS Mining company started to have partnership with a Chinese state-owned geological exploration company, JS geological service, to conduct reconnaissance at concessions near Odumase of Eastern region and Juaso of Ashanti region. In 2014, GS mining decided to first engage in surface mining at its Odumase site.

The Odumase community first opposed the mining operations, assuming it would pollute the Dansu river and farmers were also unwilling to give up their land where they grew crops such as cocoa requiring long-term cultivation. Local farmers also expressed concerns since surface mining operated elsewhere by small-scale miners from Guangxi, China caused serious environmental degradations. The local chief, the regional chief of Kibi, farmer representatives, opinion leaders, and assemblywoman all showed concerns. Thus, GS mining hired two Ghanaians, S and M as community relations officers to consult with all affected stakeholders. GS mining invited them to meet and explain their proposed work.

By relying on local talent, GS was able to connect with local stakeholders without language barrier. S has extensive working experience in gold mining companies and had worked for the Ghanaian mining company GS acquired for four years. M had worked for an Australian gold mining company called Pesos Mining before joining GS. After several meetings with stakeholders, GS mining finds all the affected farmers and explained in detail how the mining would be carried out. Then, S and M invited stakeholders to form a compensation committee for the Odumase surface mining operation and hold meetings to discuss compensation terms. The local chief on behalf of the compensation committee of the affected community agrees on compensation terms. Then, S and M invited land evaluation officer from Korforidua to survey affected farmland and meet with affected farmers to discuss total compensation for their crops (see Table 2).
### TABLE 2
AMOUNT COMPENSATED TO FARMERS AFFECTED BY GS MINING COMPANY’S PHASE IV OPERATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affected Farmers</th>
<th>Crop compensated for</th>
<th>Acre</th>
<th>Amount (Ghc)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cocoa</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Maize, Freeland</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>14,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cocoa</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>2,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cocoa</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>2,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Cocoa</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Cocoa</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>10,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Pepper</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>4,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Cocoa</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Freeland</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>2,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Cocoa</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>11,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Freeland</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>9,375</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Golden Sunshine Ghana Ltd.

In addition to crop compensation, the compensation committee asks for a new main palace for the chief, a primary school, scholarships for students, a public market structure, public restrooms, as well as a public market. According to the Odumase local chief and a former assemblywoman, they initially had concerns, but were glad that S and M used the compensation committee as a platform to explain the process and negotiate compensation terms. These were established CSR models practiced by Western mining companies such as Newmont. Most importantly, the land was reclaimed after the mining operation. It is S and M’s prior CSR knowledge and practicing experience that enabled the Odumase surface mining to go smoothly.

The main issue during compensation process is the identification of real owners of affected land. Farmers as tenants of the land are also compensated to an agreed amount between the owners and GS mining. Another obstacle during negotiation with farmers is related to the seasonal feature of agriculture. Some of the affected area is in strip lands near the river. In such strip lands, one end is on the hilly side while the other is close to the Dansu river. Farming lands are organized this way because in the dry season irrigation is easier. Thus farmers grow vegetables that need continuous irrigation in such strip lands. Cocoa plants need about 7 to 8 years before it can yield satisfying quality beans. Therefore, for farmers who have just started their batch of cocoa, it is emotionally difficult for them to lose the opportunity to see the harvest even if they get compensated. Sometimes, when the mining work approach the affected land which has been already compensated for, farmers still have to be persuaded again because it is close to harvest time. “They have a deep attachment to their crops and we have to take that into account,” commented by S, who also own land elsewhere. S and M were quite sensitive to such issues since they have family members who are farmers.
It is interesting to note that according to Mr. L, CEO of GS mining, compensation seems to mean concrete things such as money, a clinic or a school building. However, what S and M have faced during the compensation process calls for a more comprehensive plan that takes into consideration the seasonal feature of agriculture and farmers’ emotional attachment to their hard work and way of life. Affected farmers can reduce their loss, both economic and psychological, from the mining operations if it is coordinated with farming seasons. Farming knowledge and experience enabled S and M to communicate with affected farmers and manage mining work more effectively. S also takes some farmers to other proper mining sites in farming areas to observe how proper mining is conducted. These farmers come back to educate other farmers and to ensure them the reclamation procedures can still return the land to a good condition.

Therefore, S and M are instrumental in realizing CSR themes regarding environmental stewardship, risk assessment and management, community and social development, as well as stakeholder engagement. Their local expertise and prior work experience are the core assets for GS mining’s CSR practice. However, this does not mean that Mr. L and other Chinese actors in GS mining have the same understanding of CSR.

**Newmont Ghana’s CSR Practice**

Newmont Ghana Gold Limited (NGGL) has been operating as a leading foreign controlled gold mining company in Ghana for more than ten years. NGGL has two major mining sites: the Ahafo site and the Akyem site. The Ahafo mine is located in the Brong Ahafo region and is Newmont’s first African site. The Akyem site is newer and located in the Birim North District of the Eastern Region. NGGL incorporates CSR in its corporate governance by adhering to the IFC Performance Standards in terms of Environmental and Social Responsibility Practices.

In order to include the community into the economic gains led by mining, NGGL established the Community Development Unit. The initiatives undertaking Community Development Unit include local business opportunities, infrastructure projects and educational programs. In addition, NGGL helped the affected community to establish NADeF, thus enabling and supporting community initiated development programs.

Field visits to the Akyem mine affected community find a range of community development efforts by NGGL. The Akyem mine local community and NGGL reached a social responsibility agreement, which stipulates how NGGL’s growth could enkindle the growth of local community. Community development programs that Newmont has already implemented are: 1. a new primary school; 2. scholarship for students from all ten affected communities; 3. traditional festivals are funded; 4. micro-financing program for people in need; 5. two acres of land, fertilizer, crop seeds are provided to affected farmers for five years; 6. resettlement community called Yayaso is completed for one affected community; 7. water sanitation projects; 8. new roads running through the town and a tunnel bridge over which Newmont vehicles used to access the mining site. The funding for these projects comes from the Community Development Foundation, which reserves 1% of profit of the gold produced by Newmont.

Since Akyem started commercial production in 2013, several issues have been concerns for local community members. First, using dynamite has affected families. Second, the mining operations boost the service sector in Akyem—resorts, restaurants, and hotels have opened—but the cost of living has risen as well. Third, crime rate has increased. All of these concerns are discussed at the Social Responsibility Forum.

**Flexible CSR practice in Chinese Context**

Despite the different development stages of GS mining and NGGL, what is unique about a Chinese mining company’s CSR awareness and practice?

Chinese corporations grow in a context that business-to-government *guanxi* plays an important role in affecting the performance of a corporation (Braendle et al, 2005). According to Mr. L, corporation is for
profit and does not need to put much effort in the community and society, especially at its early development stage. Though Chinese corporations become more aware of CSR, they are exercising such responsibilities as a proxy to fulfill government requirements. According to a survey conducted by Xu (2014), Chinese managers’ understanding of CSR consists of the following unique dimensions: employment advancement, business ethics, and social stability. With such vague understanding in mind, Chinese managers and CEOs, especially those of state-owned enterprises, are not actively seeking to incorporate CSR in its operations at their own. They are more familiar with reporting to government guidelines than negotiating with stakeholder and community. When operating overseas, such CSR understanding is brought to investment destinations and many Chinese corporations over-simplify CSR as a way to build and report good public relation with the local community and compliance with government guidelines.

Based on the case study of GS mining, CSR awareness is comprised of multiple components from various Chinese and Ghanaian actors within the company. First, Mr. L, as a well-established entrepreneur in Ghana, is aware of CSR guidelines listed by the Minerals Commission. However, he believes that only full-fledged businesses can afford to comprehensively integrate CSR into corporate governance. Here, CSR as a construct means something that his company offers back to the community in concrete forms, such as donation of a primary school building or a drilled well for local village. He prioritizes government regulation bodies and individuals in power positions in operating his mining business. These include government bodies such as MLNR, Minerals Commission, local chiefs at the concession, and other local systems of governance. This is informed by Chinese business culture that focuses on guanxi management with government. On the other hand, local employees, affected farmers, and other community members are not prioritized and are considered as “people who need to be dealt with”.

Second, S and M are Ghanaian employees who offer local expertise for project operations including issues concerning community relations. Their background and previous CSR knowledge and experience facilitate GS mining in fulfilling certain CSR aspects including stakeholder engagement, community and social development, and environment stewardship. S and M borrow CSR practice they obtained from past employers and carry them out on an ad-hoc basis as they become necessary during mining operations. Although CSR is not an integral component of GS mining’s corporate governance system like the case of NGGL, local expertise and ad-hoc practice enable GS mining to fulfill some social responsibilities during its early stage. As a local opinion leader commented, “I hope GS mining continues to learn from CSR practice of NGGL.”

Third, Chinese geological staff and managers are not familiar with CSR concept but perform certain aspects in their daily duties. This is most evidently demonstrated in their daily work and engagement with local employees, community members, and other Ghanaian actors. Mr. J is a young technician in charge of reconnaissance job for GS mining. At the workplace, one of the biggest challenges for him is to manage Ghanaian employees who are often late for work or idling during work. He got the local chief to persuade them to accept wage settlement by contract rather than by day. This has changed their work performance. Mr. J also carried out CSR by engaging local stakeholders and fulfilling compliance. The work visa of geological staff is applied in the name of GS mining, partner of JS geological service, which results in the inconsistency between the work visa of the geological staff of JS and GS mining that hold the account. To solve this issue, Mr. J consulted with GS mining, cultivated guanxi relations with various Ghanaian governing bodies including Ghana Immigration Authority and Minerals Commission, and finally solve the problem of opening new accounts for JS geological service.

According to Ghana Minerals Commission’s CSR guidelines, CSR consists of ten areas. Based on the case study of GS mining, the most relevant CSR themes are workplace and labor standards, environmental stewardship, risk assessment and management, community and social development, stakeholder engagement, and compliance and reporting. Compared with NGGL, GS mining does not have an integral corporate office in charge of CSR in its mining operations, nor does it have a permanent organizational platform for local stakeholders to govern and discuss community development. However,
GS mining does perform CSR on an ad-hoc basis and is inclusive of anyone who is directly relevant with corporate operations. From the perspectives of CEO, local community relations officers, and geological technician and manager, CSR is practiced in tandem with operation goals via their engagement with stakeholders. But there is lack of a unified understanding of CSR.

CONCLUSION

During the past decade, there has been growing interest in CSR practice in developing countries. Although most CSR scholarship is contributed by management field, anthropologists who are interested in business organizations and the ethical aspects of corporate behavior also join the discussion. The anthropology of CSR has made unique contribution to the field by studying how CSR is understood and practiced in particular socio-cultural contexts and various responses to these practices (Dolan and Rajak, 2016). The uniqueness of anthropological contribution lies in its holistic perspective and ethnographic approach. By shifting focus away from organization and zooming in on multiple actors on the ground, ethnographic findings contextualize particular configurations of CSR awareness and doing.

Based on the case study of GS mining, a Chinese large-scale gold mining enterprise in Ghana, this paper identifies the unique CSR understanding by examining multiple actors: CEO, community relations officers, and geological technician. The comparison with an American gold mining company, NGGL, finds that CSR practice in GS mining is different in three ways. First, the Chinese company lacks a permanent organizational platform for CSR practice and does not have specialized CSR personnel. The practice is on an ad-hoc basis and integrated with corporate operations carried out by various actors. Second, GS mining is open to any actor from either formal or informal context to participate in its CSR practice. There is no fixed definition of the community that requires fulfillment of social responsibility, whereas NGGL gives definition to affected community and draw the line between those included and those excluded. Third, GS mining does not have a unified CSR understanding throughout its corporation, but various actors integrate CSR practice in their daily duties, while NGGL has made CSR a specialized component within its corporate governance system (see Table 3). In short, CSR practice in GS mining is flexible, ad-hoc, and more inclusive of multiple actors. This attests to the understanding that economic activities are deeply embedded in social institutions and various system of governance.


**TABLE 3**

COMPARISON OF GS MINING AND NGGL REGARDING CSR PRACTICE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development stage</th>
<th>Inclusion of CSR actors</th>
<th>Organizational support</th>
<th>CSR practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GS mining</td>
<td>Early; Reconnaissance stage</td>
<td>Open to formal/informal actors; no definition of affected community</td>
<td>No permanent CSR support; No organizational platform; Ad-hoc team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newmont Ghana Gold Limited</td>
<td>Full-fledged; Active production stage</td>
<td>Clearly defines affected community and exclude other members</td>
<td>The social responsibility forum; Community Development Foundation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This paper contributes to the study of CSR in several ways. First, this paper offers a specific case of how CSR is practiced in a Chinese company overseas. Ethnographic method and analysis of multi-level actors shed light on the particular socio-cultural contexts. It also provides a comparison with how CSR is practiced in an American company and summarizes its uniqueness. Second, it adds to the discussion of CSR theorization. The study of CSR practice in developing countries requires CSR theory that is built on empirical studies and ethnographic fieldwork. Theories informed by Western market economy contexts are not fit for this purpose.

**ENDNOTES**

1. Yang Jiao is visiting assistant professor of anthropology at Miami University. The ethnographic research was funded by a Johns Hopkins SAIS-CARI fellowship (Grant number: SAIS-CARI-15-03) in Odumase, Juaso, Akyem, and Accra in Ghana. The author is grateful for the support of key informants in Ghana, Mr. L, W, S and M at GS Mining and MLNR chief technological officer and Peter at Ghana Minerals Commission.
2. F refers to foreign-controlled. AX refers to Mining Leases.
3. Stool land refers to land that is managed by chiefs in Ghana. Stool symbolizes power and authority in Ghanaian chieftaincy. Such land has customary or community tenure.
REFERENCES


China's Urban Migrants: The Role of Ethnic Enterprises and Entrepreneurs

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Over the past few decades, most researches have focused on comparative study of the economic performance of different migrant groups in cities, or their economic participation patterns. In this paper, based on first-hand information of recent surveys in some cities of China, we use the "ethnic enclave" and its economic circle theory trying to illustrate that among various factors that have affected the formation of the ethnic economic-cultural pattern, the most important and substantial roles are played by the ethnic enterprises and the ethnic entrepreneurs.

INTRODUCTION

Since the Reform and Opening-up of China, the distribution pattern of ethnic groups in Chinese cities presented a "scattered" and "hybrid" trend, with large-scale population floating across regions and ethnicities and its city-oriented direction as its basic motivation. Some scholars worry that the fast process of urbanization will generate the "fragmentation" groups (Hao, 2017). Will all the border ethnic minorities migrating to a city with higher population heterogeneity be "fragmented"? And what changes will it bring to different ethnics?

Over the past few decades, most researches focused on the comparison of economic performance of different ethnic immigrant groups, or their economic participation. Chan Kwok Bun & Claire Chiang (1994) wrote in their work Stepping Out: The Making of Chinese Entrepreneurs: immigration is not a new topic, but linking immigration with entrepreneurship, to understand the process how the immigrants transformed themselves into small businessmen, businessmen, entrepreneurs and industrialists is quite novel. They got rid of the existing socio-economic structures and blocks, seized new opportunities for development, and created a new socio-economic structure. With this issue, we carried out the research work on the floating urban minorities (immigrants).

LITERATURE REVIEW: STUDIES ON URBAN MIGRANTS, ETHNIC ENTERPRISES AND ENTREPRENEURS

During 1970-1980, there were conducted a number of studies on the Chinese community (especially Chinatown). V. Nee and B. Nee (1973) conducted investigation and researches on the Chinese community in America. They are mainly focused on a variety of factors that affect the economy and the economic success of Chinese immigrants gathered in the region. B.P. Wong’s study found that the relation between entrepreneurs and migrant workers in Chinatown lies in that the entrepreneurs provide shelters and
protection to the new immigrants and act as brokers for the immigrants. While providing assistance to the
Chinese immigrants, the entrepreneurs also derive large profits from the business (Wong, 1988). Peter
Kwong organized empirical research on New York Chinatown's evolving process from the 1930s to the
1950s, in which in-depth analysis of the labor market and laborers' living condition were revealed. He
believes that in the immigrants gathering zone like the New York Chinatown, the foremen utilize the
immigrants who are not familiar with the new environment to make huge profits through low wages, poor
working conditions and extended working hours, and other means. Thus those foremen became the
nouveau riche, while a large number of migrant workers still live in poverty. In short, in Chinatown, these
bigwigs took the cheap immigrants labor as their new wealth accumulation tool and a ladder to climb to a
higher class in the United States (Kwong, 1979). In a later follow-up study, Peter Kwong still insisted
that, whether it is in the old Chinatown, or in the new Chinatown, they all are places of exploitation of the
Chinese immigrants, and most Chinese as members of the ethnic enclave have been living in poverty
(Kwong, 1987).

Alejandro Portes and Robert Bach proposed the "ethnic enclave" and its economic circle theory in
1985 or the "ethnic socio-economic enclave" theory (Portes and Bach, 1985). Alejandro Portes and L.
Jenson in 1989 conducted an empirical study toward the theory. In the research on the Cuban immigrants
enclave in Miami, they found that, on one hand, the Cuban enterprises of the enclave are more adept at
taking advantage of the American economy to gain greater profits and gains than the enterprises outside
of the enclave; the Cuban immigrants inside the enclave can better utilize their human labor resources to
obtain higher pay and status in the low-end labor market than the Cuban migrants outside of enclave. On
the other hand, the common cultural foundation, the sense of ethnic identity and the ethnic solidarity of
the Cuban enclave both help the ethnic entrepreneurs, and the migrant workers to get rid of the variety of
adverse factors in the American community (such as racial discrimination etc.) and to better integrate into
the society, and to get a higher income and social status (Portes and Jenson, 1989). On the whole, the
formation and development of the ethnic socio-economic enclave mainly depend on three factors:
economy, culture, and social networks. First, the structure of ethnic enclave's economy is consistent with
the mainstream economy. However the development of the enclave's economy largely depends on its
unique mode of operation and its labor market, thus its function is different from the "big economy". The
ethnic enclave's economy supports its own ethnic industry and commerce, and helps immigrants improve
their surviving ability and social status. Second, the immigrants in the enclave form its unique social
network, consequently leading to expansion of group scale and the enclave range. Meantime the social
network also provides a wealth of labor, goods and services markets for the development of the enclave.
Third, the sense of ethnic identity and the ethnic solidarity within immigrant groups effectively promote
the development of ethnic industry and commerce creating more employment opportunities. The
development of the enclave's economy and the frequency of social interaction also stimulate the ethnic
traditional culture to blossom. For example, the characteristic ethnic and cultural recreational industries
quickly grow up and are strengthened. The interaction and mutual promotion of these three aspects has
brought the enclave with vitality, and also improved the enclave's status in the big society.

Female scholar Zhou Min is one of the major American scholars who studied the Chinese immigrants
and their enclave area. Inspired by Portes's economic enclave theory, she held a positive and optimistic
attitude to New York's Chinatown. In the 1990s, she studied the history of Chinatown's development
process which involved the Chinese immigration history, compared the differences between the early
settlers and the new immigrants, and examined the structure and development of the economy of
Chinatown, analyzed the characteristics of Chinatown's labor market and women's role and status in
Chinatown, and finally made optimistic forecasts about future development of Chinatown. From a new
angle, her research depicted the history, the present and the future of the development of New York's
Chinatown. Although Chinatown once indeed acted as refugee camp, but later it has evolved into a major
ethnic economy having great flexibility and strong vitality. She also noted that the Chinatown is not like
most immigrants’ ghettos or slums, but it is truly an area for developing careers. The Chinese immigrants

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and their descendants have established a large number of independent local small businesses in the town, which helped the Chinese immigrants to become one of the most developed and affluent immigrant groups in the immigration history of the United States. This is not the result of scheming or carefully planning by the Chinese immigrant entrepreneurs, but rather an adaptive response to the harsh realities of American society (Zhou, 1992).

In recent years, the city's ethnic diversity has become more evident, and many scholars began to focus on the intergroup relations in the ethnic business environment (Light and Gold, 2000). One path of research is to investigate the intergroup relations between buyers and sellers. The main concern of this kind of research is the intergroup interaction patterns of the Korean business owners, especially the conflicts in the black areas. Some scholars have compared the conflicts between the Koreans and the blacks in New York and in Los Angeles, and discovered that the local political groups (e.g. community associations) were the main cause strengthening factors of conflicts (Joyce, 2003). Some scholars have pointed out, the conflict between the black economy and the Korean economy reflects the Korean businessmen's unique status as the middleman in the economic structure (Weitzer, 1997). These studies show that Mexicans and Koreans regarded each other as commercial rivals, because both the two groups have a lot of immigrants. Another line of researches analyze the differences of various ethnic groups and their problems. A scholar, who made field observations and interviewed some South Korean business owners in Chicago and Los Angeles, noted that the prejudice South Korean business owners held against blacks is greater than that of the Latinos. Because before immigration Koreans already held erroneous prejudices against blacks, and after immigration, due to lack of communication, this bias has been further strengthened (Yoon, 1997). Another scholar pointed out that the status difference and different cultural expectations of immigrant business owners and local residents, and sometimes the language barriers, can lead to conflicts between groups (Lee, 2002).

Through the comparative study of ethnic enterprises of Chinese, Japanese and the blacks in the United States, Ivan Light (1972) found that the ethnic enterprises and their economic development are different from the mainstream capital economy. General capital companies rely on the class resources, i.e., the labor capital and financial capital; while the ethnic enterprises rely on ethnic resources, such as the close social relations and various ethnic cultural resources in the community. The workforce, funding sources and markets of ethnic enterprises are connected with ethnic resources, but also affected by the ethnic culture values, customs and way of life, etc.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In many regions of China, local resource allocation and economic-social development have presented a strong characteristic of “umbrella society”, that is, a major driving force of China’s economic development is still like the “umbrella relation” between local governments and enterprises (Zhang, 2016). What is common people’s role in Chinese huge market transformation? Are they beneficiary or impaired party? To discuss such a complicated economical social structure transformation (especially market transformation) of China, the sole concept of “umbrella society” is apparently insufficient. As a broader concept of “umbrella society”, common people's economic social life is a type of “beehive society”. In the process of transition from planned economy to market economy, it allows common people to achieve higher beneficial opportunity and surplus allocation opportunity, which improved the labor enthusiasm; therefore, self-employed, vendor, private owner, blue-collar, white-collar worker, professional manager and freelancer are increasing. We depict this common people’s high involvement of market development as “beehive society”, in other words, every person is building up her own relationship network-beehives through personal or family’s efforts (Zhang, 2018).

Portes et al (1985) believe that the mass existence of ethnic enterprises in the North American cities provides job opportunities to the ethnic minority groups and also accumulate wealth to improve the ethnic economic development and support. My own above concept “beehive society” is very similar with
Portes’s "ethnic enclave" or the "ethnic socio-economic enclave", which would possess certain reference value for further exploring the function of ethnic enterprises and entrepreneurs in the formation of a new economic-cultural pattern.

The Sources of the Data

The main sources of statistical data in this article came from a priority project of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences: Floating Urban Minorities and Its Scattering Dwelling Trend. The project was officially established in the second half of 2006, and fieldwork and data processing work were completed in the first half of 2008. We chose four representative cities: Hohhot of north China, Qingdao of east China, Shenzhen of southwest and Kunming of south China. Questionnaires and in-depth interviews were the two main methods we used during the study.

The Analysis of the Data

1. Four Cities: The Basic Conditions of Six Ethnic Groups

We visited the four cities (Qingdao, Kunming, Huhhot and Shenzhen) and found livelihood strategy and the economic power as the main ground factors. Our survey shows that among the six ethnic minorities, the primary means of access to the current work of the Korean, Mongolian, Hui and Bai is to "apply by themselves" (48.1% - 60.0%), while the other two ethnics Yi and Dai is "through friends and colleagues' recommendation" (26.7% - 36.1%). Among the six ethnic groups, Dai, Hui, Bai, Yi and Mongolian respondents have the high proportion of monthly income below 1,000 yuan, and the Dai respondents have the highest proportion (50.0%). Korean respondents' income level is relatively higher with monthly income of 3,001 yuan and above, which accounts for 36.7% (Zhang 2009, Zhang 2012).

The concentration of industries and the habitant aggregation are also very important factors, on which the ethnic socio-economic enclave theory is proposed accordingly. For example, in Kunming, there are about 10 thousand Huis who migrated from Xinjie Town, Huize County. They set up 9 cattle farms, holding 90% of Kunming's red meat market, of which the two biggest Huis enterprises are Mu Shengda and Mu Hongda. On December 28, 2007, we visited Mr. Mu Hongda, who owned 60-70% market of cattle slaughtering business in Kunming. We can see in terms of economic activity, the Hui migrants occupied most of the trade and slaughtering business of live cattle market and beef, mutton market in Kunming. In Kunming, the Dai and the Bai ethnic groups are also trying to develop food service, ethnic handicrafts and cloth trade and so on.

Our survey shows that in terms of industries they are currently engaged in, among the six ethnic groups surveyed in the four cities (Qingdao, Kunming, Huhhot and Shenzhen), Mongolian respondents possess the highest industry concentration (83.9%) in catering services; Hui, Bai and Dai respondents also have high degree industry concentration (64-69%) also in "catering services"; Korean respondents hold the lowest industry concentration (23.5%) in manufacturing sector. Hui and Mongolian respondents are engaged in only one industry that concentrates more than 10% of their population, which is "catering services"; Bai and Yi respondents are engaged in two industries, namely the "catering services" and the "entertainment services"; Dai respondents also have two industries, "catering services" and "domestic service"; Korean respondents have three sectors, namely "manufacturing sector", "commercial trade" and "catering service".

Our survey shows that the profession of the urban ethnic migrants mainly can be classified in three categories: (1) ordinary workers, most of them working in the construction sites, home-moving companies and labor-intensive industries, mainly from Southwest and Central south, accounting for more than 83% of the flowing population; (2) minorities from Qinghai, Gansu, Xinjiang, Ningxia, such as Hui and Uygur, engaged in trade and commerce, mainly dealing with beef, mutton, noodles and raisins, accounting for more than 14% of the flowing population; (3) itinerant traders mainly from Sichuan, Qinghai, Guizhou, Xinjiang and Tibet, such as the Hui, Uygur, Tibetan, Miao and other ethnic groups,
mostly selling knives, jewelry, leather goods, accounting for 3% of the floating population. (Zhang and Yin, 2013).

Our survey also shows that among the six ethnic groups, the proportion of the Yi (63.9%) and Hui (64.3%) respondents working in private sectors is higher than the Bai, Mongolian and Dai respondents, far higher than the Korean respondents; the proportion of Korean respondents (35.4%) working in the "joint ventures" is much higher than the other five ethnic groups; the proportion of self-employed Mongolian respondents (46.0%) is higher than the other five ethnics. The first row of positions that the six ethnic groups' respondents hold is "corporate general staff", but with different proportions, in descending order: the Yi (69.0%), Hui (58.5%), Mongolian (57.7%), Bai (52.2%), Dai (48.3%), Korean (23.1%). The position that held more than 10% of the four groups of respondents (Yi, Hui, Bai and Dai) is concentrated in the "corporate general staff" (48.3% - 69.0%). Except for the position of "corporate general staff", there is a certain percentage of Mongolian respondents that assume the "self-employed individual commercial households" profession (11.7%) and Korean respondents that serve as the "enterprise mid-level cadres" (15.4%), "enterprise grassroots cadres" (14.1%), "private entrepreneurs" (14.1%) and "professional technical personnel" (11.5 percent) (Zhang, 2014).

2. Qingdao: Korean Ethnic Migrants and Entrepreneurs

According to our survey, at present, there are more than 8,000 South Korean enterprises in Qingdao, and nearly 100,000 Koreans work and live in Qingdao. Qingdao has become the city holding the largest number of Korean people. South Korea is one of the most important economic and trade partner of Qingdao. Therefore, there are 120,000 Korean minorities migrated from the Northeast (Yanji, Jilin) to Qingdao for working in the South Korean enterprises. Our survey shows: Korean minorities respondents are mainly distributed in three sectors: the "manufacturing" (23.5%), the "food service industry" (15.3%) and "trade" (14.1%).

For example, Li Cang district, one of the four districts in Qingdao city, is the new administrative division of the city officially established in June, 1994, which consists of the original Li Cun of Laoshan district and most part of Cang Kou District. According to incomplete statistics, there were 21 ethnic minorities with a total of 4782 people in Licang District, including 3014 Korean ethnic, accounting for 63%. At the northern end of Qingdao, Chengyang District, as the business gates for South Korean companies in Qingdao, holds the largest number of Koreans and Korean ethnics. In addition to the Korean factories, there are also more than 800 stores, of which more than 90% are hotels, KTVs and food shops and other service businesses. The Korean ethnics in Qingdao are drawn by the Korean investment to migrate to Qingdao. Their lives mainly depend on the South Korean enterprises.

Observing the whole society, how does Korean folk “beehive” society locate itself and play its role in governmental “umbrella society”? Government builds the stage and capital plays the role in the process of market transformation, it is impossible for powerless Korean migrant worker to build up his own “beehive” over night. They couldn’t even rely on any relatives or friends, therefore the cost and risk are relatively high, in short, it is very unlikely for migrant workers to build up “beehive” in the first stage. Till the second stage, these Korean forgoers become queen bee and bring worker bees (relatives and friends) come to work in the cities, and it is qualified for them to build up their own chain “beehives”. In the third stage, the network of Korean migrant workers is becoming wider and wider, the range has gone beyond the consanguinity or affinity and it is qualified to become net type “beehive”. In a word, the main principle of Korean migrant workers self-built “beehive” is mutual help; it has two types of “chain type” and “net type”. Korean folk “beehive” society becomes supplement part of Qingdao official “umbrella” society, they exist side by side and play a part together (Zhang, 2018).

A senior Korean man told us: The Korean minority people are mainly attracted by the South Korean enterprises due to convenience and language advantages. In 1993, the Korean enterprises began to recruit laborers from the north-east China. Most of the Korean ethnics work in factories, many of whom were engaged in the shoe-making, clothing, toy and sport utility industries. The elders tend to be nurses or
cleaners, or work in the kitchen; while the younger ones work in the Korean factories, earning more than the Han people, with salary up to 5000-6000 yuan. Even those with the lowest income can earn 1500-2000 per month. There are also some Korean ethnic people working in Japanese factories, because many of the Korean ethnic groups used to learn Japanese in high schools providing them with an advantage in finding jobs. Jiaozhouwan was opened up later than Weihai. In Qingdao, initially the Korean came to Chengyang, then Laoshan and finally the downtown Qingdao. Now, there are many Koreans in Chengyang, Jiaozhouwan, Jimo and Pingdu, and they mainly live in Licun. There are many Korean enterprises here. Owing to the language advantage, our children work as interpreters in the Korean companies, and many of us settle down here following our children. Chengyang holds the most ethnic Korean population. Other Koreans scattered in Xifu, Xiazhuang, Liuting and others. Many of the young men work in the manufacturing sector, and some in the trade companies.

In recent years, due to severe pollution, poor management and other reasons, coupled with the recent international financial turmoil, some South Korean-owned enterprises had to leave Qingdao. South Korean companies in Qingdao fell into stagnation or even decline, which greatly affected the foundation for the development of the Korean ethnic people. At present, for example, Chengyang receives the most Korean migrants, but a lot of them just came blindly and can't find a job.

In terms of employment and management, on the one hand, a lot of young Korean migrants work in the South Korean companies. After some time, they mastered the technology and craft, they would quit and start their own business, and some of them can even annex the original Korean-owned enterprises, particularly the handicraft processing industry. On the other hand, the Korean ethnic people have to solve the employment issue themselves because the government has no interest in doing that and the Han enterprises are generally unwilling to recruit Korean ethnics. If the South Korean companies once leave, many of the Korean ethnics will fall in impoverishment.

Qingdao Korean ethnic immigrants are mainly employed in the procurement, production, sales, service and other economic areas or they operate their own businesses. Their economy is mainly transplanted from the Korean-owned export-oriented enterprises. The professionalism and business activities of the ethnics are necessary for the local economy, however their social and cultural life still retain their cultural identity, yet also actively absorb a variety of new cultural elements, such as the South Korea's modern corporate culture.

In religious aspect, Qingdao's Korean ethnics accepted Christianity from South Korea. Originally there were no Korean churches in Qingdao. Started in 1994, the first Korean ethnic church was established in Liuting by the Korean company S & K. From the second half of 1994, the Korean ethnics began to join the Korean church activities with the South Koreans. The Korean church did not have any priest at first, so the South Korean churches send some over. However, the Chinese authorities are extremely unhappy about this. South Korean missionaries are willing to help, and now 80 percent of Bible are from South Korea. The Korean churches also provide us with many learning materials, but we dare not to accept them. Currently, the Korean ethnics have three churches in Qingdao organizing worship activities for the believers, trying to form their own ethnic religious culture. Our funding sources are from Korean Christians. In accordance with the provisions of the Bible, everyone should hand in 1/10 of personal income to the church.

Our survey shows that: currently 66.7% of Korean ethnic respondents said they own an apartment in Qingdao City. 55.3% of the Korean respondents said their dwelling space ranges from 71-100 square meters; 21.3% claim that dwelling space is more than 101 square meters. In fact, the origins of Qingdao's Korean minority are quite scattered, such as Harbin, Jiamusi, Qiqihar, Mudanjiang, Jixi, Ning, and Mishan of Heilongjiang province; Changchun, Yanji, Longjing, Hunchun, Jiaohe, Liuhe and etc. of Jilin province; Shenyang, Yingkou, Fushun of Liaoning province. No matter how scattered they were, now they voluntarily assemble together to form a new community.

A Korean elder told us: Qingdao is equivalent to the second Yanbian. In Qingdao, the Korean language and customs are retained and continually strengthened through children’s education and the
elders’ community activities and other means. Baitong Community Elders Society has more than 60 members of the Korean ethnics. Baitong Community has more than 20 Korean residents, and many others living in nearby districts. The Korean ethnics properly assembled together, like Xita of Shenyang, where the Koreans live quite concentrated so that no matter learning language, or living environment, are all very convenient. If Koreans live dispersedly, then the language, customs and so on will soon be gone. Daily activities of our association include singing, dancing, playing cards, chess, mahjong, etc. Every Sunday afternoon, a reading party will be held. As can be seen, many Koreans are ready to settle down in Qingdao for long-term working and living.

There are a few primary and secondary schools teaching Korean in Qingdao. We surveyed Qingdao Bishan Korean Elementary School. According to the principal, Xu Yushan, the school is a private one under the guidance of the Education Bureau of Lee Chang District, Qingdao City. The school implements trilingual education: Korean, English and Chinese. Among all the 31 elementary schools in Li Chang district, Bishan school boasts of the Korean language teaching as a feature, and the English language teaching is also among the best, while math and Chinese teaching are on the middle level. The school offers many after-class activities, such as Korean traditional country music, long drum, fan dance and so on. The main enrollment targets are Korean ethnic children. The enrollment numbers of Han students are tightly controlled with each class shall not exceed three. Chinese, mathematics and English teaching apply the unified textbooks; Chinese, mathematics, and English are taught in Chinese by Han teacher; while Korean language, Morality, Art and Music are taught in Korean.

Overall, in terms of employment, management, marketing, finance, technology, customers, design, religion, international contacts and modern pop culture, the Korean ethnics show clear dependence on Korean companies and Christian churches. From several aspects, such as primary education, traditional cultural heritage and etc., we can deduce the "transplantation" characteristic of the Qingdao Korean ethnics. The Korean ethnic immigrants in Qingdao are forming a kind of "dependence-transplantation" economic-cultural pattern.

3. Huhhot: Mongolian Ethnic Migrants and Entrepreneurs

Recent years, with the help of its advantaged natural pasture, the dairy industry of Hohhot has developed rapidly and become a famous "dairy capital". Along with the rapid development of the economy and the urban infrastructure, the characteristic tourism also grows vigorously. There are many dining places (some of them are Mongolian Food Streets) and the business and service industry with Mongolian style also grow swiftly.

Batusuhe, a restaurant owner from the Xilinguole (Ximeng) believes that Mongolian catering industry in the cities have to innovate. The Mongolian meal should add in pepper, aniseed and various spices to cater to the urban taste. Originally the Mongolian food add just salt, and the flavor is good. But now it must add some flavors of Han people to meet the market's need. Another question is that the development of the Mongolian catering industry is quite mussy. For example, there is no industry standard. Every place has its own characteristics, and so, he suggests, the Mongolian catering industry should set up their own standard.

Batusuhe said: “I have three restaurants in Xi Meng. Now I intend to open the fourth, which will be the largest, 2000 square meters. I do not loan from banks and I try to integrate all the ethnic specialties and the original ecology into the restaurants. My red meat and dairy products are from Xi Meng. Here on the market there is a lot of fake stuff. Xi Meng has many original ecological products. But due to some conditions, a lot of things are limited. In the blood farm, all kinds of animals’ blood are mixed together. However on the prairie of Xi Meng, animals are all raised separately. The Mongolian food industry has to take root on the grasslands, where horses, camels, all kinds of meat and weeds are abundant. Here there were too many restrictions. We cannot find a lot of raw materials we need. And the meat flavor here is not good because the cattle and sheep are all raised around the countryside, where the environment is polluted.
The meat of the prairie tastes far better. I want to start a slaughterhouse, and we slaughter and cook for immediate consumption. I think the business will be definitely better.”

The general manager of Bayinwori, Ma Quanxi told us: “In 2005, we established the Mongolian Meal Research Institute, which is a nonprofit non-governmental organization. We invested a lot of money into the research and development of Mongolian food. I formed this idea in 2002, at that time I solved the food and clothing problem, and also made some money every year. So I hoped to make a new height of my business. Mongolian food is healthy and nutritious. The people on the grassland are all very healthy and strong. Mongolian meals can definitely play a role in raising people’s health and nutrition. Bayinwori must retain the tradition, but also has to innovate according to modern tastes. For example, based on innovation, we launch the Abalone Camel Palm as upscale dishes, each cost 40 yuan. We recently launched the hot pot, fresh lamb for the first floor lobby. If you do not innovate, the grade and level will stay low. At the same time, we also have to take the health and nutritional functions into consideration.”

Ma Quanxi said: “This year (2008) we start a project led by the Mongolian Meal Research Institute to integrate the eastern, central and west Mongolian food together with support from Bayinhaori. I will lead the team, with assistance of the Inner Mongolia Agricultural University. This should be supported by the regional government and the state. We have a long history, many things we have to ask the elderly's advice. This year our main goal is to develop Mongolian Cuisines as a cuisine system. Mongolian cuisine is not among the 8 National Cuisine Systems. We hope to integrate and promote Inner Mongolian cuisines, making it the ninth largest cuisine system.”

Whether can this "transplantation" pattern of economic and cultural changes of Hohhot Mongolian come to success mainly depends on whether the driving force of all levels of governments, entrepreneurs and consumers are strong enough or not and whether this transformation can meet the market demand innovatively in the process of migration. The migration and transformation did not cause local social and cultural conflicts because although there are differences between the pastoral Mongolian and the urban Mongolian, however, no matter pastoral or urban they are all Mongolian ethnic people, and the two do not have significant cultural differences. Thus, in the process of migrating to urban area, the pastoral Mongolian will naturally link the two areas, which leads to the "transplantation" of the Mongolian economic-cultural pattern. In another word, the origin and resettlement area will be connected together.

Therefore, we can see, in Hohhot, a city known as "Green Town", the Mongolian migrants are gradually transplanting the distinctive Mongolian culture to the modern life, and trying to commercialize and marketize the Mongolian material and the intangible cultural resources to establish a new Mongolian economic-cultural pattern in line with modern metropolis. For example, the daily diet of the Mongolian is highly related to the ecological environment, natural resources, cultural characteristics, religious beliefs and so on. The Mongolian economic-cultural pattern is transformed from the original ecology to market-oriented with its impetus coming from all levels of government, entrepreneurs and consumers.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

The Role of Ethnic Enterprises and Entrepreneurs in the Formation of New Economic- Cultural Pattern

Based on my investigation and observation among the above six ethnic groups in the above four cities, I consider there are three types of business “beehives”: (1) family “beehive”: family-centered mutual benefit network, (2) value chain type of “beehive”: win-win network centered by value chain, (3) ethnic “beehive”: mutual benefit network based on minority groups. The growth of these private ethnic enterprises does not only depend on economic ability but also social cultural background. Private ethnic enterprise and manager have ethnic resources like distinct ethnic culture, language, value concept, kinship and community relations. These distinct characters help them to build up various “beehives” to obtain entrepreneurship capital, low costs labor, business credit and develop them into business and management activities after they left home. These various relation networks have something in common that is the
existence of queen bee (leader). The leader is like the “King without crown”, who serves as certain leading or directing functions inside the circle. They could be the head of a household, elder with high prestige or sometimes very successful businessman. More and more successful ethnic enterprises and mangers are gathering together and become ethnic enterprise group based on human relations of various family “beehives” and value-chain “beehives” (Zhang, 2018).

Among all the factors that influence the forming of the economic-cultural patterns, the ethnic enterprises and entrepreneurs play the most important and substantial roles, which epitomize the ethnic minority's livelihood strategy and economic strength in the city. Ten years ago, I asked an officer who worked at the central government: "If take an animal as metaphor, what do the ethnic enterprises in China look like?" He replied: "Butterfly. Because they are very weak and fragile, people usually make them, or treat them as 'specimens'. I said: "This is one side of it. The other side is that the worm pupates into 'butterfly'."

The growth of ethnic enterprises and entrepreneurial is not castle in the air. They have a certain ethnic resources, such as the significant cultural identity, national values, family, community, social networks, etc. These features and advantages guarantee the success of business after they migrate to the resettlement place (Aldrich & Roger, 1990). Chan Kwok Bun pointed out that facing with the cruelty and hostility of reality in the host society, Chinese immigrants often use their kinship and social networks to raise funds, venture capital and gain financial credit. Chinese enterprises in the past were, and still are, established among the same tribes, especially families and relatives (Chan, 1991). For cultural, economic and ethnic division of labor reasons, the principal North American Chinese restaurants mainly use Chinese workforce. Peter Li argues that Chinese restaurant owners often have to work as hard as his relatives-waiters, thus blurring the boundaries between the employers and employees (Li, 1976).

Furthermore, in the process of transformation of ethnic migrants' economic-cultural pattern, the number, the economic strength and the industry concentration degree of the ethnic enterprises form an inflexible standard judging the success of the transformation. Accordingly, the entrepreneurial qualities, quantities, courage, economic strength and social influence are also key factors in the transformation of the economic-cultural pattern. Conversely, if an ethnic migrant group scatters all over the city in various industries just as ordinary workers, and has yet to set up their own ethnic enterprises and does not have entrepreneurs at all, then how do this ethnic group change or create their economic-cultural pattern?

In Qingdao, from the view of government policies, employment and business, education, religious life, community society, language and traditional cultural heritage and other aspects, although the Korean ethnics' economic-cultural pattern presents a new prototype, “dependent-transplantation”, we cannot assert its true content and form. Among them, the most fundamental fact is that Qingdao's Korean ethnics are mostly professional managers or common employees in South Korean enterprises, yet there did not appear a large number of Korean ethnical enterprises or entrepreneurs. For example, in religion aspect, Korean ethnic in Qingdao are merely spokespersons or agents of the Korean Christian. They have not formed their own independent Christian organization. In other words, in fact, their influence and social organizing force is not strong enough to form a new type of economic-cultu ral pattern with ethnic characteristics.

Without innovation, the "transplantation" economic-cultural pattern is meant to wither. The pastoral Mongolian left the ranch to the city and innovatively established commercialized food service, ethnic handicrafts trade and other economic activities, which have been proved to be an innovative way to build a new prototype of economic-cultural pattern. The economic-cultural pattern of Hohhot Mongolian migrants' "urbanization and marketization of prairie products” is the "innovation- transplantation" type. Hohhot Mongolian immigrants are forming relatively concentrated business area. Mongolian ethnic enterprises and entrepreneurs in the urban economy are forming an out-looking economic model: on one end is the grassland and pasture, on the other end is the greater China inland and the international markets. In terms of their social and cultural life, on the one hand it has a relatively closed nature with the development in their own independent space, on the other hand it shows a certain compatibility and
becomes the "articulation" between area of origin and the resettlement areas, between the urban and rural areas, the tradition and modernity. The dichotomy does not apply to them anymore. Their economic-social identity and cultural identity have reflected multiplicity in nature.

For ethnic entrepreneurs originated from remote ethnic areas, the ethnic characteristic business is their major paths. These ethnic people start their own business alone or with partners, it not only increases the survival and development opportunity, but also brings unique ethnic culture to the city life. Thus, we analogize that the ethnic migrants in China have to transform or create their own economic-cultural patterns. Ethnic enterprise is a form of social organization, and the social foundation for changing or creating the ethnic economic-cultural patterns. Without such entity as the structural basis, the new type of economic-cultural pattern will have no foothold. Depending on the enterprises, the ethnic entrepreneurs can utilize their own cultural identity, ethnic values, family and community social networks to venture capital, gain cheap labor and commercial credit, etc., creating a favorable environment for the development of the ethnic enterprises. “Ethnic character” is an important condition for market access and also a significant competitive advantage. The “ethnic character” shows very distinct personality, which attracts customer’s attention. These characteristic entrepreneurs exactly fill in the “blank” or “gap” of market’s diversification demand, and build up a kind of ethnic “beehive society” with "ethnic enclave" or the "ethnic socio-economic enclave".

ENDNOTES

1. Source: from the interview at a church in Licang district, Qingdao. He was one of the earliest Korean immigrants here. In 1994, he used to work in a factory. Later the factory went bankrupt, he started to do some trade business. Now he retired and entered into the church, though the church stuff was hard to maintain, he tries his best to do the job.
2. Source: Cui Yongji’s speech in a residential committee symposium on January 14, 2008.
3. Li Cang District has two churches: one is Wenchangge church, which has 110 Christians; the other one is Zhengdinglu church, about 100 people; Laoshan district has one Christian church, more than 200 people.
5. During the survey in Qingdao, with the help of Baitongyuan residential comittee, a large commercial residential area, the survey team members held a symposium with the elderly association members (they are all Koreans) on January 14, 2008. The elderly association is in fact a Korean folk organization in Qingdao. The President of this organization is from Yingkou, liaoning province. He used to serve in the army for seven years and retired as a captain. Now he lives with his children. His has four children, two of them working in Qingdao.
6. Source: I interviewed Xu Yushan, the principal of Bi Shan Korean Elementary School on January 10, 2008. The headmaster's office has a slogan: "dedicated in the ethnic education career, establish a environment for the 200000 Korean children in Qingdao to learn their native language".
7. Source: from the interview of Mr. Batusuhe, the boss of Qingkeerhada, on January 17 and January 19, 2008.
8. Source: From the interview of Mr. Ma, manager of Bayinhaoriwo on Jan.19,2008.
9. Korean migrants obtain employment or start their own business in the procurement, production, sales, service and other areas of the economy, thus become dependent in the city’s economy. Their professions and business activities are necessary to the local economy development. Their social and cultural life retain their own ethnic or regional characteristics of tradition, but also actively absorb a variety of new cultural elements of urban life, trying to form their own new ethnic or regional culture.
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Dynamics of Weaving Industries in Amarapura Township, Mandalay Region

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In Myanmar, the garment industry started from the weaving. In weaving the hand loom was started as a folk art and the Saunders Weaving and Vocational Institute was established by Mr. L H Saunders in 1914. In 1954, the power looms were introduced by this institute but the local people were not interested in power looms. Nowadays, local people are trying to develop their weaving industries with power looms. This research aims at pointing out the dynamics of weaving industry and describing the main factors influencing these changes. The study site is Amarapura Township of Mandalay Region. Data were collected by qualitative research method. The research tools are key informant interview, in-depth interview and participant observation. Weaving industry is one of the main professions of the Amarapura people and about 80% of the people depend on weaving and other works related to the weaving industries such as dyeing, chichagin, yetphaukgin, chapope, cloth selling, and so on. After 1993 the weaving of Amarapura became popular and well-known in Myanmar because one of the most famous politicians wears the sarong woven in Amarapura while canvassing for votes in the national election. The design of the sarong was known as "Aung San Suu Kyi achei" and it was very much known to every woman. The runners of the weaving industries extended their business and they used mostly power loom for mass production. On the other hand, it is facing many difficulties such as scarcity of labour, absence of waste water system, lack of demands from abroad, etc.

INTRODUCTION

Weaving is one of the primary methods of textile production. It commenced from the traditional rural handicraft in the world. Then it developed in workshops, transformed in local places, and got activated in factories. Likewise, the garment industry in Myanmar started from the weaving. There are two methods of weaving: hand loom and power loom. The hand loom is a traditional handiwork business and the power loom is a business which transformed the hand loom because of the technological development. The decline situation of the hand loom is that the price of raw materials increases every year and the cost of the hand loom cloth has increased more than that of the power loom cloth (Narasaih and Krishna, 1999). The power loom industry has grown up from traditional hand loom sector with inherent technical knowledge passed on from forefathers and is being continued in many of the clusters (Sultana and Nisa, 2016). So, the power looms have obviously better technology than hand loom.

The development of weaving industry aims at raising productivity and flexibility. The weaving processes are confronted by customer wishes for more and more variety of products and fabrics in a shorter period of time. Therefore, the productivity requires the capability to produce more fabrics in a shorter period of time. This industry provides numerous individuals with gainful employment. The
growth of the power loom sector leads to the development in other fields, but there are still many challenges to deal with.

During this study, the dynamics of weaving industry was studied in Amarapura Township of Mandalay Region (see figure 1). There are nine wards in this township of which Ohtaw ward is selected which consists of eight sub-wards. Among them, there are Tamargone ward where dobby was first tested, and Yetkantaw ward where weaving was first started in this township. There are 1166 households and 6150 people.

**FIGURE 1**

THE STUDY AREA OF OHTAW WARD IN AMARAPURA TOWNSHIP, MANDALAY REGION

Research Aim and Methodology

The aim of this study is to point out the dynamics of weaving industry and to describe the main factors influencing changes. The qualitative research method was applied in collecting data. Research tools included in-depth interview, key informant interview, and participant-observation. A total of 36 interviewees participated in the data collection. They were weavers, cloth sellers, dyers, the sellers of thread and weaving-related material. This research was conducted from August 2017 to December 2017.

RESEARCH FINDINGS

Background History of the Weaving

The weaving industry of the study area might have been started during the New Stone Age. The evidences in the form of marks of the pieces of cloth were found on the earthen pots and pot-shards that
were used in weaving and spinning when the Taungthaman bank collapsed (Amarapura Township Record, 1982). In Konbaung dynasty, the consecutive kings made much improvement in the art of weaving through the concerted efforts of the weaving technicians both at home and from abroad. In 1910, Mr. LH Saunders introduced a flying shuttle loom "Lunpyan-letkhatsin" to Amarapura. This loom can weave the fabric with widespread breadth and long length. In 1954, the power looms were introduced by the Saunders Weaving and Vocational Institute but the local people were mainly interested in the hand loom. The weaving industry was operated as the private business before 1962. Afterwards, it was run and headed by the cooperative department from 1962-1988. In later years, doing private business was permitted. The local people have used the hand loom and power loom which can weave the plain cloth by using a roller.

After 1993, a famous politician used to wear achei longyi. The hand loom weavers first attempted to weave this design. This pattern became popular and its demand greatly increased. But the low productivity of the hand loom could not meet the demand. Then the power loom was tested to weave that achei designs which contain the dobby with two rollers. Since then, the pattern of the fabric has become well-known as "Aung San Suu Kyi achei" (see figure 2). For these facts, the locals have gradually changed to the power loom with two rollers.

**FIGURE 2**  
**AUNG SAN SUU KYI ACHEI LONGYI**

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**The Processes of Weaving**

A huge proportion, 80%, of the locals mainly depends on weaving for their living. It involves dyeing thread, transferring yarn from a swift to a reel "chichagin" and winding thread onto the bobbin "yetphaklokegin", transferring the thread "chapope" and weaving.

**Dyeing thread.** The locals did not have to do the dyeing process because the cooperative department gave out the ready-made dyed threads. They made the work of dyeing after 1988 as the Indian threads were not ready-made dyed. The most people changed to the using of China threads after 2000 because it was ready made dyed thread. But they continue the job of dyeing as the ordering colors are not contained in the selling colors. They dye yarn for themselves as well as for sale. There are two kinds of dyes: natural dyes and synthetic dyes. There are eight people in synthetic dyes and three people in natural dyes. There are two types of dyeing techniques: hot dyeing techniques and cool dyeing techniques. For dyeing process, hot water, cold water, glue-liquid, dye and glove are required. And then cleaning (purifying), dyeing (see figure 3), wringing, shaking off, and putting out to dry (see figure 4) have to be conducted step by step. As dyeing needs physical strength, it is done by men only. Dyeing is done not by individual
but by groups. Each man who dyes earns about 10000 mmk on an average. But the owner provides 50000 - 70000 mmk for the dyeing leader as a special extra payment.

**FIGURE 3**
**DYEING THREADS**

**FIGURE 4**
**KEEPING DYED THREADS IN THE SUN**

*Chichagin and yetphauklokegin.* Although it was done by hand before, it is done by machine now. The machines can be different in size like small, middle and big ones according to the type of business, but the working process is all the same. In the process, thread from the swift must be firstly wound onto the reel (see figure 5). Next it must be rewound onto the bobbin (see figure 6). That portion of job does not need physical strength, so mostly women take it up. The charge for ten pounds of yarn of it is 1500 mmk.
Rotating the swift (*Chapope*). There are two ways of rotating the swift: by hand and by machine. Nowadays, rotation by machines (see figure 7) is being used mostly. The way of rotating the swift first needs to collect reclining big swift "*tonelonechargeyi*", base of a thread-divider "*sikhwekhon*", bobbin-holder "*yauklone-cut*", bobbin, roller "*leitlone*". Then the number of swifts to be used; the breadth and length of the warp; and weft to be rotated are to be calculated. After that, bobbins need to be attached to the bobbing-holder. Next, taking front thread "*shaesi*" and back threads "*nauksi*, *sikhwe*, *yinthwar-thwin*, *Sikauk*, *chapartchein* must be finished before *chopope*. When the threads are wound onto the big swift, the second stage is reeling around the roller. The price of *chopope* is 50 mmk per *pasoe* or *longyi*. These activities are done by men only.
Weaving. There are hand loom (let-tan) (see figure 8) and power loom (set-tan) (see figure 9) for weaving. Men wear (pasoe-tan) and women wear (meinma-tan) are mainly woven. The number of weaving industry and the price of weaving-related materials are shown in Figure 10 and 11, and Table 1.

In weaving by hand, it requires shuttle, hand loom, bobbin, roller, silk, etc. Before the start of weaving, design and formula are to be made. It is to be practically created with the help of a small bobbin for curlicue pattern and a small shuttle in which silk threads with necessary colors are on the basis of a silk warp. Designs were woven in detail in former days. But they have to create plain patterns and small patterns. Regarding it, a woman aged 63 said:

Formerly, most of the customers bought the fabrics with the producers’ design. Nowadays, customers themselves draw their own design in their favorite colors and put orders. And, they also put orders by looking at the designs of fabrics the celebrities wear. As a consequence, weavers have to constantly observe the apparels of the celebrities.

They mainly used to weave only the silk. Most products are lunyakyaw-kyogyi achei, yarka achei, etc. The prices of the longyi are from 300000-1100000 mmk. It is not the casual wear for the people. Because of this, cotton clothes have been woven instead of the silks since 10 years ago. The price of a cotton achei is 15000-100000 mmk. The weaving-charge depends on the shuttle of a loom. A shuttle costs from 1300-1500 mmk.

In the power loom, plain fabrics and designed fabrics are woven. Weaving plain patterns needs shuttle, loom, bobbin, thread, roller, etc. If the designed fabrics are woven, it requires another roller and a dobbey (the machine to illustrate designs). When the weaving is to be started, reeling threads onto the roller, drawing warp threads through the heddle "hmutkaw", putting the bobbin into the shuttle, etc. must be done step by step. Then, the weaving can be started. Not only men but also women weave fabrics. Their daily income is 4000-8000 mmk.
FIGURE 8
HAND LOOM

FIGURE 9
POWER LOOM
FIGURE 10
THE NUMBER OF LOOM IN OHTAW WARD IN AMARAPURA

Source: Ohtaw ward Administrator's Office (August, 2017)

FIGURE 11
THE COMPARATIVE NUMBER OF LOOM IN OHTAW WARD AND AMARAPURA TOWNSHIP

Source: Ohtaw ward Administrator's Office (August, 2017)
TABLE 1
THE PRICE OF WEAVING-RELATED MATERIALS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name of weaving-related materials</th>
<th>Value (mmk)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>hand loom</td>
<td>200000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>power loom</td>
<td>2000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Reel</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Bobbin</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Dobby</td>
<td>400000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>chicha and yetphauk-khone</td>
<td>500000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Chapope</td>
<td>900000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Loom</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Motor</td>
<td>90000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Challenges of Weaving

The locals in the study area face difficulties with weaving such as shortage of laborer, dumping waste water, financial investment and distribution.

Shortage of labor force. The livelihood of the local people mainly depends on weaving-related economic activities. Formerly, they wove mostly by hand and there were many weavers with the capacity. After 1993, there were many job opportunities and jobs with more income were available in Mandalay. The population of those who went to work in Mandalay gradually increased. There remained only few weavers. When the fabrics of Amarapura became so famous, they hire workers from other regions. Some of them could not afford to buy raw materials, but they got them from wealthy people who got products in return. Such a system could be found in villages of Amarapura. In hiring workers from far places, each worker is to be given 600000–1000000 mmk in advance. But workers, no sooner than their arrival, find some other links that give them more money. After repaying the advanced debt, they move to work with other employers. Regarding this, a 45 year old man mentioned:

*I did weaving. Currently I have stopped working due to the rarity of workers. If a worker is hired, advanced payment must have to be provided. As I cannot afford to provide it, nobody comes here. Now, I'm a broker.*

Besides, a 55 years old woman, owner of a weaving factory said:

*We have over 100 employees. There are locals and from other places. The workers of this town come to work irregularly. When they are late, they don't like to be called. Those from other areas, they are provided with hostels here. They keep regular hours. They are given 800000-1000000 mmk as advance. Half of their daily wage is cut on the basis of their daily income.*

Therefore, it is found that the locals have to stop weaving, to go on with reduced number of looms or to go on relying on exchanging system due to the problem of workers shortage.

Dumping waste water. After 1988, the locals started the dyeing thread. Later in 2000, weaving industry grew more; the customers put orders of fabrics in multi-colors. The entrepreneurs attempted to dye threads. Nowadays, despite multi-colored threads from abroad are available, they do not stop dyeing. As glue-liquid and chemicals are to be used, the product produces waste water. There is no separate drainage system for delivering waste water, and it goes into the Lake of Taungthaman. Regarding it, a 58 year old man said:

*Chemicals are used in dyeing. It produces waste water. But most of the locals have no ideas that such water that comes out is waste water and that how much waste impacts it has on the environment. They do not understand what can be ruined.*
Thus, the dyeing business becomes much developed; most of the locals know less about to what extent the waste water produced may have bad impacts on our environment.

**Financial investment.** Locals have to make financial investment in the sectors of machine accessories, wages of workers and product.

In the investment of machine accessories, the costs of some accessories are shown in Table 1. There are no buyers when the value is high. Some can buy an incomplete set. As the machine or business is not their own, they have no private chances to create their own designs. The machines currently used are the ones that they started to have some 50 years ago and that have been repaired a little. They can make so little investment that they rarely use modern machines.

There were few businessmen in weaving industry. Most of local people produced fabrics within their capacity. Advance money can rarely be provided for workers. After 1993, the numbers of weaving industry has gradually increased. Workers are in more demand. By that time, there were fewer workers in weaving because some locals went to Mandalay to be engaged in other activities. The owners hire not only locals but also people from other regions by providing advance money. Regarding it, a 68 old woman said:

> I have got about thirty looms. We did it here. Now there are rare local weavers. Of workers hired from far areas, I have to invest nearly ten lakhs in individual and provide them with accommodation. As we cannot afford it, I moved looms to Nyaungpinwaing village and work under raw give-products take system."

So it can be found that they have to move from their place to another area; have to shift their jobs; have to change their jobs as the locals cannot invest much in wages.

All fabrics produced were to be put forward to the co-operative department before 1988. It was not difficult to make investment. Later, the weaving owners can give permission to private business and have the right to sell their products directly. But their products are in good demand only in the six months of a year (from October to March). If there is political instability, the sale drops in any month. The merchants and the entrepreneurs can only store products but most of them cannot do that. So the fabrics they collect are sold to them. If compared with the other times, there is difference of at least 2000-5000 mmk per unit. To overcome those difficulties, loans could be taken out by fulfilling the commercial loom and SME loom forms. But only three or four were chosen to take out loans. As a consequence, their businesses became delayed in progress and they got less income.

**Distribution.** The co-operative department played the leading role in insuring threads and receiving fabrics. So the locals had no practice of distribution by themselves. After 1988, private weaving industry was granted permission, and they had to buy threads, dyes and other necessary things at the Zaycho market. Most of the products were sold to the merchants there at wholesale prices. After 2000, the fabrics were in great demand, the locals opened shop-houses to sell machine spare-parts, threads, dyes, etc. If the customers put orders to buy weaving-related materials, the sellers sent them right to the buyer's home or shops through door-to-door delivery system. Now, there are varieties of ways in selling fabrics such as receiving orders, selling at their shop-houses, selling to the merchants at wholesale prices and distributing to other areas. Moreover, some are advertised on television and in newspapers, magazines and are being sold through phone contacts, online shopping and right price system. A small number of the products are trying to be distributed to international markets. But the locals are facing many difficulties. These include:

- To change consumer goods such as purses, scarf,
- To innovate frequently about new designs,
- To get the contacts about the international markets;
- To need investments, machines and skillful workers to produce the high quantity and quality of products.

Therefore, the fabrics sellers are making attempts in varieties of ways to sell their products.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

According to these findings, about 80% of the locals do weaving business. So the weaving industry is the main business at the locality. The locals used the loom with shuttle pushed by hand before 1910; lunpyan-letkhatsin in 1910; the power loom with a roller in 1954; and the power loom with doby after 1993. The weaving has been gradually developed through ages into the power loom. Formerly, there were many weavers whose businesses were within their capacity and the locals did it well. After doby had been used, the demand also increased and expanded their businesses. By that time, some shifted their jobs to other areas. There has occurred a shortage of workers. To overcome these difficulties, some hire workers from other areas and rely on raw give-product take system. Therefore, weaving industry owners have to change the situation according to their social environment.

Nayak and Ulaganathan (2004) stated that the power loom cluster in Nagari has a deeper traditional root. Lack of economic infrastructure, technological obsolescence and poor information systems have led to the inferior quality and low productivity of the cluster. However, the industry has been able to survive both the locals and international trade. Similarly, the power looms in the study area which are still being used so far are the ones that have been repaired. It can only produce less fabric and cannot create new designs. The fabrics produced have to rely on the local market. In selling, only the first six months of a year is the period of great demand and they cannot gain as much profit as possible. Though the products can be sold at foreign markets, there are still difficulties to improve quality, marketability and the product-image. Thus, it can be found that the locals are attempting not only to export quality products abroad but also to sell them locally whatever difficulties they are facing.

Tanusee (2015) stated that the hand loom weavers of Varanasi have lost their prestigious traditional industry. It has occurred due to the industrialization in all over India. Subsequently power loom started functioning. For the huge production in short time, better wage, less labor and more profit, the weavers have shifted from hand loom to power loom. These facts are a little different from those in the study area. The locals have been doing the hand loom weaving straight forwardly. After the power looms emerged, weavers by hand gradually changed to use machine looms. The number of weavers by hand has decreased as power-loom has more advantages, such as being easy to learn, earning more wages, gaining more profits, needing less investment. As a result, though the locals' business has been improved, the traditionally inherited hand looms may disappear in long term.

The customer is the backbone of every business and sustainable growth of any business can only be achieved through customer satisfaction. This assumption is true for the present study. Although there are sellers of dyed threads, the colors that customers require are not available. So they continue dyeing threads. In the dyeing process, the chemicals are used rather than natural dyeing materials to get bright colors that most customers like. Besides hand loom as well as power loom, the designs were the producers' favorites in former days. The priority is now given to the designs that the customers like the most. Thus, weaving business people put more emphasis on buyers' choices rather than on the quality of the item.

In conclusion, the locals did weaving only by hand in earlier days. In later 1954, they worked by both hand loom and power loom. Nowadays, there are fewer weavers by hand and more weavers by machine. This industry not only contributes to the regions well-being but also creates jobs for those from other areas. Therefore, it can be learnt that the policy maker should up-grade power loom and avoid the decline of the hand loom.

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Model Village: Political and Economic Symbols after A Landslide Disaster in Southwest China

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The study of model villages has received extensive attention in academic circles of Chinese studies. However, studies on post-disaster recovery and reconstruction of model villages are rare. This paper discusses the political and economic significance of the construction of model villages after landslide disaster, and the difference between model villages and non-model villages. At the same time, the paper discusses the relationship between model village and community demand; and various problems and contradictions in the construction of a model village. With the advancement of the policy of precise poverty alleviation and rural strategy in China, the research on model villages will receive much attention. The construction of post-disaster recovery model village can provide an idea for post-disaster reconstruction in future.

Model Village, Disaster Reconstruction and Community Demand

A model village presents a model of successful experience for other villages. It does have the advanced (xianjin) and model (mofan) elements, rewarding them symbolically and materially, and holding them up for study and emulation (Diamond, 1983). Other villages should do things according to the model set by the model village. “In Agriculture emulate Dazhai, in industry emulate Daqing (nongye xue dazhai, gongye xue daqing)” is an important historical example of the use of the idea of “model.” Today’s model village is different from that time. The purpose of Dazhai and Daqing was a spirit of working hard collectively to achieve collective output/goals. Everyone in the country should work hard like them. The model village today mainly shows successful economic development, which is different from Dazhai and Daqing of a spirit of working hard collectively.

The construction of model villages has been paid more and more attention in the contemporary economic development. It becomes an important way of promoting local development since it directly targets to project grant application. As a result, various model villages have been derived, such as model villages of economic development, national unity, ecological demonstration villages, tourism development demonstration villages, poverty reduction demonstration villages, and so on. The model village construction has become an integral part of the rural revitalization plan, which has aroused the wide interest of scholars. Ethnic solidarity model village is one of the most recognized model villages. Certain scholars have studied the model village project in depth (Wang, 2018), the model village development methodology (Zhang, 2018), and some have focused on the role of model villages in poverty reduction (Jia, 2017). There are also discussions on ecological construction model village in the role of environmental protection and new countryside construction (Huo et al., 2017). On the whole, model villages are considered to have superior effects in terms of township civilization, neat appearance of
villages and democratic management compared with non-model villages (Hu et al., 2011). Scholars believe that models, pilots and experiments are considered to be significant features of China's policy process (Ahlers and Schubert, 2013). However, there are also some people who criticize the unfair project competition, power and resource allocation and wide social network problems existing in the construction of model villages (Li, 2018). The acquisition of model village project is closely related to the social network and social capital of local cadres. These research results show that model village construction does have certain advantages and disadvantages in rural development in contemporary China.

However, it is an indisputable fact that with the implementation of China's rural revitalization plan, model villages will attract attention from all sectors of the society and scholars. Model villages and disaster recovery and reconstruction will be combined, although not as many as the ethnic unity model villages, but they have emerged as post-disaster recovery and reconstruction model villages. The model village of disaster recovery is of great significance, because the model village is built on the basis of community. In disaster research, many scholars emphasize the importance of community demand-orientation. Anthropologist Torry (1979) points out that the theory of disaster research is the theory of community, namely, the continuity and change of community. Community demands are important because disasters are deeply embedded in the political economy and social culture of a society (Oliver-Smith, 1999; 2005). Once community demands are ignored, local villagers will lose confidence in community recovery and reconstruction.

The model village then not only has good construction and infrastructure, but also has deep symbols of social and political meaning. The model village is usually constructed near the main road, not far from the town and in an open field of vision. These conditions are mainly designed for the convenience of high level leaders to visit and “investigate” (diaocha). Two following facts are important when building a model village. First, many high-level leaders do not want to go to difficult places or places far from main roads. They prefer to visit a place near town or on a road to check lower- levels’ work. The model village shows them low-level cadres’ successful work. Secondly, the evaluation of low-level cadres’ jobs is decided by high-level leaders, who also control the promotion of low-level cadres. Low-level leaders must clearly understand these two principles so that they can get good evaluations from high-level leaders. Susan Whiting’s (2001) work shows that the cadres’ evaluation system is a powerful tool of bureaucratic control, and depends on political organizational and leadership abilities as well as actual achievement. Good evaluation is linked with material and nonmaterial both rewards, as well as transfers and promotions. Definitely, the cadres’ actual achievement is linked to their economic records. These factors are the reasons why people select places near roads or towns for reforestation projects (tuigeng huanlin) and model villages. In academic circles, there is a very beautiful name for this kind of project, called Road Side Project (lubian gongcheng).

The scope of model villages is expanding today, including model households, model townships, model counties, model regions, etc. Yunnan province is China's model region in ethnic unity and progress. There is no doubt that the construction of model villages is valued in China's rural construction and development. With the promotion of China's rural revitalization strategy, it is of great significance to summarize the experience and study on model villages.

**Landslide Disaster in Shuitang Township of Xinping County of Yunnan in 2002**

On August 14th of 2002, serious landslides happened in the Ailao Mountains in Shuitang and Gasa Townships, Xinping Yi-Dai Autonomous County, Yunnan Provence, causing a lot of damage. Bajiaoshu village of Jinchang Cunweihui (Village Administration Committee) was washed away, and 14 people died in the village. About half of Mannuo village of Xinzhai Cunweihui was washed away, and 17 people died. Dashiban, Dashuijing and Songshujiao of Nanda Cunwei hui were washed away, and 13 people died. The landslide in the town of Shuitang led to 4 deaths. The landslide in Pingtian of Gasa killed 9 people. According to the local government, the landslides led to 63 deaths, 801 houses’ collapse, and 2000 people becoming homeless. The landslides also washed away 221 cattle, 1463 pigs and 2704 ducks and chickens.
The damage to roads, utilities, bridges, agricultural land, and other infrastructure was severe. The county government said that they lost more than 300 million yuan (37 million US dollars). Since all landslides happened on August 14, it was named “8.14 landslides disaster”. The county government claimed that this had not happened within 100 years. For a long time, people have been struggling with the memory of the landslides. A Dai man told the story of the landslide:

That was a night that our village was in disorder. We tried as much as possible to move our properties to the mountain behind the village. My wife and I were busy moving the TV and other expensive things out. Our village’s location is special. There are two rivers around our village, at left and right. The left one is dangerous since floods always come from that side. The right one is small, has rarely floods, and has a lot of trees. We believe right side is safer. There is a mountain behind the village. All villagers tried to move their properties to the mountain close to the right side. Since it rained terribly and was dark, people could not find family members, and could not recognize people when they saw them, but they kept moving things. I sometimes fell down, sometimes broke things, but the worst thing was that I could not find my wife and kids. The water in the left river was becoming bigger and bigger, and I realized that I needed to find my wife and kids. Then, when I started to go to the right side of the river; suddenly, I heard a tremendous sound, I saw a huge 20 meter- high thing came out from the left side of river and disappear. Within 3 seconds, half of our village was gone. All the people in the village were scared like lost souls. Nobody could say a word for four hours. The process of the landslide itself only took about 5 seconds, but I cannot forget the fear for my life. I lost my wife, and we even cannot find out her body. She was washed away somewhere by the landslide, but we do not know where. 17 people died in our village.

Shuitang Township is the place where the most serious landslides happened in the county, and the township is still in a dangerous situation for a long time after the disaster. In the post-disaster recovery and reconstruction, relocation has become one of the most important tasks. 2225 families and 8551 people must move out of their original villages. These people involve 65 village teams (50 natural villages) of 10 Cunweihui (administrative village). This is the biggest removal in Shuitang and also in Xinping history.

Model Village: New Shanghai Village

The recovery construction started soon after landslide disaster. More than 2225 families needed to relocate. In Shuitang’s relocation township, there are two kinds of village construction; one is ordinary villages, and the other is model villages. Here model village does not necessarily mean that they could do the best way of constructing a new village, but it means that the township government received 2 million yuan from Shanghai people’s government, and needs to build a model village to show the great contribution from Shanghai People’s Government. Then, a Han village called Pingzhangtian was selected as a model village. The reason that the local government selected Pingzhangtian as a model village is that the village’s economic situation is much better than that from other villages. The local government believes that Pingzhangtian can do a much better job since they are richer than people of other villages. They, of course, soon become the example of the best village construction in the county during the reconstruction period. Then, the name of Pingzhangtian is changed to “New Shanghai Village”.

The Early Plan of the Location

The site selected for the model village was on the top of a small hill where Dai people had planted a lot of sugar cane. There are no trees on the site, since people plant sugar cane, but there are many bushes half way down the hill. To the east is the mountain called Changchong Shan meaning long worm mountain; to the south is Shuitang town; to the west are the Ailao Mountains through which passes the main road from Shuitang to Zhelong Township of Xinping; and on the north is a broad view of fields area
and also of the Han village named BalaTian, which was moved from the mountains during the 60s. The land on the hill belonged to Dai people in Xiaomaka originally.

After the landslides, the local government invited two geologists to Shuitang to find a safe place for people to live. When the geologists came here, the place was definitely selected for at least one hundred families to live. Of course, at the beginning of that time, nobody knew who would move there, or what kind of village would be constructed. Even when Pingzhangtian village was selected from among the landslide-affected villages to move to the selected spot, the government still had no plan to build a model village. They only wanted to build an ordinary village.

When I came to the place with the chief leader of the Shuitang government in the winter of 2002, the view I could see was only sugar cane. The sunlight of winter was not hot but warm. I saw the smoke in BalaTian village only 1 km from the hill. Occasionally, I could hear cocks crowing. The road from Shuitang to Zhelong crosses the village of BalaTian, but the noise could not reach this silent hill. Changchong Mountain is a symbol of luck and secret in local Dai thinking. This is why so many Dai people opposed planting sugar cane on the mountain. Through a very simple road on the hill, I saw a simple and crude house on the edge of sugar cane land. Dai people rent this land to a person to plant sugar cane. The person was told by the local government to cut the sugar cane down and sell to the sugar mill as soon as possible. The government wanted to send a team to survey the land and design houses. After local leaders discussed the problem, the local government decided to ask farmers to finish house construction before the rainy season which would begin in early May of 2003.

After two weeks, when I came back to the hill, I saw no sugar cane left. The designing team was working hard to survey the land. The obvious change was that the bulldozers were roaring to flatten the soil. The land became red under the sunlight. After the bulldozer had finished their jobs, the design team started to survey specifically the land for the design of each house. All houses were the same in initial design. Each house (family) got 120 square meters. Before the villagers came to draw lots, the government had the responsibility to finish what were called “three supplies and one flatten” (santong yiping) which means electricity, water, road (tongdian, tongshui, tonglu) and flattening the soil (tuiping tudi). The government needed to finish all things early and design the houses and make clear demarcations for villagers. This would avoid arguments among the villagers, so that villagers could concentrate on construction. The “three supplies and one flatten” is the government responsibility for all villages in Shuitang who needed to move, not only for this village.

The third time I came to this hill, I saw the land had become terrace land, and the bulldozers had not stopped and were doing their final work. The designing team finished the basic work of design. According to their suggestions, 145 families could be arranged to live there. Some farmers had to build retaining walls (dangqiang) behind their houses if they were located in a high terrace area. Those who got the flat areas did not need to build a wall. The government did not build the walls but asked the farmers to do it.

The lot drawing day was exciting for all villagers. All people were asked to gather together at the site. To people’s surprise, the leader of the Shuitang government suddenly announced that the village had received 2 million yuan from the Shanghai people’s government. Each family would get about 10,000 yuan for house construction. The village would be named New Shanghai Village (Shanghai xincun) and be a model village. For the purpose of building a new, beautiful and successful village, the structure of the village and houses would be redesigned, and the drawing of lots would be delayed. The leader asked the villagers to wait for the result of the new design of the village.

Direction, Stratum and Overall Construction of the New Village

After the announcement, villagers and government officers were all excited. The new design would require enlarging most houses from 120 square meters to 154 square meters. The bulldozers showed their power again in this area. According to new plan, the village would be arranged as a model village for specialized pig-raising. The government would give preferential treatment to support them. Farmers felt very lucky with this information. They started to use the name of Shanghai. Many of them even believed
there were two Shanghai in China; one was the real Shanghai in eastern China, and the second was definitely in Shuitang. They preferred to use the word Shanghai instead of New Shanghai Village. I heard everybody in rural areas including government cadres and farmers saying, “I will go to Shanghai”, “I just come back from Shanghai”, or on mobile phone, they said: “I am in Shanghai now”. All people know that Shanghai meant the new model village in Shuitang.

The directions of New Shanghai Village are very important. This is a hill, and there are four directions. One direction faces Shuitang town, one faces the main road, the third faces a huge area of land, and the fourth direction faces Changchong Mountain. The former three directions are important since people can see the village from a far place or even from a car or bus. The last direction, the fourth one facing Changchong Mountain is not important because there are no people living in the mountain. According to the government plan, the fourth direction would be provided for poor people who had no money or ability to build beautiful houses, and they would get 120 square meters for their houses, which is less than those provided to people facing other directions. They can choose to build tile-roofed houses (wafang) or asbestos-roofed houses (shimian wafang). The other three directions will be arranged for richer people and required building houses with flat concrete roofs (shuini pingdingfang). They got 154 square meters for each family. Poor people must draw lots for properties facing the mountain if they had no money to build good houses. The result of drawing lots was coordinated with the plan designed by local government.

The construction immediately started after drawing lots. The movement of many tractors, trucks and other vehicles started there. Sometimes tractors and trucks tried to carry more material to earn more money, but the road was very narrow, which nobody could pass. This situation occurred frequently since so many vehicles came including government cars for checking the process of construction. With more and more people coming, restaurants and Karaoke rooms were built, which was very lively. For the successful village construction, the government established construction headquarters in the village and the county government sent a team to help build the pigsties. This was the kind of headquarters that only a model village was given, not other relocation villages. All these arrangements showed that local government tried their best to build the model village. All high-level cadres, leaders and other visitors were taken here without exception for observation and investigation on relocation. The model village showed its importance.

However, villagers and local government had different opinions and understandings about spending the 2 million yuan. The local government said part of the budget of 2 million yuan should be used for buying land from Dai people, building roads and a modern water system, and connecting electricity. They also needed money to rent bulldozers to flatten out the terrain. All things cost money. The farmers, however, did not agree with this. They thought the above things were local government’s responsibility whether Shanghai had been given 2 million yuan or not. The money from the Shanghai People’s Government should be used to support villagers, not for the road, land, water, electricity and renting bulldozers since that money should already be counted in the government budget.

According to the farmers, each family should get:

1. 2000 yuan for relocation fee
2. 900 yuan for building a marsh gas heating and cooking system
3. 10,000 yuan for each family from the funds contributed by the Shanghai People’s Government

Farmers believed that No. 1 above was the money all people who had to be relocated would receive. No. 2 was special money for building a marsh gas heating and cooking system for New Shanghai Village only, and third one was the money from Shanghai People’s Government for special help to the people there. Therefore, the total money that each family should receive was 12,900 yuan. However, farmers said that the local government did not give them 12,900 yuan. Instead, they received the following things from the government:

- 2000 yuan for relocation fee (banqianfei), which is not from the Shanghai people’s government
7 tons of cement, which were worth 1400 yuan
3 pigsty doors, which were worth 100 yuan
2 toilet doors, which were worth 70 yuan
600 big hole bricks (kongxinzhuoan), which were worth 690 yuan
water pipes, worth 200 yuan
sand, which was worth 369 yuan (but some farmers said should not more then 150 yuan)
gravel, which was worth 130 yuan.

The total money they received was 4950 yuan, which was far less from 12,900 yuan. If one deducted the 2000 yuan for the relocation fee, each family received 2950 yuan out of the 10,000 yuan they believed they should get from the contribution made by the Shanghai People’s Government. This was far from their hope of receiving support of the model project. The final decision, of course, was absolutely controlled by the government, and no discussion or negotiation occurred between farmers and local government.

The construction speed and quality differed greatly among the villagers. Some people finished the second floor before others had even started. Some villagers started construction, but after finishing half way, they did not have money to continue the construction. Then they had to stop to working and try to find some money to continue. Some people were struggling with the wall (dangqiang) behind the house since they built it very poorly the first time, and when the rainy season came, it slid down and they needed to rebuild it. For those who drew lots on very steep areas, they needed to spend a lot of money on the wall behind the house. For many reasons, the villagers could not unify the process although the government requested them to do so.

The only thing they could unify was the so-called sanpeitao or three sets, meaning pigsty, toilet and marsh gas burner. These had unified designs and needed to be finished in a certain time since some technical people would go back in a short time, and all villagers should finish their sanpeitao together within the deadline given by the government. This was easy to finish within the time given by the government since all materials for Sanpeitao were free and paid out of the 2 million yuan from Shanghai. The Sanpeitao was something farmers really got from the project fund from Shanghai.

The different opinions and actions in New Shanghai Village reflect conflicts of interest between the farmers and local government. The local government had to pay for construction of infrastructure, such as water supply, roads, electricity and flattening the terrain, whether or not they got support from Shanghai, but after they got the support, they could also save their money for other places. This is not difficult to understand if many people needed help in the area. Actually, they did not need to discuss or negotiate with farmers as they had the power of making a decision. The villagers could only listen to government explanations. They also had no place to state their opinions.

However, New Shanghai Village is the best one in Shuitang and also probably in the county. There is a road in front of each family’s house, and in the central part of the village, and there is a public square of 2500 square meters composed of basketball court, tuoluo court, and green area. There is a meeting room near the basketball court. The basketball court was designed according to the national standards; and the green area had many trees including some evergreen trees (wannian qingshu) planted by the main leaders of the county government as a symbol of the support of the county government to the people who suffered from the landslide.

Relocation of Poor Families in the Village

With the government requirements and very limited time, many people had no spare money for construction under the very hot weather near the Honghe River. Many villagers came early and went back late, and put all their time and energy into the construction. I met a young man who was one of the poorest people in the village, but he was the first person to finish his house and move into the new house in July, 2003. Many villagers felt admiration for him, although his house was simple and its direction was facing Changchong Mountain, the poor people’s direction. The Yuxi daily, a party newspaper in the
prefecture, published an article telling his story of quickly building his new house in the new village. There are only two people in the family, he and his mother who is 68 years old. He told me the story why he was poor:

   My father died this year. He was sick and we sent him to the hospital. We did not know anything about the sickness. His stomach became bigger and bigger. The doctors also did not tell us. We spent several thousand yuan in the hospital, but it did not cure his sickness. He finally died. We do not have money to build a house since the money has been spent to try to cure father’s sickness. I can only build an asbestos-roofed house (shimianwafang). I borrowed more than 8000 yuan for the house, and this did not include materials I borrowed from friends.

   At the end of 2003, many villagers started to move into new houses before Chinese New Year. The local government especially cut out of iron, painted six big yellow characters saying “nanda shanghai xincun” on the roof of the meeting room. They also wrote an inscription on a stone tablet in the meeting room:

   Great benefits under the heaven come from water, but disaster also comes from water. At 4 am on 14th of August 2002 (6th day of 7th month of the Chinese calendar), the areas of Shuitang, Zhelong and Gasa suddenly received a lot of rain. Landslides happened in this area. Land moved with water, and stone moved with land. The landslide occurred in the Nanda area. 350 houses were damaged, 8 people died, 7 people have never been found, 1 person had a major injury, 8 people had slight injuries, and roads and other utilities were blocked, the direct economic loss was 33,186,000 yuan.

   After the landslides, the marks of landslides were everywhere. Danger also existed in all the villages. Farmers could not go home. The disaster affected the leaders’ hearts, and startled the central government. The government of every level immediately organized cadres, soldiers, and people to rescue victims from the disaster, employing the spirit of “one side has a problem, eight sides come to help” to console victims and rebuild homes. We received 2 million yuan support from the people of Shanghai and quarter of million yuan from the government of different levels and many goods and materials from people inside and outside the county.

   Today, the new village has been constructed. All people are glad and happy. For the memory of the support of people of Shanghai, we, 146 families in the village have decided to change the name of village to “New Shanghai Village”. We also wrote this inscription on a stone tablet in order to educate our future generations not to forget the help from the central, provincial, prefecture, county and township government, and all those who have helped us.

   All villagers of New Shanghai Village

   New Shanghai Village had not encountered situation that people did not want to move to the village if their houses had been finished. According to the leader of Nanda Cunweihui, those whose houses were unfinished were doing wage labor jobs. They needed to get some money to build their houses. About 100 families had moved into the village, and people were happy to live there, the leader said.

   Unfinished Houses, Poverty Families and Subsidies

   The construction speed of New Shanghai Village was slower than planned and imagined by the local government. The rainy season finally arrived, and the farmers still could not move into their new houses. The government asked the farmers to speed up the construction of houses, but they could not continue since rainy days were difficult for construction. At the same time, the rainy season was also the busy season for agriculture. Farmers had to concentrate on agricultural fieldwork for sugar cane and walnuts.
Then, the autumn was even busier with the harvest of rice, corn, and walnuts. Pingzhangtian has the best reputation for walnuts in the county, and villagers are waiting to sell walnuts to get more money for the construction. As winter approached, farmers began to concentrate on construction. During winter time, the high-level government came and checked the process of the construction. The local government found that not so many people had finished their construction. The actual situation was that 75 families had finished, 15 families had moved, but local government reported 111 families had finished, and 45 families had moved into new homes.

At the end of 2003 and beginning of 2004, prices in China went up dramatically. The price of reinforcing bar increased from 2200 yuan per ton to 4200 yuan per ton. Cement increased from 200 yuan per ton to 260 yuan per ton. The price of transportation also increased since the price of gasoline went up. These things made the construction even more difficult since the people who had not finished were mainly poor people. They originally had no money to build their houses, and with the addition of rising prices, they really were not able to finish the construction. The government, of course, did not want this to happen, especially in the model village. After the local government wrote a special report to the provincial government asking them for helping the poor people in this model village, the Department of Civil Affairs (minzhengting) of the Yunnan provincial government agreed to add a quarter million yuan for additional help to the village. This was special help to poor people in the village who were affected by the price spiral. The provincial government thought this would be enough to solve all problems.

However, there was argument among villagers over how to allocate the quarter million yuan given by the provincial government. Many people did not agree to give money to those who did not finish their houses. They believed that their own incomes were not so different. The fact that they finished the construction did not necessarily mean they were rich. They just obeyed the government’s advice and borrowed money from friends and banks to finish the construction. Those did not finish the construction not because they were poor, but because they did not want to obey the government orders, and did not want to borrow money. If this method would get additional help from the government, everybody would stay and wait for help. People who finished the construction wanted to allocate the money equally. The local government found this argument was not good for solving problems, and then decided to not give money to anyone. One local government officer told me that there were now only 170,000 yuan left from the original 2 million, plus additional money from the provincial government, that was about 430,000 yuan left for the construction of New Shanghai Village, which was a lot of money compared with other villages.

**New Shanghai Village: A Model for Raising Pigs and Sickness of Pigs**

The model village was designed by the government as a specialized village for raising pigsty. This is why every family got a free pigsty. After they finished the construction, they needed to raise as many pigs as possible to show outsiders their success in raising pigs. The government would then take visitors to see. Many people started to buy pigs and raise them. I saw one family who had 12 pigs, which meant they really started the program. However, after the Spring Festival 2004, the pigs got a serious sickness, which seriously changed the model of raising pigs. Many families said all their pigs had died. The symptom of sickness was swelling including pig’s head, mouth, eyes, foot and hoofs; some pigs also had diarrhoea and asthma, and had a running nose. The sick pigs could not walk. The agricultural extension experts came several times but they did not know what kind of sickness it was. Finally, the local animal hospital station (shouyizhan) began to do anatomical studies on pigs. They found out that the pigs’ lungs were swollen, but they really did not know what kind of sickness it was, or why this happened. Obviously, their very limited education and knowledge with poor equipment were not able to explain this complicated sickness. It required a high-level of scientific work which they did not have. The situation was even worse for those poor farmers who did not have any education or knowledge about the sickness and medicine. However, they went to market to buy many medicines to do injection. They were trying as many medicines as possible to hopefully cure the illness of their pigs. This did not work since they did not know
what the sickness was or what kind of medicine they were buying. They just did the injection and if it did not work, they changed the medicine. Sometimes extension people also came and gave injections, but like farmers, they also did not cure any pigs.

Many pigs died, and more and more pigs got the disease. Local government and villagers finally realized this was a very serious and dangerous contagious illness. The government started to worry about the illness that could spread to other places, and realized they needed to do prevention. They then immediately laid down a regulation that ill pigs were not allowed to be sold in the market. However, in order to reduce their losses from the illness, some farmers ignored the regulation and stealthily sold the pigs in the market. Then, the next day, the pigs died in other places. After the situation of stealthily selling pigs in the market was spotted, the government sent a team to the main road near the model village to stop the sale of ill pigs in the market. Villagers began to stop this action and brought ill pigs to wild areas in the mountains and let pigs die there. Some families began to kill pigs before they died, and ate the meat. The government did not stop either of these two kinds of behaviors. Many farmers spent much money, but no pigs were cured. This situation happened after a chicken sickness, which also caused lose money.

The illness of pigs raised doubts among farmers and others about the model pig-raising village. Almost all villagers lost their pigs and people started not to raise many pigs. Those who wanted to raise pigs in the village received a big blow. Some people did not raise any pigs after that illness. One family dismantled the pigsty built by the government for free and built a new kitchen, which strongly challenged the government plan of raising pigs. These people said the farmers needed a toast room (kaofang) to dry walnut, not a pigsty. They thought that the government design was not in accordance with actual situation in this area. Some families raised their pigs in the old village Pingzhangtian and they thought New Shanghai Village was too hard for raising many pigs.

Non-Model Village: Xiaomaka

Many villages relocated during the reconstruction were not model villages, and here, I chose one village named Xiaomaka to do comparative study with the model village. People in Xiaomaka were not as lucky as people in New Shanghai Village, who got support from Shanghai and from the Yunnan provincial government. People relocated to Xiaomaka were mainly Yi people from Hetaoping, which was also severely damaged by the landslides. There were many reasons that the local government did not choose Xiaomaka as a model village, such as being too small or having just a small number of households that needed relocation, which made Xiaomaka not representative.

Xiaomaka is only 1.5 km from New Shanghai Village, but the government treated it very differently from the model village. Xiaomaka and New Shanghai Village were different before the relocation, since there were no people living at the site of the model village, but there were already 15 Dai families in Xiaomaka. Xiaomaka is a place where outsiders moved to mix with original villagers there. However, the Dai people in Xiaomaka are also people relocated from another place. The land around Xiaomaka belongs to people in Damaka. In 1980s, a Dai village moved to the site of Xiaomaka and exchanged land with Damaka. When the government discussed the relocation and land expropriation after the landslides, they only discussed the issue with people in Damaka, not with people in Xiaomaka.

When I first came to this place with leaders of the Shuitang government, I saw that it was a very steep place with some terraces planted with sugar cane. According to geologists, it was a safe place for about 50 families. The geologists’ words were the main reason for the government to choose the place for relocation. When I first saw people working on the construction in the village, they asked: what are you marketing to us? What do you want to collect or purchase? You came too late; our houses have been contracted to other people. When I told them what I was doing, they asked: why don’t you take a car to come here? In their idea, people from Shuitang always come by cars, not by bus.

Xiaomaka is very different from the model village. The government only gave 2000 yuan to each family for relocation plus “three supplies and one flatten” (santongyiping) which means water supply, electricity, road and flattening the ground. Some people also thought that these things were not as good as
those the government provided in the model village. There were no marsh gas cooker, toilet or pigsty here, what were called “three sets” (sanpeitao) in the model village. Villagers had to pay for all those things themselves, and people here could not afford them. Most of the villagers had no toilets, and there were no public toilets in the village. The pigsties were very simple. I visited one family who had finished their house, and I saw the house was very simple, without a pigsty or toilet, but the host said they had spent more than 8000 yuan for the house. This kind of situation I did not find in the model village. Clearly, this was not a place the government was interested in although it was very close to the road. One villager said to me:

Dakou cunweihui is one of the poorest cunweihui in Shuitang, and Hetaoping is the poorest village in Dakou. We are the poorest, but we did not get help. They (the Han in the model village) are rich, but they got the most. This does not accord with the government policy, but we have no place to express our opinions. Even if we did go to say something, they would ignore us.

One old man also said to me when we discussed the Xiaomaka and Hetaoping villages:

There are no people poor like us in Hetaoping village. We originally had less land but now we have more people, so we needed to go to many places to reclaim wasteland. Historically we are poor. Before liberation, the richest family only had two horses. There were no really rich people in the village. During the class demarcation time, we only had two middle peasants (zhongnong). We even had no upper-middle peasants (shangzhongnong), and needless to say rich farmers called funong or landlords called dizhu. After liberation, when we saw people from outside, we still ran away. We also had no accountant in the village since we had no one with any education.

According to what the people in Xiaomaka told me, they had no public toilets, not enough water pipe, no marsh gas system. Their road was not as good as that in the model and other villages. The most difficult thing was no nearby agricultural fields, and their farming fields were very far from the village. The furthest place was about 20 km away. It was not possible for them to have time and energy to do any agricultural work after walking there. In many places, they could only do a few hours’ work and then needed to come back home.

48 families were designated to move to Xiaomaka village, mainly from Dakou Cuiweihui. Among them, 30 families were Yi, 15 families were Han from Dakou and 2 families were from Sichuan Province and Zhenyuan County of Simao Prefecture. Visiting Xiaomaka, I had a different feeling from visiting the model village. Although 48 families were assigned this place, more than half of them had not finished their house construction. Many of them only finished half of the construction and then stopped and left. With poor quality construction, money was wasted, and they needed to rebuild. Many home sites contained nothing but grass. Although some families had finished their houses, they had not moved in. Some people moved into the new houses for a while, but then moved back to the old village since Xiaomaka was not convenient for agriculture. By August 2004, two years after the landslides, only 9 families had actually moved into the village. People only planted some bananas or vegetables on the house sites to lay claim to their property rights.

The differences between Xiaomaka and New Shanghai Village show the distinction between a model village and a non-model village. This is not an occasional example, but it shows that the intervention of state power can make things very different. After New Shanghai Village was built, one of my friends in the local government said to me: “If you can find some money from America, we can build a New American Village.” We laughed and said that we could build an international model village, and probably, we could put it in Xiaomaka.

The Political and Economic Symbolism of the Model Village

Nobody knows how many cadres, leaders and news reporters have visited the model village. Sometimes cadres and leaders from different places and levels came to the village many times each day.
Some leaders and cadres only came here to visit; some of them came for investigation (kaocha); some leaders came to check on the job that the low-level government was doing for relocation after the landslides. Some of them only accompanied high-leaders to do investigation, and some of them had no purpose but just to look at the model village. All visitors from outside were taken to the model village to look at what the local government had done for relocation after landslide. This is a clear demonstration of the symbolic significance and the political and economic meaning of the model village. Its neighbor, Xiaomaka, a village only 1.5 km from the model village, almost had no visit by leaders and cadres at all. High leaders wanted to see good news, not difficult situations. Some villagers said: “We do not have opportunity to reflect on problems. They (leaders) just come here by car, stay for a few minutes, and then go to a restaurant.”

The New Shanghai Village is a model village that local government wants to use to test a way of relocation or migration from one place to another. Many factors have been taken into consideration when the local government designed the relocation after the disaster, such as farmers’ income—raising pigs, villagers need a convenient place to leave—good houses and proximity to the road and town. Villages specializing in raising pigs, chickens, sheep or cows, or planting fruits or medicines are called specialized villages (zhuanyecun). Small town construction (xiaochengzhen jianshe) and specialized village are valued by the Chinese government for rural development in the future. The model village is an example of them, but the key thing here is that they got 2 million yuan from Shanghai People’s Government so that they could accomplish it.

However, they also had some difficulties. First, it was not easy for all villages to build houses like the model village. In Shuitang, 2225 families needed to move after landslide, but only 146 families got support from the project, which accounted for about 6.6% of them. In other words, 93.4% of the villagers did not get help as those in the model village. The model village was too special since they got 2.25 million yuan from outsiders. Many poor people or people who needed help could not get money since the money was concentrated in one village. This situation shows that the government allocation to the villagers was not fair even though people in the model village still did not get as much money as they expected.

Second, the number of specialized villages was very limited, and it was difficult to do cooperation among villagers. Once the government approved a village to be a specialized village, people there would benefit from the policy, but farmers would also pay for this. Whether the residents like it or not, the production patterns would be changed according to the specialized village plans approved by government. If the government approved a village for pig-raising, all villagers needed to raise as many pigs as possible since they benefited from the policy. The problem was that some farmers did not do it since they did not like raising many pigs. The model village was a good example of this. By contrast, one family in Xiaomaka raised 22 pigs, but did not benefit from the model village policy. Third, there was no good and effective way to evaluate model villages, so it was difficult to prove that the investment or plan for a special model village had achieved its goals. We need a specific way to evaluate the results of a model village or government plans, and to make sure something that we have done or something that we need to do or research more. If there are no criteria for evaluation, the political significance is bigger than the realistic or economic significance. This means that the New Shanghai Village is a model village, but it is not a village that performs the best, rather it is a village that received 2 million yuan from the Shanghai government, so it became a model village. It is a model village that the local government made with the support from Shanghai. If they had not received money from Shanghai, there would have been no model village there, since the local government could hardly leave 93.6% of the villagers without adequate help, and no means in sight to finance it for them.

Fourthly, model villages are government projects in nature, and their competition is also intense. The establishment of model villages involves social network relations, which is related to social capital (Lin, 2002; Cleaver, 2005). Communities with good social relations and good economic foundation and whose project can achieve remarkable results have higher competitive advantages. This is a short-term
management approach centered on interests (Li, 2018), but it is of great significance to re-examine and re-understand the model village practice and governance reality in rural China (Ahlers and Schubert, 2013).

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CONCLUSION

This paper has discussed the political and economic significance of the model village, and the difference between the model and non-model villages after a landslide disaster. We need specific ways to evaluate model villages for looking at whether they are sustainable or not. Model village is related to the Chinese political system where low-level government jobs are mainly evaluated by high-level leaders, and the promotion of cadres is also decided by the high-level leaders. One reason for local governments’ creating model villages is that they can easily show their success to high-level officers. Besides the possible promotion of local cadres, there are also economic reasons why the local government and villagers hope to get model village projects. That is, model villages can get more funds for infrastructure construction and improvement of living conditions. With the progress of targeted poverty alleviation strategy in rural China, model villages will be expanded in types and regions, and of course, it will attract academic attention. The construction of model villages in post-disaster recovery and reconstruction links the model villages with post-disaster reconstruction, and provides an idea for future post-disaster reconstruction.


Traditional Continuation and Modern Transformation: A Study on the Changes of Structures and Functions of Border Markets in Yunnan Province

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The border areas of Yunnan show complex and diverse ecological environments and unique geographical locations which make their rural markets bear typically ethnic, regional and open features of cross-border exchanges. The structures and functions of the border markets are undergoing significant modern transformation with the development of market economy, rapid urbanization and construction of towns in the border areas. This paper explores how the space and time structures of the markets have been reshaped in the process of modern changes; while as the traditional economic function of the markets has been gradually weakened, a trend of increasing social and cultural functions has emerged. This factor reflects that the border markets, rural societies and ethnic cultural traditions in Yunnan are undergoing structural changes bringing about diversity in the marketing system.

INTRODUCTION

In academic research, markets are often named as “periodic markets” or “fairs” generally referring to gathering of buyers and sellers at relatively fixed locations at certain times and periods for trades and exchanges. In the vast rural areas of China, since the markets always bear functions of trading and social interaction, the markets and their related studies have been focused in the fields of history, sociology, and anthropology for a long time.

In the 1930s, the Japanese scholar Kato F. (1973) first systematically analyzed and described the regular markets and their structures and functions in rural areas of North China with Chinese local records. Later, Yang Qingkun clarified the “internal function, structure and operation” of Zouping’s traditional markets through a concentrated field survey of the Cheng-Guan-Ji, Ming-Jia-Ji and Liu-Juqiao-Ji and other seven markets; and then he pointed out that in the period when China’s society was about to enter the stage of industrial revolution and urbanization after Europe had done, the market reflected the changing economic structure and organization of rural areas in China (Yang, 1934). In Peasant Life of China, Fei Xiaotong analyzes the rural markets, focusing on the economic and trading role of markets in the rural community. He believes that the primary markets in the village community cannot meet the villagers’ demands for social obligations, mutual reception, accommodation, mutual support, and gift exchange. Only a higher level-the intermediate market-can effectively satisfy the farmers’ daily needs.
Since the intermediate market is always located in a town, “the town is the center of exchanges between
the farmers and the outside world” (Fei, 2001: 206-217). Farmers buy industrial products from the middle
merchants in the town and sell the products to the acquiring specialists there. Yang Maochun (2001), in
his study of the community of Taitou Village in Shandong, emphasizes the social and political functions
of the markets apart from their economic and trading functions. Young's research shows that the markets
not only provide the villagers public places for communicating, but also are important joints of scattered
villages.

In the first half of the 20th century, a lot studies were conducted on markets in China, so was done on
the social and economic condition and trade in the southwestern region of China, especially in Yunnan's
frontier regions. For example, Jiang Yingliang (2009: 167-169), based on the field surveys, discusses the
market trade, commodity circulation, and currency in the “Baiyi” region. Li Youyi (2014: 75-85) makes a
systematic analysis of the “Han-Yi” economic relations and changes in the Nanwei Village of Lunan in
Yunnan in his book “The Economy of the Han-Yi Co-Inhabited Areas” and depicts the roles and status of
grass-root markets, and how they affect the local villagers. Although the chapters of these works related
to the markets are relatively simple, they laid foundations for later research on trade in Yunnan's ethnic
minority areas.

In the academic world outside China, American anthropologist Skinner's “market system theory”
indicates that the study of China's traditional township has entered a mature stage. He published the
article titled *Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China* in The Journal of Asia Studies in 1964 and
1965. In the article, he proposed a unique method to analyze China's grass-root society, namely the
"Skinner Model." Adopting the "Central Place Theory" proposed by German geophysicist Christaller,
Skinner clearly put forward that the study of the China's urban and rural economy and society is based on
the structure of the markets. Skinner pointed out that based on the structure of the markets, the structure
and operation of the Chinese economic system can not only be elucidated from a spatial point of view, but
also the study of the structure of Chinese society can be differed from those traditional studies based on
the administrative system. Though being at the lowest level in the market system, the rural market plays
an extremely important role. It is not only a place for farmers to exchange goods, but also a starting point
for the rural surplus products to enter a higher-level market system. The rural market is also the ending
point of goods provided to the villages. Moreover, Skinner believed that “farmer’s actual social area is not
determined by the narrow range of his village where he lives, but by the boundary of the grass-root
market area where his village belongs to” (Huang, 1986:23). Thus, Skinner’s analysis on the functions of
the Chinese markets has reached an unprecedented level leading to the comment that Skinner made “a
whole generation of American historians believes that Chinese villages are economically and socially
highly integrated with the big trading system” (Huang, 1986:23). In addition, influenced by Skinner’s
marketing theory, anthropologists who study China's problems are no longer constrained by small villages,
but they pay more attention to the role of the markets in the social structure, expanding their research to
marketing areas. When Eric R. Wolf was conducting his anthropological research in the Han Chinese
society in Taiwan, he focused on the Sanxia marketing area. Since 1988, both foreign scholars such as
Helen F. Siu, David Faure, Hamashima Atutoshi, and Okayama, etc. and Chinese scholars have focused
on market towns in the Pearl River Delta region, such as Xiaolan, Shawan, Shatou, Lubao and Longjiang
(Liu, 1993).

In contrast, due to some complicated factors, the research on the Chinese markets by Chinese scholars
remained at a low level for a long time after the establishment of the People's Republic of China. Until the
1980s and 1990s, market researches again won the attention in the field of history, sociology, and
anthropology. The research orientation and research focus of history are more consistent, which focuses
on the morphological structure, historical changes, like the rise and fall of the dynasties in various
markets of different regions in China since the late Qing Dynasty to the Republic of China. Combined
with empirical data, these historical studies launched academic discussions and theoretical dialogues
among senior scholars like Skinner. For example, Bao Weimin (1998) conducted a good research
combining empirical research and theoretical analysis on Jiangnan Town and its rise and fall at the modern times. Fan Shuzhi (2005) adopted both macroscopic and microscopic approaches to explain the development of Jiangnan from the Ming and Qing Dynasties to the Republic of China. Wang Di (1993) in his book, titled “Across the Closed World, Regional Social Research (1644–1911) in the Upper Yangtze River”, applied the “Skinner’s model” to analyze in detail the regional trade, city system and market network in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River in the Qing Dynasty by discussing a series of issues such as the role and function of the market, market density and activity sphere, advanced markets and urban development. Later, Wang Qingcheng made a detailed analysis of the growth of regular markets in North China in the late Qing Dynasty, and put forward an innovative view that poverty was a result of the increase in the volume of trade and the number of markets, and the expansion of commodity circulation in northern rural markets in late Qing Dynasty. Moreover, Gong Guan (2001), Li Zhenghua (1998), Xu Tan (1998) and others have conducted some unique studies on North China markets, ranging from historical development and its characteristics, the transformation process and historical trends, the relationship between the railway and the town development to markets and commodity economy. The above researches fully demonstrate the important influence of the "Skinner’s Model" in this field.

Compared with the historical research, researches on the markets in sociology, anthropology and other disciplines in this period were greater in number. However, a number of outstanding researches were conducted on the markets in North China and Southwest China. Among them, Lu Yilong (2012), whose research was focused on temple fairs and markets in Dingzhou, Hebei Province, drew a general conclusion on the basis of the development and prosperity of the rural market in North China that transformation and development of rural societies were brought about by the construction of modern markets of agricultural products and other products. Huan Pingqing (2005) discussed the changes of the rural markets in Dingzhou, Hebei, the differences and reasons of the market transition between China and the West, and the difficulties and trends of rural social transformation in North China. He gave an innovative viewpoint about transformation that urbanization was the only way to go out of the dilemma. In the study of the markets in ethnic areas in southwestern China, based on the ethnological and historical data, Wan Hong (2004) discussed the formation and evolution of the markets located in the southwestern ethnic areas of China. Wu Xiaoyan (2008) took Yuan tong in eastern Sichuan as her research site, and adopted microscopic empirical research methods that included rural markets in the historical process of modern country construction. Based on her research in the Nuosu (Yi) region in Liangshan, Sichuan Province, Liu Shaohua (2010) pointed out that the interaction between the traditional culture of Nuosu and the market system had caused great impacts on the local social life and social changes. Zhang Yue and Wang Xiaoyan (2010) took insight into the rich cultural connotation of the markets and their ties to the entire community network through a case study of markets in a Yi community in Yunnan. Most of the above researches bear the features of facing the status quo and problems of contemporary Chinese markets from the perspective of sociology and anthropology, expanding the views and dimensions of relevant market researches.

However, though Skinner and other previous researchers on China's markets attached great importance to revealing and exploring the economic, political, and social functions of the markets, their studies were focused on traditional markets which had existed for a long time before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. They paid more attention to such issues as the historical changes of the market, the rise and fall of the relationships, and the relationship between the rural society and the transformation, but less attention was given to the functions and roles of these markets at the modern times. Thus, in these studies, we cannot learn more about the changes of the function of the contemporary Chinese markets. Moreover, from the perspective of the regional study, the markets in Northern part of China and Jiangnan regions have always been relatively prosperous with rich historical records, bearing
clear the historical development. Therefore, the market researches done in these areas seem to be a paradigm in the field. Rural markets scattered in frontier areas, especially in the border areas of Yunnan, which are closely related to the production and livelihood of ethnic minorities, have got insufficient attention. Besides, researches conducted in these regions are relevantly ignored. What is the space-time structure of markets in Yunnan's border areas? What role does it play? Are the functions of markets which have been pointed out by modern researchers including Skinner still continue being played in border areas of Yunnan? Have any changes taken place in the structure and function of those markets that previous researchers have not noticed? To answer these questions, this paper attempts to use macroscopic approach based on historical literature and fieldwork to explore the continuation of the traditional structures and functions of the border markets in Yunnan province, and to analyze the transformation of those border markets in the background of the contemporary market economy and urbanization process.

Exchange and Contact: Continuation of Traditional Structures and Functions of Markets in Yunnan

Yunnan is a province with the largest number of ethnic minority groups in China. The complex and diverse geography and ecological environment make this area inhabited by several ethnic groups, but each ethnic group relevantly lives together. Therefore, the scattered rural markets are not only an economic or cultural coordinate in the geographical space, but they also play important social and cultural roles. In particular, markets can be regarded as special areas that extend across national borders and ethnic groups due to their special geographical location. Since the appearance of markets in the Yunnan border areas, they have not only enriched the residents’ material and cultural life because of their unique function of radiation and acculturation, but to some extent have also formed “marketing cultural circle” around the boundary markets, which has profoundly affected the life style and even cultural traditions of the residents in border areas.

1. Market Period: Continuation of Traditional Space-Time Structure

In the historical process, on the one hand, the development of markets in ethnic minority areas in Yunnan has been affected by many factors such as the local natural environment, folk traditions, livelihoods, and the pace of life; on the other hand, they have also been deeply influenced by the commercial culture of Han people. In terms of the time system, it is similar to the Inland China based on "regularity", and some "regular markets" form a stable cyclic structure with a fixed time rhythm in a certain geographical area, which has continued to today.

In general, there are mainly five types of the time systems for the trade markets in multi-ethnic areas on borders: (1) continuing to use local marketing traditional system of 12 Earthly Branches; (2) adopting the old calendar or the lunar system; (3) adopting the calendar system; (4) adopting the week system; and (5) daily markets (Wan, 2006). In addition, in some areas, there are some markets without fixed time period.

Generally speaking, the local traditional marketing system of 12 Earthly Branches (represented by 12 animals) is adopted in some remote areas where transportation is not convenient. For example, in Chengguan Town of Yuanyang County, Honghe Hani and Yi Autonomous Prefecture in Yunnan Province, there is a market for every dragon day, rat day, and monkey day; in Niujiaozhai Town, there is a market for every dragon day, monkey day and rat day (Niu, 2000:161-162). Markets are on every mouse day and horse day at Jinhe Town of Jinping Miao and Yao and Dai Prefecture County. Markets are on monkey days and tiger days in the town of Mengla (Niu, 2000:161-162). In these regions with the 12 earthy branches systems, the time system, rhythm, and folklore tradition differ with those in other regions. The names of the markets such as “Horse Street”, “Cattle Street” and “Chicken Street” actually reflect the 12 earthy branches of animals. The reasons for its formation are entirely related to the arrangements for agricultural production in different areas, which is to avoid taking up too much production time and to exchange goods conveniently.
Therefore, the intervals of markets are neither too long, nor too short, and are of roughly 5 to 7 days. Meanwhile, the periods of markets are overlapped so that people in different regions can exchange with each other and adjust shortages (Ma, 1987). For example, according to the historical data, markets at Longchuan in Dehong Prefecture have transactions on a five-day period. Villagers go to markets intricately. The market period calculated by the folk is that the fifth day is the market day after four-day rest, except that at the chieftain’s residential place, the marketing day is on the same day. During the Cultural Revolution, marketing for seven days or ten days was generally implemented, which was on the same day for the whole county. It was not until 1979 that it resumed marketing after five days. At present, the marketing time at townships is set by the overall planning of the county, and the marketing at villages is arranged alternatively within the township (Wang, 2012). Those who adopt the lunar calendar system are more often Han people living in agricultural areas, though some ethnic minorities also accept the lunar calendar system. Markets are set on every fifth to tenth day or on every third, sixth and ninth day, or every fourth or ninth day, or every first, fourth or seventh day, etc. of each month according to the lunar calendar to form a periodic rotation in the region.

"Weekly" and "Gregorian calendar" periods marketing are more frequently adopted around the towns in the border areas. For the "weekly" system, every Thursday, Sunday, Wednesday, or Saturday can be the marketing day. In the “Gregorian calendar system”, marketing days are on the 2nd, 5th, and 9th day of each month, or on the 3rd, 6th, and 9th day of the month, or on the even dates of the month, etc. Generally, the scope where the weekly calendar system is adopted is relatively narrow, which is mostly confined to the inner areas of cities and towns. The scope where the calendar system is adopted is relatively large, which appears in some higher urbanized places where the Gregorian calendar system has long been established and commodities are relatively developed. In areas where different ethnic groups live together, there are some cases where different time systems are used in a mixed way.

As for the daily marketing, it is often located in areas with high population density, rich products, convenient transportation, and high commercialization. In addition, in some areas of raw material production or mining area, it is easy to manage daily marketing, or even large markets at some fixed interval. The reason why such regions haven’t formed fixed markets is that these regions are distributed by ethnic groups located in remote mountainous areas. However, handicraftsmen and traders go to the villages from time to time to exchange daily necessities and food.

Thus, the contemporary markets in Yunnan border areas have a more complex time-space structure than those in the Inland China. The existing market network systems are actually determined by the spatial and temporal distribution patterns of the markets, which reflect the overall situation of the markets in border areas in Yunnan to some extent. At the same time, the spatial arrangement and temporal system of various markets are formed in the course of long-term historical development, which are matched with their corresponding regions and populations. Thus, such spatial arrangement and temporal system on one hand, reflect the close relationship between the complicated humanistic and geographical environment of the border areas in Yunnan, and the diversity of cultural traditions, and on the other hand, it also reflects their traditional agriculture and handicraft production, trading circles, and the interaction between settlement social relations and regional cultural identity in the long run. Above all, the continuation of historical development and distinctive regional cultural characteristics are embodied in the time-space structure of the markets.

2. Market Exchange: Continuation of Traditional Economic Functions

As a primary form and place of commodity exchange, rural market has lasted for thousands of years. As Braudel points out, “Exchanging has existed from the beginning of the human beings, and the historical research on the markets should be extended as far as possible. All the markets can testify that: a number of backward trading venues which are rare are at the first level, which are ancient species left before the Great Flood. The primary market is at the first stage of the economic ladder, which is the best form of exchange that is most direct, transparent, and supervised. ‘First-hand’ transactions are in the
primary market. On the spot, the deal is made.” (Braudel, 1993: 228) It can be said that the regular market determines the rhythm and pace of rural life. The market is a product of the peasant society, the peasant culture, and the peasant economy (Braudel, 1993: 103-105).

Commodity exchange in Yunnan's border areas has a long history, and it can even be traced back to the pre-Qin period. However, the real markets flourished in the Ming and Qing Dynasties, many of which still exist today. From the Qing Dynasty, the Republic of China to the present, the border markets have changed their forms from barter, “walking villages to exchange” and temporary markets along the roads, to the fixed market trading venues and market periods for exchanges, and even to rich commodity transactions like the daily marketing in big cities. Their development is similar to the evolution of the market trade in other parts of China, and has undergone a process of development from a low-level, non-conventional market to an advanced fixed one. This historical change has not only been recorded in the literature and data, but also has left a deep imprint in the historical memory and daily life of the ethnic people.

Markets in the Yunnan Border areas have been a material space with the main function of commodity exchange from past to present. It is characterized by the exchange of its surplus products, agricultural and sideline products, handicraft products, and special products among different ethnic groups in different trading circles from mature rice farming and fishery products in the flatland to dry land crops and prey in mountainous areas; from the nomadic livestock and dairy farming products in the high mountains of western Yunnan to the local special products in the slash-and-burn mountainous regions of eastern and southern Yunnan; from subtropical fruits and vegetables of southernmost Yunnan to highland barley and blankets in the high mountain areas in northwestern Yunnan; from agricultural and sideline crops, poultry, livestock and regional specialties such as tea and salt in the Han people area to the ethnic handicraft textiles, handicrafts, medicinal materials, and mountainous property and other materials specially produced and collected by ethnic minorities. As long as there are surplus products, they are sent to the market instantly. The scene is almost same as the markets in Zouping in Shandong Province written by Yang Qingyi in the 1930s. Today, the markets in the border areas in Yunnan are still the places for people living in the neighboring areas, especially for those cross-border peoples to sell their own primary agricultural and sideline products, handicrafts, and ethnic specialty products.

Moreover, the markets in border areas of Yunnan, as Fei Xiaotong (2001:206) said, “are the main places where every peasant gets his daily necessities that he does not produce.” Although almost every village in the border area of Yunnan now has its own grocery store, some daily necessities such as salt and candies can be bought in the village, but more items needed by families still need to be got at the time of marketing in the town. For example, fresh pork, beef, and lamb are not available in the village canteens. They can only be bought at markets. A lot of bulk oil and rice supplies or household appliances, such as rice cookers and electric teapots, or household items, such as hoe, sickle or other agricultural tools or tables and chairs, as well as clothes are available at markets.

In addition, compared with the urban and rural markets depicted by C. K. Yang, Fei Xiaotong and Skinner in China before the middle of the last century, a unique trading way in the Yunnan border regions has continued: cross-border trading. Yunnan Province is bordered by Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar. It is common for peoples (from different ethnic groups) to go across the national borders. Therefore, the cross-border markets have emerged. In the early stage, the bordering markets are only a form of transaction developed spontaneously by the people on both sides of the national borders. Its trading location and time are modeled on the traditional markets and set dates. In the mid-1980s, the cross-border markets were gradually governed by the government’s border trade management, allowing Chinese border residents to trade within the limit of 100 yuan per person per day. Since then, with the increase of trade amount in the border areas, the limit of borderline transactions has gradually increased to 8,000 yuan today. Also, the types of goods for trade have also evolved from agricultural and sideline products to hardware, household appliances, building materials, daily necessities and sanitary wares, etc. As a result, the mutual exchanges on borders have also developed into a modern trade service industry which
originally aimed at improving the bordering people’s life by bartering. For example, the mutual exchanges in the border areas of China and Vietnam, people on the border of the two countries usually sell their unique native products in the markets and then buy some production and living goods home. Even if it is not the marketing day, the phenomenon that Vietnamese go crossing the border to exchange goods is still common (Zhang and Gu, 2012). Another example is in Ruili City on the border between China and Myanmar. Statistics show that the number of people participating in the border-marketing exchanges has reached millions each year. The types of mutual-traded goods have also increased from dozens in the early 1980s to the thousands at present. In the case of buyers and sellers, Burmese sold oversea goods while Chinese bought them in the early 1980s. However, the situation has developed to level off for both sell and buying (He, 2011: 252). In the areas like Hekou, Mengding, Mohan, Wanding, Daluo, etc., where there is a history for border trading, cross-border trade is an important source of income for local people. Even in the border areas where no ports are set, villagers and businessman at home and abroad can enter each other’s markets “conveniently” to do transactions. Such “peaceful cross-border” trading model is a special way of economic exchange formed by the residents in the historical development.

Skinner once predicted that China's rural markets would gradually disappear at the end of the 20th century with the development of modern society and economy. However, the markets in the border areas of Yunnan remain as an indispensable part of ethnic villagers’ life. Comparing with the urban and rural societies in the Inland China, which have a relatively complete modern market system, the complicated geographical environment, the undeveloped economic foundation and the less urbanization in Yunnan's border areas have restricted the development of the social economy and the needs of people. Exchanges of necessities and commodities must be realized in rural markets. The small rural markets spontaneously formed in the past still play a role as an economic supplement to production and life of various ethnic groups. In this sense, "ethnic economic exchanges are an important form of the ethnic economy. Economic exchanges are the first need for the survival of an ethnic group and are the most important contacts" (Jin, 2007: 184). For all ethnic groups trading in the markets, the choices of commodities and transaction ways will obviously be highlighted before their cultures and ethnic consciousness (Zhang and Wang, 2010).

3. Exchanging in Market: Continuation of Traditional Social and Cultural Functions

In the rural society, a market is undoubtedly a public space, which reflects a certain existing public nature within the society, as well as the relatively fixed social association forms and interpersonal structures. As early as the 1960s, Skinner (1998) made it clear that since the market structure bears all the characteristics of the Chinese agricultural society, market is a unique social system in traditional China. Later, Fairbank (2008: 26-28) further re-expressed the concept of “primary market” which was defined by Skinner as “market society”, arguing that it is “the combination of an economic unit and a social world”. “In normal situation, the peasants’ lives are not confined to a village, but to a large number of villages that form a market community.” Thus, market bears contact function since its born which links goods and people, people and people. Market is one of the most dynamic places in rural society.

Yunnan Province is bordered on Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. The border markets in Yunnan have always been important places for many ethnic groups at home and abroad. First, the markets in such areas present peoples’ transnational flows, which radiate the neighboring nations. Secondly, the ethnic minorities living in the border areas are mostly multinational, whose kinship, geographical relationships, etc., can be fully reflected in the markets where different nationalities gather. Economic activities weaken the boundaries of national differences. Language, commodity, and transaction are the main focus in the markets, while ethnic composition and consciousness, etc., are relegated to secondary positions. The ethnic symbols of the peoples in the markets are no longer the focus. For example, a researcher once did his research in the northwestern village of Ma Andi Township in Jinping County on the Sino-Vietnamese border. He found that the common languages in the local market were Hani, Chinese, and Hmong. Simple words such as sugar, cigarettes, alcohol, and needs, can be helpful in the transaction. People who can’t
speak such marketing languages have to adopt gestures to communicate. In the northwestern market, many vendors can speak several simple languages for trade (Li, 2011). Moreover, in the markets in Xishuangbanna, which is Dai area, people can speak both Han language and Dai language in marketing. Besides this, most Dai people there can speak other languages of neighboring ethnic groups. Bulang people have long-term economic and cultural exchanges with Dai people, who are deeply influenced by Dai’s culture. Although Bulang people have their own language, they expressed numbers in Dai language except those from one to ten. The majority of Han residents living in the Wuyi “street” can speak Dai, Hani, and Yao language (Wan, 2006: 83), which are not uncommon in other markets along the Yunnan border.

What should be stressed is that in the markets, contacts and exchanges based on geopolitical and kinship relations often constitute the most important “relationship” in the marketing area, which generally exists before the exchanges relationship in the markets. For example, in the traditional culture of the Jingpo people, it is extremely common to determine the relatives of the two sides through ethnic origins. The kinship is often expressed through a "practical way" in the market, such as drinking after meeting in the market, buying goods from relatives or selling goods to their relatives cheaply or even for free. These seemingly contradictory marketing rules continually adjust family obligations in specific market areas. Bourdieu pointed out: “From a practical point of view, farmers’ merchants strive to act in accordance with the rules and explain the rules according to their needs. All the strategies they have adopted remind us that the various phenomena, especially the classification of kinships, have a purely symbolic but still tangible effect” (Bourdieu, 2003:269). Thus, what behind the market exchange and communicative activities is the continuous consolidation and development of cross-border ethnic relations in this spatial structure.

In recent years, with the socialization of production, life, and contact, the needs for information, communication, and leisure have become increasingly diverse, and the social space for farmers in border areas has been continuously expanded. However, in many places, market is still a node in people's trade, entertainment and communication networks. Many people are still regarding marketing as their own world of life. Just as what depicted by Fei Xiaotong and Yang Maochun in the 30s and 40s of the last century, in the inland markets, people get influenced by local social and cultural traditions, meanwhile they connect their lives with wider outside world by marketing, gaining information there and going out of the village even into the cities. Thus, markets in Yunnan's border areas are not only the fields of exchanging goods; they always provide space for people to socialize. Trading, gathering and communicating in the markets create a public space for the local society, which plays an important role in economic and trade exchanges, cultural exchanges, relationship adjustment and social integration.

**Change and Integration: the Modern Transformation of the Structures and Functions of Markets on Yunnan Border**

Although the markets in Yunnan's border areas have been following their traditional trend of development for a long time, they take up a center position in the daily economic and socio-cultural life of the rural societies. However, what cannot be overlooked is that, with the rapid development of the urbanization and socio transformation, not only have a series of changes in the structure of time and space in the markets in Yunnan's border areas taken place since this century, but also the center role that the markets on border have played are gradually weakening. At the same time, because the dual relationship between urban and rural societies in China still exists in the border areas of Yunnan, which still has a huge impact, the process of urbanization and socio-cultural transformation have not immediately brought about the modernization of urban and rural life in Yunnan's border areas. On the contrary, the different cultures of the urban and rural societies encounter in the markets. Therefore, the markets function as a social and cultural hub between urban and rural areas; it is becoming more and more prominent, and will be bound to exist for a long time in future.
1. **Reshaping Market's Space-Time Structure**

Compared with the traditional markets, the most obvious change in contemporary markets in Yunnan border areas lies in their space-time structure, which reflects in the reintegration of the markets and their marketing period systems. In the 1950s and 1970s after the founding of the People's Republic of China, with the establishment of the planned economy system, the state incorporated market trade into the planning system, and the policy on the primary market was adjusted several times, which aimed at controlling the markets more strictly or even eliminating free markets. Until the early 1980s, the once banned market trade was gradually restored. During this period, some traditional fairs and markets in Yunnan's border areas, because of their being closed for many years and changes in the population and society in the border areas, could no longer be able to restore the vigorous scenes of good old days and disappeared silently in the history. With the implementation of the reform of the market economy in the 1980s, the Yunnan border areas began their transition from a “traditional agricultural society” to a “modern industrial society” and entered a period of rapid economic development. In particular, after the implementation of the strategy for the development of western China, a large number of transportation infrastructures such as highways, secondary roads and rural roads have been built and renewed on a large scale in the border areas, which has greatly promoted the development of local urbanization. Small and medium-sized new towns have sprung up in the border areas. Furthermore, some traditional markets either faded or disappeared due to geographical reasons, or because they had completely lost the time-space attributes of the traditional ones and transformed into the “modern trading centers” as called by Skinner. At the same time, due to the emergence of a large number of small and medium-sized towns in the border areas, a new batch of regular markets has emerged in these towns and their surrounding areas.

It needs to be pointed out that, whether it is a continuation of history or new birth of regular markets on border, the time systems of the field periods have also changed with the time. As mentioned above, there are about five types of the Yunnan Border Fairs: the Chinese Zodiac system, the lunar calendar system, the Gregorian calendar system, the weekly marketing system, and the daily marketing system. Since the new century began, the Chinese Zodiac system and the lunar calendar system have gradually experienced decrease in their usage. In some cities and their suburban areas, the Gregorian calendar and the weekly marketing system have been adopted more extensively. In some highly-commercial towns, the markets have gradually developed into a daily marketing system. It can be seen from all the four systems that the time period of marketing is becoming shorter and shorter. This trend has met the standard of Skinner’s “modern trading center”. Thus, the last type of the market system does no longer belong to traditional ones.

In addition, the village as a center of rural society again has also profoundly demonstrated the changes in the temporal and spatial structure of Yunnan's border market. Researches on space have proposed two ideal states: formal and informal space. For the formal space, the power is mainly derived from external administrative forces, while the informal space gets it power from the traditions, habits, and demands of the village. The formation of the latter one and the various activities in the village are determined by the local knowledge and the rational choice of the survival of the villagers, which bear a strong folk tune (Cao, 2005). Therefore, villages with government administrative power obviously belong to the formal public space; the markets formation constrained by the environment of the villages belongs to an informal space. In recent years, the state’s strategies of modernization and reconstruction of rural society, such as “beautiful rural construction” and “new rural construction”, have mainly focused on building settlements centered on villages and defining space of public services. Such strategies make the resources of configuration and power continue to flow to the villages in the specific space-time relationships, which partially replaces some functions of markets, leading to changes in the original market spatial behavior and the relationship of market components to some extent.
2. Fading of the Role of the Market as Economic Hub

Market is a place to exchange commodities, and its economic regulations and rules have been determined by the village itself as well as by the construction of the country in different historical periods. As mentioned above, in the first 30 years after the establishment of People's Republic of China, due to the economic policies of unified purchasing and marketing and the People's Commune System, the trade of the market was greatly affected and tended to wither. It's not until the 1980s when China's Reform and Opening-up period came and the market entered a new stage of historical development and returned to the daily life of farmers with policies to develop trade in the market and the acquisition of farmers' economic autonomy. In recent years, with the continuous advancement of the market economy led by the government, farmers’ social life has undergone great changes. The current economic activities of farmers in the market are obviously no longer covered by the traditional “natural economy”. In the process of modernity, not only has the structure and function of the market changed quietly, but also the relationship between farmers and markets has changed, which needs to be re-examined.

As far as the border areas of Yunnan province are concerned, with the improvement of traffic conditions and the rapid advancement of urbanization, the most obvious change is that market as an economic hub has been gradually weakened in people’s production and life. Changes are particularly prominent in some areas which used to rely heavily on markets. For example, in the Gongshan Dulong Nationality Autonomous County of Nujiang Prefecture in Yunnan Province, there are five township markets which are located at Cikai Town, Bingzhongluo Town, Pengdang Township, Puladi Township, and Dulongjiang Township. In the past, since these areas were really remote in high mountains and deep valleys, the transportation to these areas was inconvenient and dangerous. Therefore, the local people of the Dulong, the Nu, and the Lisu all used to depend on the nearby markets to make a living for a long time. Particularly, the area centered on the markets of Dulongjiang Township, and the traffic to the outside world was extremely inconvenient; and the local people were deeply dependent on the markets to handle their economic activities. With the completion of the Dulongjiang road in September 1999, the history of no roads to the last ethnic community among the 56 ethnic minorities was ended. By December 2014, the completion of the Dulongjiang road reconstruction project completely ended the history when vehicles could not pass from November to May because of snow blocking all the roads in the mountain. With the change of traffic conditions, ethnic people are now able to get to Gongshan County quickly for their economic activities. The old market's central position in production and life has been gradually replaced by the bigger markets in county where more goods are offered. Another example is the Awa Mountain area, which is located at Ximeng Wa Autonomous County in the west of Puer City in the southwest of Yunnan Province. After the county government moved from Ximeng Town to Mengsuo Town in 2000, the urbanization construction was pushed forward rapidly. A modern city has been built quickly in the last ten years. In the past, people of the Wa and Lahu who used to trade in open-air markets around Mengsuo Town, Mengka Town, and Lisuo Township now more and more frequently go shopping in the modern supermarkets of the Ximeng County. They are becoming more and more accustomed to selling their agricultural products and livestock in the urban markets for a better price.

From the perspective of the society, the economic activities of the villagers in the border areas have increasingly centered on cities. Villagers’ contact with the outside world is not necessarily by "administrative hierarchy system" or "market hierarchy system." However, they can communicate with external society directly through some distributed network systems. They make contact with each level of the markets directly and participate in any level of the market system by products. In fact, such changes have already appeared in North China. Lu Yilong (2012) completed an investigation in Dingxian, Hebei Province. He suggested that “the rural marketing centers have been moved to a centered city of the region and even farther away, and the markets in towns were no longer important cargo distribution centers.” Huan Pingqing (2016) put forward that “in county Ding, Hebei Province, market was no longer a center for distributing agricultural products or a place for surplus goods, but to a large extent it had become a mobile market where the external goods are sold to rural areas.”
The modernization of transportation facilities and the rapid development of small and medium-sized cities are making the economy in all ethnic communities on the border less dependent on the local markets. With the popularization of information and communication networks, the traditional economic functions of the markets have been continuously weakening. So far, all the villages in Yunnan province have access to electricity, and have been widely covered by television signals. Furthermore, almost every villager who has received primary school education does have a cell phone. Surfing on the internet, communicating with WeChat, and even paying bills online are common. National and local policies, regulations, and service information used to be learned only in the markets, but now can be gained instantly from news on TV and cell phones. The fees that used to be paid in the towns can be paid online now. Thus, to some extent, information resources, cultural resources, and even administrative resources which were only got in the markets in the past can be gained through information network now. Although markets are still the nodes of transactions and contacts, the farmers' vision has now surpassed the boundaries of traditional markets. They can selectively participate in market activities rather than accept and adapt passively as they did in the past. It can be expected that the role of the market as an economic hub and a resource allocation center will be increasingly affected by the development of information network technology which has penetrated the rural society in China.

3. Constantly Enhancing the Social and Cultural Functions of the Market

There has always been a fallacy on the modern transformation of the functions of the border markets in Yunnan. As the traditional economic function of the market and its economic center role are gradually weakening, its social and cultural functions are constantly increasing. It is playing an increasingly more and more important role in social interaction and cultural recreation.

First of all, as mentioned above, the modernization of transportation and the rapid advancement of urbanization in Yunnan have brought about tremendous social and economic development in the border areas. At the same time, cities’ influence and radiation functions have increased, especially in cultural production and communication, ranging from popular culture to popular fashion which are produced in the cities and then spread to the countryside. In this process, despite the fact that the dual division of identity and treatment between urban and rural areas after the Reform and Opening-up has been eliminated, the gap between urban and rural areas in social interaction and lifestyle still exists because of historical influence. Thus, markets have always played an important role in the rural society, both in social interaction and cultural recreation. Urban culture and lifestyle which are symbols of modernity will radiate in towns which are relatively densely populated with a high degree of mobility. Such urban culture and lifestyle will reach its peak during the marketing periods. Moreover, due to China’s once boom of “small towns” in the 1980’s and 1990’s, and the flourishing prosperity of markets on Yunnan's borders, almost all the townships on border that rely on the markets have unprecedentedly well developed. It can be expected that urbanization is still one of the most important social processes in China for a period of time in the future. The function of the markets on Yunnan border as social and cultural hubs between urban and rural areas will exist for a long time ahead.

Secondly, from the view of the village, as more and more young and middle-aged villagers in the border villages flood into nearby counties, or prefecture cities far away, or even provincial capitals, those remained in the village are elderly people, women and children. The growing hollowing of the village population has made it difficult for villagers to engage in social interaction that used to be normal. At the same time, traditional village entertainment, such as visiting friends, playing cards, and play games on plazas, have gradually disappeared with the loss of the population. Thus, the markets have become the most important communicative and entertaining places for the remaining villagers, and activities at markets also become the most important social communication and cultural recreation. Even if they have nothing to buy or sell, the villagers who stay in the village are eagerly looking forward to going to the market during the marketing day so that they can chat more with villagers who come from other villages in the markets, or get together to sing folk songs, listen to the local folk songs, and watch drama...
performances to kill time when the family members are out and to enjoy the leisure time in ways not available in the village. Therefore, we can often see such scenes in the markets: energetic middle-aged and young men and women come and go or chat with each other and the elderly play cards or chess, smoke and sunbathe. For most of the remained ones, “arena” has become an indispensable part of their lives. Skinner (1998:49-50) said in the 20th century: “The standard marketing community is the relevant context of organized recreation for the peasantry. Standard and higher level markets constitute the arena of professional storytellers, theatrical troupes, blind singers, purveyors of games of chance, boxers, jugglers, performing machine sellers and magicians. Such professionals are notably absent not only from villages but in the usual case from minor markets as well. Just as market day brings relief from the tedium of rural life through the provision of recreational opportunities, so the temple fair affords the high point in the villagers’ recreational year.”

In addition, the villagers who are working outside have difficulty in integrating into the city life and becoming residents in the city, even if they have been working in the city for a long time because of the urban-rural dual household registration system and the gap between urban and rural areas in terms of social security such as education, medical care and pensions, as well as the unstable factors such as housing and work. Such gap cannot be eliminated immediately. However, because they have worked in the cities for a long time, they have been familiar and accustomed to the social interaction, fashion and lifestyle in the cities. When they decide to return to the countryside, they are reluctant to go back directly to the villages, and they are more willing to make a living in towns that are closer to urban social and cultural style. Even those young and middle-aged laborers who return to their villages for a break are not accustomed to the relatively simple and rural lifestyle. On the contrary, they feel more comfortable in town, and they are more willing to go shopping there to seek spiritual comfort. To some extent, the markets have become places where people, especially the young ones get together, entertain, communicate and hang out. However, the people in the markets are not passively integrated into the market operation system. They will shape the markets as suitable fields based on their own cultural habits, the geographical and temporal characteristics to carry out various social activities.

Above all, the ever-increasing social and cultural functions of Yunnan border markets and their impacts on local societies have surpassed economic significance. The original social interaction model was largely governed by kinship networks, ethnic cultural traditions, and the state political system. However, with the participation of new markets and the growth of non-government markets, the above-mentioned dominance was changed and the traditional power and authority, interests and rules, relations and order structure were fundamentally shaken. Meanwhile, the social, cultural and entertainment functions of markets have been unprecedentedly released, which contribute to the conversion of the original functions and structures of the markets. In addition, the increasing social and cultural functions of the markets are also changing and shaping all aspects of people's daily lives, such as exchange mode and the way of communication, which even affect people's social concepts and economic concepts. Markets also affect people's professional ethics, values, fashion style, desires, sexual relations and imagination (Yuan, 2017), which reflects the fact that the modern changes are taking place in traditional cultures behind the markets.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The current markets on the border of Yunnan province are undergoing a modern transformation; their economic functions are gradually weakening while social and cultural functions are enhanced; and such transformation will continue for quite long in the future. What does this functional transformation mean for the markets in the border areas? Skinner (1998:48) pointed out that the market not only provides trading places for goods produced in the marketing community, but also constitutes a hub in the social structure of this community. Loads of economic interaction and intensive cultural interaction are proceeding in the area of the standard market. Undoubtedly, the grass-roots market theory provides us...
with a very effective analytical tool for understanding the border markets in Yunnan Province. The tool can be adopted to examine the structures and functions, and historical development of the markets in border areas. However, what should be stressed is that Skinner pays more attention to the “economic” activities in the market system. He believes other factors are the derivatives of economic rational behaviors. Meanwhile, because of the limitations of the times and the environment, Skinner was obviously unable to predict the trend of the development of the markets in Yunnan border areas, especially the modern transformation of the market function and their consequences. So far, the modern transformation of the border markets in Yunnan is ongoing. It clearly shows a series of structural contradictions in the process of social development. Therefore, this paper attempts to make use of the functionalist concepts of "manifest and latent function" to make an analysis of this problem.

According to Merton, the so-called manifest function refers to "the function that contributes to systematic adaption or adjustment, whose objective consequence is the recognition and expectation of participants" (Merton, 2006:153). The latent function refers to the "function that doesn’t contribute to systematic adaption or adjustment, whose objective consequence is not the recognition and expectation of participants" (Merton, 2006:153, 174). When Merton (2006:174) put forward the concept of latent functions, he also clearly realized that “the prominent contribution of sociologists lies in the unexpected postulate of social activities where latent function are involved and the expected postulate where manifest function lies in.” From the definition of Merton and the expectations of the researchers, we believe that the modern transformation of the border market in Yunnan is increasingly showing two important consequences.

First, from the perspective of “significant function”, the increasingly prominent social and cultural functions of the markets as hubs not only promote the deep excavation of tourism resources in the border areas, but also drive the upsurge of cultural tourism. With the development of rural tourism, markets are recognized and accepted by people as resources of cultural tourism. Particularly, the markets in the border areas maintain their “original ethnic ecology”. Markets are the stages for folk cultural performances. The border areas of Yunnan Province have rich resources of cultural tourism. For instance, the ethnic people’s festivals, such as the “Kuoshi Festival” of the Lisu people, the “Torch Festival” of the Yi people, the “Gexu Festival” of the Zhuang, the “Huashan Festival” of the Miao people, the “Panwang Festival” of the Yao people, and the “Dong Songkran Festival” of the Dai people, have been recorded in local county gazetteers since the Ming and Qing dynasties. During these traditional festivals, villagers used to kill pigs and slaughter sheep, set campfires, and sing and dance in different ways to celebrate the festivals, which showed their unique ethnic cultures. However, with the market economy sweeping through the villages in late 1990s and villagers leaving to work in cities or towns, the village culture has been declining. Even if on the festive day, marketing day can’t be as prosperous as it used to be. However, many marketing towns in the border areas have become socio-cultural hubs today, and most of the traditional festival activities held in the villages in the past have been completely moved into these towns. As time goes, even though the function of traditional festivals to satisfy gods and to entertain the people has not changed much, the needs for food, clothing, supplies, and other services during the festivals have turned marketing to be an essential part of the festivals. In some tourist hotspots with rich ethnic cultures and with convenient transportation, native culture is closely integrated into rural market tourism and has become the attractive logo for local culture. On the whole, border marketing as tourism resource is gradually becoming a new trend for cultural tourism industry in Yunnan, which undoubtedly offers a new perspective on the modern transformation of traditional ethnic culture.

Secondly, from the perspective of “potential function”, in the process of the modern transformation of the economic and cultural functions, a series of unexpected social problems have occurred in the markets in the border areas and have increasingly become prominent. For instance, porn, gambling and drug phenomena are particularly prominent. The Yunnan border markets are not only the important places for goods and social exchanges as well as the cultural recreation which the local villagers enjoy, but also the gathering places for the people who are from the neighbor countries. With the coming and going of
people from foreign countries, businessmen, tourists, and other kinds of persons, the markets have a population of high mobility and complexity. Moreover, affected by the external environment, people in these areas bear less legal ideas. Loads of smuggled goods such as cigarettes and cosmetics, porno publications are often sold in the markets; porno performances are also occasionally offered in the remote districts. Gambling by cards or machines has become common in teahouses, plazas, or in open space. The worst thing is that the number of drug users and drug traffickers depending on drugs from abroad is increasing in the border towns. Some markets even become the hardest-hit areas where drugs and AIDS are rampant. In addition, the markets which are lack of self-regulation and integration capabilities due to their remote location have become distribution centers for fake and shoddy products. Sham marketing and fraud activities also occur in the markets. The socio-cultural managements of the markets are becoming more and more difficult. In all, what have been mentioned above reflects that the functions of the border markets in Yunnan province have undergone an extremely complex transformation in the modern era and are facing unprecedented opportunities and challenges.

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